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This thesis is a theoretical analysis of organisational identity, community and 
belonging. I use a debate concerning transgender inclusion/exclusion to exemplify 
the identity work of the Council members of Morton Hall, a UK based public 
sector LGB organisation. I draw on a range of queer, feminist and post-structural 
theorists in explicating the processes of dis/identification that I have observed. I 
elucidate the complex, and often contradictory, relationship between gender and 
sexuality by employing discourse/narrative analysis on the transcripts of 
interviews and meetings of the organisation. The reasons given by Council 
members for either including or excluding transgender from the organisation give 
insights into the identity constructions of the individuals themselves, and of the 
organisation as a whole. This is combined with a diverse and distinctive 
theoretical approach which aims to utilise contemporary queer and gender theory 
as well as less obvious thinkers such as Nietzsche, Durkheim, Hegel, Bataille and 
Deleuze and Guattari. Using these theorists I develop the argument that the 
transgression of normative gender codes is central to the creation of a boundary 
between gender and sexuality which instigates the exclusionary practice adopted 
by the organisation at the conclusion of the debate. Whilst the research site 
specifically relates to sexual and gender identity, the theoretical conclusions 
regarding the construction of collective identity and the formation of community 
are widely applicable.
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1In t r o d u c in g  M o r t o n  H a l l
The relationship between the individual and the collective, and the ways in which 
it is structured are, perhaps, some of the oldest preoccupations of sociology and 
philosophy. On the larger levels, this relates to the relationship between the 
individual and society itself - what could be termed the Hobbseian problem of 
order: how are the bonds between people created so that we can exist within 
society, how do people 'belong'? However, the majority of relationships between 
individuals and collectivities are not at the level of society, but rather at the level 
of groups within society, be they based upon ascribed or achieved characteristics. 
Questions of identity, belonging and the self have been a mainstay of social theory 
and research, and it is to this body of work that this thesis contributes.
For many, identity is either un-thought-of, or conversely, hotly contested. 
For most, identity only becomes thought-of when it is questioned; when one’s 
right to live, or behave, in a certain way is challenged. As Bauman argues ‘the 
thought of “having an identity” will not occur to people as long a “belonging” 
remains their fate’ (Bauman 2004: 11-12). Identity is not something natural that 
we can be said to posses; rather it is something that has to be invented,
As a target of an effort, “an objective”; as something one still needs to 
build from scratch or to choose from alternative offers and then to 
struggle for and then to protect through yet more struggle -  though for the 
struggle to be victorious, the truth of the precarious and forever 
incomplete status of identity needs to be, and tends to be, suppressed and 
laboriously covered up (Bauman 2004: 15-16).
This thesis explores some of the struggles for identity of Morton Hall and the 
Executive Committee members, and details the methods employed to suppress the 
‘incomplete status of identity.’ The following chapters illustrate the work and
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effort put into defining gender and sexual identity, and thus the remit of the 
organisation.
In the thesis I utilise a Foucauldian understanding of power; that is ‘power 
must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own 
organisation’ (Foucault 1998: 92). Power is not something that works in a 
hierarchical fashion, acting on more or less passive subjects, rather it is 
relationally constructed. In The History o f Sexuality Foucault asks what the 
questions that should be addressed are; they are not -
Given a specific state structure, how and why is it that power needs to 
establish knowledge of sex? Neither is the question: What over-all 
domination was served by the concern, evidenced since the eighteenth 
century, to produce true discourses on sex? ... It is rather: In a specific 
type of discourse on sex, in a specific form of extortion of truth,
appearing historically and in specific places ... what were the most
immediate, the most local power relations at work? (1998: 97).
Similarly, I am concerned with the local power relations at work in the Executive 
Committee of Morton Hall which have, for a moment, fixed the identity of the 
organisation. Much of the thesis demonstrates that these power relations are 
historically, socially and culturally specific. I am interested in the multiple ways 
in which the various discourses of inclusion and exclusion are constructed.
Moreover, these discourses must not be seen to be divided along the lines of
dominant and dominated, rather there are a multiplicity of discourses that can be 
brought to bear in various contexts. As well as transmitting and producing power, 
discourse ‘also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible 
to thwart it’ (Foucault 1998: 101). Foucault notes the historical confusion 
surrounding sodomy -  that it was both punished brutally and seemingly tolerated, 
given the infrequency of judicial intervention. Such discretion, undermining and 
confusion can be found in the discourses of trans inclusion/exclusion employed by 
Executive Committee members, as the thesis will illustrate.
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This introduction will outline the research setting and provide a brief 
description of Morton Hall, before placing the research in the wider context of 
current work on identity and the self. This chapter will conclude with a precis of 
the proceeding chapters. The setting for my research is Morton Hall, a lesbian, 
gay and bisexual organisation in the UK, and, more specifically, the executive 
body of that organisation - the Executive Committee. Within the Executive 
Committee, the research centres on a debate that occurred, at the time of writing 
(2007), three years ago, concerning whether Morton Hall should widen its remit 
from working for lesbian, gay and bisexual people to include transgender people 
as well: this is referred to throughout the thesis as the trans(gender) 
inclusion/exclusion debate.
The Research Setting
As the methodology chapter outlines in greater detail, the organisation, and those 
within it have been completely anonymised so as to prevent the disclosure of the 
true identity of the organisation and its members. Notwithstanding this, I provide 
here a description of the main purposes and functions of Morton Hall as far as 
these constraints allow. Morton Hall is a relatively new organisation, having been 
formed within the last ten years with the dual purposes of seeking political change 
and of community building. The central aims of Morton Hall are to, first, promote 
the human rights and equal treatment of lesbian, gay and bisexual people and to 
challenge discrimination against such people; second, to consolidate and develop 
the infrastructure within lesbian, gay and bisexual communities and to enable 
them to contribute to and have representation in policy developments; and third, to 
articulate the needs and interests of lesbian, gay and bisexual people and represent 
these to local and national government and other appropriate bodies. These aims 
should be borne in mind throughout the thesis as they have a bearing on the 
decision making process. Chapter 8, in particular, discusses the ways in which 
having both a political and a community aspect to the organisation has proved 
problematic during the trans inclusion/exclusion debate. These aims frame 
Morton Hall as a particular type of LGB organisation; a theme that will be
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developed throughout the thesis. That the organisation explicitly claims to 
represent lesbian, gay and bisexual people raises centrally important questions 
concerning both who is represented and how they are represented; furthermore this 
also raises the, arguably more important, issue of who is not represented by 
Morton Hall. As this thesis sets out, the transgender inclusion/exclusion debate 
illuminates who is represented by the organisation and who is not; in doing so it 
demonstrates the Executive Committee members’ understandings of gender and 
sexual identity.
The Executive Committee is the executive part of the organisation and is 
responsible for setting the agenda of Morton Hall. There are also paid workers, 
including a Director, who carry out the work of the organisation on a day to day 
basis. On top of this there is the wider membership of the organisation which is 
made up of those in the area who wish to have an input into Morton Hall and be 
informed of its activities. The membership are invited to the annual general 
meeting and conference where they are informed of what the organisation has 
done in the past year as well as be invited to suggest ways that the current 
campaigns can be taken forward and new ones developed. The Executive 
Committee is comprised of volunteers who put themselves up for election to the 
Executive Committee at the annual conference. At any one time there are fifteen 
elected Executive Committee members who are elected for a period of three years. 
Each year five members stand down, meaning that (excluding the possibility of 
others resigning) there are five new members each year and ten old members. On 
top of this there is the facility for the Executive Committee to co-opt five (un­
elected) people to the Committee; this may be done, for example, to bring 
someone with particular expertise onto the Executive Committee that was 
otherwise lacking.
The Executive Committee meets five or six times a year, and the function of 
this group is to:
(a) determine high level strategy according to the identified needs of the population 
[within the area covered by Morton Hall]
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(b) Help to identify needs and opportunities
(c) set priorities
(d) Address key strategic issues
(e) Support the Director in delivering the strategic plans
(f) Act as ‘ambassadors’ in relation to communities and/or organisations
(g) Assist in the identification and development of appropriate partnerships
(h) Assist in the identification and development of appropriate resources
(i) To further the development of strategic issues by participating in task groups, 
where appropriate
The Executive Committee is, then, the body that controls the objectives and 
structure of Morton Hall; as the methodology chapter elaborates, this is why I 
focused my research on it, rather than the wider, general, membership of the 
organisation. Further research on the wider membership’s opinion of the outcome 
of the trans inclusion/exclusion debate would be interesting, but fell without the 
time constraints of the thesis.
A Critical Site
Central to this thesis is a desire to engage with, and interrogate ideas, be they 
theoretical or empirical, through the particular research site by analysing the trans 
inclusion and exclusion debate. To this end this thesis is a case study on the 
construction of community and identity using Morton Hall as an exemplar, rather 
than an ethnography of the organisation. The examination of the debate provides 
ways of understanding not only the reasons Executive Committee members 
advocated either inclusion or exclusion, but also the precarious nature of identity 
and belonging. The following chapters, outlined below, demonstrate this 
relationship between the research site, diverse theories and the power/knowledge 
regimes of trans inclusion and exclusion.
Chapter 2 considers the methodological and epistemological considerations 
of the research. The methods of the research, that is, participant observation and 
interviews will be elucidated. Ethical issues surrounding consent and anonymity 
that were raised during the research will be discussed and my solutions to these
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problems presented. Here the relationship between myself, as an active participant 
in the Morton Hall Executive Committee both prior to, and during, the research 
will be discussed, along with some of the problems and benefits this position 
afforded me. This chapter also examines the methods of analysis employed in the 
thesis, namely discourse analysis (broadly defined).
Chapter 3 is the first o f two chapters that seeks to situate the research in 
terms of wider debates concerning transgender and LGB politics and identity. 
Chapter 3 discusses transgender identity and politics and serves to introduce 
several themes concerning this that are centrally important throughout the thesis, 
as well as explaining where my thesis fits into current discussions of transgender 
identity and politics. Central to this chapter is a problematisation of the 
definitions of transgender, transsexual and transvestite used by Morton Hall which 
prefigures several claims made in subsequent chapters. Furthermore this chapter 
demonstrates that ‘transgender’ does not refer to a coherent politics or identity; a 
factor which makes it difficult for an LGB organisation to consider trans inclusion. 
Different versions of transgender politics are discussed and are compared to the 
understanding of transgender politics employed by Morton Hall. The relationship 
between transgender and LGB politics is also considered, enabling comparisons to 
be made with Morton Hall. This is to situate the organisation’s trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate in the context of wider debates on gender and sexual 
identity.
Chapter 4 is the second chapter to discuss the research with regard to wider 
debates, in this case, those concerning LGB politics and identity. This chapter 
situates the trans exclusion/inclusion debate with regard to queer theory and the 
history of gay activism. I map the historical relationship between gender 
transgression and homosexual communities from the eighteenth century to the 
present day, considering previous positions, and how they have changed. The 
purpose of this is to argue that the relationship between cross-gender practices and 
same-sex sexual attraction and LGB identities are both culturally and historically 
constructed and contingent. This demonstrates that there is no finite end to the 
debate in Morton Hall and problematises some of the arguments for exclusion
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deployed in the debate, for example, the contention that (heterosexual) trans 
people know nothing of LGB experience. This chapter introduces several 
conceptual tools that are used throughout the thesis, such as 
minoritising/universalising views of sexual orientation (Sedgwick 1990), and 
Young’s (1997) definition of identity politics. In this chapter the works of Butler 
(1993, 1999, 2004) and Sedgwick (1990) are discussed and compared in detail and 
are used to question the nature of gender and sexuality, and the possibility of 
separating it, or otherwise. The understandings gained from this are used to 
critique transgender exclusion and also raise several themes to be discussed in 
later chapters.
Chapter 5 concerns some of the arguments that were employed to advocate 
trans exclusion, specifically the separation of gender and sexuality. The chapter 
argues that several Executive Committee members were successful at claiming 
that trans issues were about gender, whilst LGB issues were about sexuality, and 
that, furthermore, the two are not related. This rationalisation of gender and 
sexual identity produces an ethnic and essentialist model of identity. I expand 
upon Young’s (1997) work on identity politics and demonstrate that her criteria of 
identity politics are present in Morton Hall. This chapter also considers how 
definitions of transgender were employed in the debate: I contend that whilst most 
Executive Committee members referred to transgender people, they were, more 
properly, referring to transsexual people. This was evidenced by a reliance on 
legislation and organisations that primarily cater to the needs of transsexual, rather 
than transgender persons, such as the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and Press for 
Change. This section of the chapter demonstrates that this legislation and similar 
organisations are specific to transsexuals. This demonstrates that whilst the debate 
was supposed to be about the inclusion or otherwise of transgender it is clear that 
there was confusion as to the meaning of transgender, partly related to the fact 
that, as Chapter 3 argues, there is no stable definition of transgender. The chapter 
also begins the discussion of trans and LGB subjectivity by considering Sartre’s 
(1976) theory of seriality as a mechanism for group formation.
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Chapter 6 considers themes of pollution, danger and fear and begins with a 
discussion of liminality, demonstrating that transgender, as opposed to transsexual 
occupies a marginal and liminal position that is capable of provoking pollution 
behaviour in others. The chapter then goes onto to analyse the different ways in 
which the inclusion of transgender (particularly heterosexual trans people) induced 
fear and is regarded as contagious by several Executive Committee members. The 
ways in which transgender is seen as a dangerous contagion works to strengthen 
the collective identity of Morton Hall is considered. This chapter identifies 
heterosexual transgender people as being definitionally central to Morton Hall. In 
the ways in which such people are positioned by the organisation, one can see 
what is being permitted and what is being denied. I also relate my research to 
other research that has considered the exclusionary practices of gay and lesbian 
organisations. In so doing it becomes clear that although the specific reasons for 
exclusion or inclusion are different for different organisations, the methods are 
similar. As well as arguing that transgender can be seen as a polluting influence 
and as a contagion, this chapter also problematises these arguments and 
demonstrates other ways of thinking about transgender and sexuality that do not 
have recourse to themes of pollution.
The subject of chapter 7 is transgression and it expands upon the 
understandings of transgender gained in the previous chapter as it focuses on the 
transgressive nature of transgender. Several theories of transgression are 
employed to demonstrate how transgression works to define collective identity, 
starting with the Durkheimian (1947) ideas of repressive and restitutive sanctions 
and mechanical and organic solidarity. The trans inclusion/exclusion debate is 
then analysed in terms of dialectics which enables a clear picture of the internal 
and external parts of the debate to become apparent. The chapter then moves to 
consider Nietzsche (1969, 1974 2003a, 2003b) and his relationship to 
transgression, particularly through the death of God and the re-evaluation of 
morals and values. The transgression of transgender is interpreted in Nietzschian 
terms before I consider it in terms of Foucault (1977) and Bataille (2001). Both 
Foucault and Bataille show how the revelation of the limit by the transgression
also reveals and constitutes the centre. This chapter illustrates the liberating 
power of potentially including transgender within the remit of Morton Hall as well 
as the actual hostile reaction to inclusion. This relates back to chapter 3 as I argue 
that it is only a particular model of transgender that has transgressive potential, 
rather than transgender per se.
Chapter 8 concerns some of the theories of Deleuze and Guattari (2004), 
particularly that of rhizomatics. Whereas the focus of preceding chapters has been 
on arguments for exclusion, this chapter is more centred on arguments for trans 
inclusion and employs theories of rhizomatics to understand the differences 
between queer understandings of identity and politics and ethnic/identity 
understandings which argue for inclusion and exclusion respectively. I argue that 
the separation of gender and sexuality and the subsequent rejection of trans 
inclusion can be seen as an example of arborescent logic as it enforces the verb ‘to 
be’ onto gender and sexual identity. On the other hand, the arguments for 
inclusion can be seen as rhizomatic in their reliance on multiplicity and non- 
linearity. I argue that the exclusionary arguments attempt to fix and stabilise 
gender and sexual identity. I also employ Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction 
between maps and tracings, claiming that Morton Hall has chosen to trace sexual 
and gender identity rather than map it, resulting in the exclusion of trans from the 
organisations remit. Furthermore, the notion of becoming minoritiarian is also 
discussed and it is suggested that there is a possible becoming trans of Morton 
Hall.
In the conclusion I bring together the central themes that run through the 
preceding chapters and draw out the implications of the research. I consider the 
more narrow situation of Morton Hall before considering some of the broader 
conclusions to be drawn from the thesis, about, for example, the nature of 
community and the organisational shaping of identity.
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2A s s u m in g  N o t h in g : M e t h o d s  a n d  M e t h o d o l o g y
This chapter will consider the methodology and methods of the research. To this 
end I discuss, first, the methods used for data collection and the reasons for 
employing them; second, the type of analysis carried out on the data; third, the 
ethical consideration of the research; and fourth, the epistemological basis of the 
research.
The introduction contains a brief description of Morton Hall; however, I 
pick out certain factors here that are methodologically relevant. The Executive 
Committee meets five or six times a year for meetings that last between three and 
three and a half hours. In these meetings the policies of Morton Hall are decided. 
This includes the writing of business plans, deciding campaign objectives and 
securing future funding for the organisation. There are usually between fifteen 
and twenty people present at each of the Executive Committee meetings. It is 
these Executive Committee meetings that have provided the basis of my research. 
I recorded the Executive Committee meetings on minidisk and transcribed them as 
soon as possible after the meeting. As well as recording the meetings, I also 
interviewed eight of the Executive Committee members, for between three 
quarters of an hour to one and a half hours. These interviews were transcribed and 
analysed along with the meeting transcripts. See below for a detailed discussion 
of the analysis.
Whilst I have been a participant observer as part of the research, it was not 
of the more traditional sort. First, unlike many other settings for participant 
observation or ethnography, such as a school or community, it was impossible to 
spend an extended amount of time carrying out the observation. As already stated, 
the Executive Committee only comes together a maximum of six times a year, 
making sustained immersion in it impossible. Nor do the Executive Committee 
members necessarily see each other in the periods between the meetings, although
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they may do, either because of friendship or on the business of the organisation. 
This meant that my periods of observation were limited to those times at which the 
Executive Committee met as a whole; that is, at Executive Committee meetings, 
and the annual conference. If one wanted to do a prolonged study of the 
organisation, one would have to focus primarily on the activities of the paid 
workers and director. Whilst this would most likely produce some good data it 
would not have been of particular relevance to my research. This is because it is 
the Executive Committee which decides what the Director and other paid workers 
should be doing on a broad level. Therefore the Executive Committee meetings 
are the site of the high level decision making processes of Morton Hall. 
Furthermore, my primary interest in the transgender inclusion/exclusion debate 
meant that the most pertinent data would come from the discussion of the future 
policy of the organisation, rather than the implementation of that policy. Also, 
any implementation of the policy, whilst obviously relevant, fell without the time 
period of my research.
Although it remained with the same general aim of exploring lesbian, gay 
and bisexual identity, the focal point of my thesis altered during the period I was 
in the field (April 2004-5). My original intention was to explore how Morton Hall 
operated as an identity politics organisation in a time when such organisations and 
ways of thinking have been heavily criticised by both queer and feminist theories. 
This decision was made before I had any knowledge that Morton Hall would be 
debating the inclusion or otherwise of transgender in the organisation. It was at 
the first meeting that I attended and recorded for the purpose of research that the 
issue of transgender inclusion/exclusion was raised. During the debate in that 
meeting I quickly realised that this issue would provide an excellent way of 
understanding the identity constructions of the Executive Committee members. 
Therefore I decided to concentrate on this debate in order to analyse the Executive 
Committee members’ perspectives on gender and sexual identity.
Using Gold’s (1969) continuum for defining observer-observed relations, 
my position occupies the area between complete participant and participant as 
observer. Consentaneous with the former I was engaged fully as a member in the
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activities of Morton Hall, however, my role as a researcher was overt, as in the 
latter, but I had more involvement in the activities than Gold’s participant as 
observer. My involvement with Morton Hall did not begin with the research as I 
was elected onto the Executive Committee two years prior to beginning my 
fieldwork, therefore I was undertaking research with an organisation that I was 
already a member of. My personal involvement with the research subject is 
elaborated upon, below.
Interviews and Participant Observation
It is probably true that there are as many theoretical opinions on interviewing and 
participant observation as there are practitioners of these methods. One’s 
epistemology and ontology are deeply entwined in one’s choice and practice of a 
particular method. Kvale (1996) has conceptualised two types of interviewer- 
knowledge production, that of the miner and a traveller. In the former ‘knowledge 
is understood as buried metal and the interviewer is a miner who unearths the 
valuable metal’ (1996: 3), whilst the latter sees the ‘interviewer as a traveller on a 
journey that leads to a tale to be told on return’ (1996: 4). These lead to two very 
different types of interview. Working in a largely queer framework (Jagose 1996, 
Seidman 1996) I see myself as a traveller. I do not believe that there is some 
abstract notion of ‘truth’ that I could capture in my research. Rather I got the 
participants multiple perceptions of their lives and identities. This is true for both 
interviews and participant observation. This was not Becker and Geer’s view of 
participant observation (1970a, 1970b). They tended to the view that participant 
observation is a gold standard against which other methods, including interviews 
could be measured, as ‘a model which can serve to let us know what orders of 
information escape us when we use other methods’ (1970a: 133). This is 
reminiscent of the positivist orthodoxy whereby asking the right questions and 
seeing the right things will give the ‘correct’ answers. Becker and Geer also claim 
that ‘participant observation makes it possible to check description against fact, 
noting discrepancies [and] become aware of systematic distortions made by the 
person under study’ (1970a: 139). Becker and Geer here present an unproblematic
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idea of ‘fact’, however the researcher in the seventh moment of qualitative 
research (Denzin & Lincoln 2000) is in no position to lay claim to indisputable 
facts. If, for example, I noticed a difference in what I saw someone say in an 
Executive Committee meeting and an interview setting I would want to find the 
reasons for this difference, for instance, was there some political expediency 
which called for the discrepancy, but would not place a value judgement upon it.
Contra Becker and Geer, ‘interviews generate accounts and narrative that 
are forms of social action in their own right’ (Atkinson and Coffey 2002: 810). A 
narrative account of an event is constructed in discourse in interviews in a manner 
that is just as meaningful as observing that event.
Doing participant observation on Morton Hall was different from 
observing, for example, a definable subculture within which it is possible to live 
since, as stated above, there are only five/six Executive Committee meetings each 
year, and the members are not situated in the same locale. This makes sustained 
immersion in the group impossible. Therefore of necessity observation times are 
largely predefined. Consequently I have also used interviews. Taking heed of 
Spradley (1979) there are differing question styles to give differing levels of 
information. The use of these skills enabled me to build up information on the 
participants’ ideas on what it means to identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or indeed 
straight. The interviews were semi-structured; that is I had certain topics I wished 
to cover, but my interview schedule was not prescriptive. The questions asked 
were generally open ended and allowed the interviewee to talk about whatever 
they wanted in their response. For example I asked ‘why do you think that some 
Executive Committee members objected so strongly to including transvestites’, 
rather than ‘do you think some Executive Committee members object to the 
inclusion of transvestites because of X, Y or Z ’. This also meant that I was trying 
not to lead the interviewee in any particular way. Because the interview schedule 
was not prescriptive I was also able to ask follow-up questions to clarify and 
expand upon what the interviewees said. This made the interviews into more of a 
conversation that simply a series of questions and answers.
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The epistemology of the interview is also a subject of debate. The type of 
interview I employed, and how I have interpreted them have implications on the 
research. If I were to take the approach of the ‘miner’ I would be following a 
route totally incompatible with the poststructural sensibilities of the queer theory I 
am trying to interrogate. Against this positivist approach lays the postpositivism 
of those such as Mishler (1986). Mishler appears to put great emphasis on having 
a ‘carefully prepared transcript’ (1986: 50) as the only way interviews can produce 
valid data. This is still a predominantly modernist project, ‘particularly the 
assumption that there is a ‘reality’ out there that the research can accurately 
capture or represent, given the use of improved research methods’ (Scheurich 
1997: 66). Such a method does not sit well with queer theory, which ‘houses the 
analytic tools used to examine what is “normal” and “abnormal”, primarily 
through deconstructing issues of that sexuality in society’ (Dilley: 1999: 469). 
Furthermore Mishler’s paternalistic idea of empowerment is problematic. Whilst 
he correctly states that there are power inequalities within the interview context he 
relies on the goodwill of the interviewer to ‘encourage the [interviewees] to find 
and speak in their own “voices’” (Mishler 1986: 118). Here the researcher 
remains in a position of control over the interview, and ultimately of the meaning 
s/he attributes to the respondent’s ‘voices.’ A queer interview is one that realises 
that ‘there is no stable “reality” or “meaning” that can be represented’ (Scheurich 
1997: 73) rather meaning is created by the interaction between researcher and 
researched, and that an ‘interviewee’s subjectivity is locally produced sequentially 
in and through talk’ (Rapley 2001: 307 original emphasis).
As my research is partly to investigate some of the major theories of queer, 
for example those of Butler (1999) and Sedgwick (1990), my methods need to 
take account of their being the basis for theory. This is in response to their being 
possible ‘theoretical capitalists,’ ‘engaging in pure speculation’ (Seale 1999: 99). 
Although I could use a hypothetico-deductive method to validate or refute these 
theories, I believe a more inductive, grounded approach is preferable. Part of the 
claim to grounded knowledge lies in the fact that ‘practitioners [of participant 
observation] shun what is known as the a priori ... preferring the a posteriori’
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(May 2002: 148). I therefore observed Executive Committee members at work 
(including myself) and saw how they managed multiple identities, which has 
enabled me to come to some theoretical conclusions regarding the nature of 
gender and sexual identity construction. I would argue that this is the case with 
interviews as well, if they are carried out in the appropriate way, although it might 
be harder than using participant observation as I could be bringing my prejudices 
about queer theory to the interview in a more explicit and overt way than in 
observation. The implications of using participant observation or interviewing in 
my research to create some sort of inductive theory are largely the same, as it is 
the analysis of the data that is central, rather than the collection, as shown by the 
fact that ‘quantitative ... data can ... be incorporated into a grounded theory 
approach’ (Seale 1999:102). The analysis needs to take account of the fact that 
there are multiple theories that could come out of the research, not one ‘true’ one. 
It is ‘flexibility and the discovery of meaning rather than standardisation, or a 
concern to compare through constraining replies by a set interview schedule, [that] 
characterise this method’ (May 2001: 125 original emphasis). This is central to 
my research; I am concentrating on the meanings, feelings and emotions attached 
to identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender. Also in using interviews 
one is able to reflect upon what the interviewee says, to clarify a point, or to 
elaborate a new topic that was raised. This was particularly important for me, 
because whilst I had some ideas as to the construction of collective identity, I 
certainly did not know them all. I expected to be told things not previously 
considered. An interview is the best method for finding out certain information, as 
it is unlikely that what are often personal identity-meanings would come to surface 
in participant observation, especially as that method was limited for me. 
Notwithstanding this, several people did reveal highly personal information in the 
Executive Committee meetings whilst debating trans inclusion/exclusion, as will 
become apparent in the following chapters. I think that this was because the topic 
is a very sensitive and personal one that can produce emotive responses that have 
a reliance on personal experience. Furthermore, in interviews I have discussed the
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trans inclusion/exclusion debate with the research participants. This has given me 
multiple understandings of the debate.
Using a combination of interviews and participant observation has been 
beneficial for my research as interviews can ‘illuminate the researchers’ 
understandings and provide information which is simply not available through 
observation’ (May 2001:129). In my case all of my observation has been of the 
formal arena of the Executive Committee meetings, which is obviously 
constrained by the agenda and the Chair; resultantly information about people’s 
personal lives and experiences will, in the majority of cases, only be available 
from interviews.
The management of myself as a reflexive self is of great importance as ‘the 
accomplishment of fieldwork is not a passive activity. We actively engage in 
identity construction and recasting’ (Coffey 1999: 26). I would argue that this is 
particularly true if you are researching an identity that you share. Whatever my 
methods there are issues about my own identity. To this extent, I shall be writing 
some form of autoethnography, if only by virtue of the fact that I was already a 
part of Morton Hall prior to beginning the research, and have analysed my own 
input into the trans inclusion/exclusion debate. However, there are some who 
argue that this deep personal engagement/relationship with the researched group is 
disadvantageous, for example Gans argues that ‘once researchers fail to distance 
themselves from the people they are studying, ...the rules of qualitative reliability 
and validity are sidestepped, reducing the likelihood that sociologists and their 
work will not be trusted by their readers’ (1999: 542-3). Whilst perhaps this was 
the case in the past, I believe that the recent theoretical developments of feminism, 
postmodernism, poststructuralism and queer have changed the ‘rules of qualitative 
reliability and validity.’ Furthermore, concurring with Coffey that ‘an emphasis 
on the autobiographical side of fieldwork and ethnographic writing can be a 
productive way of encapsulating ethnography’ (1999: 126), I would claim that to 
deny my personal relationship with the subject of my research would be harmful 
to it as my own identity is entwined with my ideas of, and interpretations of queer 
theory. Schwable (1996) gives an account of how his own biography interacts
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with the stories of his participants. He says that ‘my experience in the 
psychodrama convinced me. If my feelings were real, so were those of the other 
men’ (1996: 63). This illustrates that an ‘engaged’ researcher can get more 
information than a purely objective one. Furthermore, Denzin claims that ‘those 
who write culture using reflexive interviews are learning to use language in a way 
that brings people together’ (2001: 24). This seems eminently suited to queer 
theory, as part of queer is breaking down the binary nature of Western thought, 
especially dualisms as they are constructed in language. Moreover, as an active 
participant in the debate I was part of the researched group, as well as the 
researcher. In doing my analysis I have tried to treat my interventions in exactly 
the same way that I would treat them if spoken by another person.
Issues of Consent
The main ethical problem during my thesis was that of negotiating the consent of 
the Executive Committee members to undertake and write up the research. Before 
I started to record the meetings I emailed all the Executive Committee members a 
letter detailing my research and stating that I would be using extracts from the 
transcripts of the meetings in my thesis and future work. I gave everybody the 
opportunity to reply to me if they wanted to discuss this further or to refuse to be 
part of the study. I also emailed this letter to the newly elected Executive 
Committee members who joined the Executive Committee after the first meeting 
which I recorded.
Some months later I presented a paper on Morton Hall as part of a seminar 
series at another university. At this point I had used pseudonyms for the 
Executive Committee members, but had not anonymised the organisation itself. 
Through a fairly tortuous route, my paper found its way back to two Executive 
Committee members who claimed that their consent for my research had not been 
obtained. In response to the first person who complained to me, I apologised 
profusely, explained why I thought that consent had been obtained, and, in 
accordance with their wishes, assured them that I would not use anything they had 
said in my thesis or in any further published work. Having thought that the
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problem had been solved, I then received another complaint from another 
Executive Committee member threatening me with the Data Protection Act and 
the (non-existent) Confidentiality Act. At this point the matter was passed on to 
the university’s Data Protection Officer, who, in conjunction with my supervisors 
met the Executive Committee members who had complained, to resolve the 
situation.
The problems resulted from the fact that although I had emailed all the 
Executive Committee members asking for their consent for me to conduct the 
research I had not asked them to confirm their consent to me, rather I asked them 
to contact me if they had a problem with me conducting the research. Those who 
claimed that I had not sought consent had either not read, or not received, my 
emails. There were approximately three people in this position. At this point I 
was fortunate that the Director of Morton Hall, as well as several other Executive 
Committee members were supportive of both me and my work. To remedy the 
situation, and prevent any future confusion I wrote again, by post, to all Executive 
Committee members asking them to return a signed consent form stating whether 
they were happy for me to use their words in my thesis and subsequent 
publications, or not. In the end there were four people who withdrew from my 
research, whilst the remainder were happy for me to use their words in my work. 
With the ever-useful benefit of hindsight, it is clear that when securing consent in 
the first place, I should have sought written confirmation, which would have 
removed this problem.
At this point I also took the decision to completely anonymise the data. As 
stated previously, I had used pseudonyms for the Executive Committee members, 
but had left the identity of the organisation intact. However, I decided to 
anonymise the organisation as well. This involved not only changing the name, 
but also removing anything that could identify the organisation, such as references 
to particular locations, individuals, other LGB(T) groups and local authorities. 
Furthermore, as will become apparent throughout the thesis, the pseudonyms that I 
have chosen for the Executive Committee members are all gender neutral, that is 
they can be both women’s and men’s names. Although I have chosen to refer to
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individuals as ‘he’ or ‘she’ rather than using any of the gender neutral pronouns 
available (this is purely for stylistic reasons), this should not be taken to signify 
the gender of the individual. This was done so that it should be almost impossible 
to identify a speaker from the data available in the thesis. This high level of 
anonymisation has meant that there are certain themes in the data that I have not 
been able to raise because it would go some of, or all, the way to revealing the 
identity of the organisation and possibly thereby identify individuals. However, 
this has not been a significant problem given that the focus of the thesis is on the 
transgender inclusion/exclusion debate which has not required situating Morton 
Hall in any particular area.
After this I also attended one of the Executive Committee meetings (by 
this time I was no longer an Executive Committee member myself) to discuss my 
research. At this point I officially apologised for the problems over consent and 
assured everybody that my work would be as anonymised as is possible. I 
furthermore gave my assurance that those who had withdrawn their consent would 
not be used in the research, or any future work. I also gave an assurance that I 
would only be concerned with the transgender debate and that I would not be 
concerned with the other business of the organisation.
I cannot comment in great detail about the motivations of those who 
withdrew their consent, partly though fear of revealing their identities, which I 
have no desire to do. However, I do believe that the issue was wider than simply 
that of consent. In the Executive Committee meetings, as will become apparent in 
chapter 8, I advocated strongly for widening the remit of Morton Hall to include 
trans people. Further, my method of analysis is one that deconstructs the debate in 
a way that can be challenging. I do not think it is a coincidence that the Executive 
Committee members who raised the issue of consent were individuals who were 
arguing forcefully for the exclusion of transgender in the Executive Committee 
meetings. I suspect that, had I been supportive of their political position, either the 
issue of consent would not have been raised, or if it was that it would have been 
resolved more amicably and without the threat of legal action.
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This demonstrates some of the problems of researching a group of which 
you are an active participant. First, if I was a researcher entering the organisation 
solely as a researcher then there could have been no doubt that someone was 
researching Morton Hall. As it was, the only difference between before and after I 
started fieldwork was the presence of a minidisk recorder in front of me, which 
will not necessarily be noticed by other Executive Committee members. Second, 
the situation was made more complex because the focus of the research was a 
debate with strong views on both sides. I was not researching an organisation that 
had shared beliefs on the subject. Therefore, arguably, whichever side of the 
debate I personally sided with there could have been the potential for problems. 
Ironically, this demonstrates the importance of the research topic; the very reasons 
that this was such a sensitive and emotive research topic, from which some people 
withdrew, are the same reasons that the trans inclusion/exclusion debate has been 
so illuminating in explicating the identity beliefs and practices of the Executive 
Committee members and Morton Hall as an organisation. Third, my participation 
in what was a politically and emotionally charged debate presented problems for 
some people. It is easy to understand that someone may be concerned about how 
they will be represented by someone with opposing political views. I made every 
attempt that every point I make in the analysis can be backed up by evidence from 
either the Executive Committee meetings or interviews, however, this was not felt 
to be the case by some of those who withdrew consent. However, my active 
participation in Morton Hall had a fourth, beneficial impact. Were I an ‘outside’ 
researcher the argument could have been made that I was not supportive of the 
organisation and that I was trying to destroy its credibility; this could have led to 
the organisation as a whole withdrawing their support for the research. However, 
my active participation in the activities of Morton Hall was cited as evidence that I 
was supportive of the aims of the organisation and that I was not trying to discredit 
it.
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Epistemology
I now turn to a discussion of the epistemological foundations of the research. I 
compare standpoint and queer/poststructural approaches given that they are 
probably the two most common epistemologies in gender and sexuality studies. I 
also consider what an ethnomethodological perspective can bring to the study.
The argument of feminist standpoint epistemology is that ‘there is a 
distinctive perspective or reality which pertains to feminists or to women’ 
(Tanesini 1999: 138). According to this perspective, it is possible for (only) 
women to speak from the oppressed position of womanhood, which is not only 
different to a masculine account, but is privileged over it. This can be seen as a 
rejection of the foundational claim to universal knowledge, as having a standpoint 
places a value on subjective experience. Cartesian dualisms are also questioned in 
this account because being and knowing are conflated, in contrast to the traditional 
separation of mind and body. ‘Consequently, knowledge produced from an 
acknowledged subjective standpoint is less distorted than knowledge that does not 
reveal its partialities’ (Webb 2000: 41). Feminists have also criticised the 
disengagement of malestream research; the belief that the researcher and 
researched can remain separate, thereby obtaining ‘objective’ data. It is a fallacy 
to contend that one’s self can remain immune from the research process, as 
‘researchers should be aware of the ways in which their own biography is a 
fundamental part of the research process’ (May 2001: 21). Similarly, a gay 
standpoint epistemology would argue that there is a distinctive perspective on 
reality that pertains to gay people.
Using such a gay standpoint epistemology I could claim that as a bisexual 
man, writing on issues of LGBT identity, that my understanding would be 
privileged over those of heterosexual researcher. I could construct an argument 
that because I am both bisexual and a former member of the organisation studied 
that my biography was inextricably connected to the research project. 
Furthermore, I could argue that in order to research the LGB ‘community’ one 
needs to have a certain amount of what could be termed subcultural capital in 
order to fully comprehend the knowledges, practices and believes of lesbian, gay,
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bisexual and transgender people. Such a position is, however, largely untenable, 
particularly given my theoretical positioning. Whilst it is possible that a gay and 
straight researcher may well have different findings, this is not to say that the 
differences are because of the sexuality of the researcher. My perspective should 
not be privileged, or seen as more objective, simply because I happen to share an 
identity with those I am researching. Furthermore, Tanessini claims with regard to 
feminist standpoint epistemology that ‘to claim that there is a unique cognitive 
style or set of experiences which pertain to women seems to presuppose that 
women have essential features and to ignore the many important differences 
between women’ (1999: 45). Moreover, my analysis of the trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate centres on problematising the definitions of gender and 
sexual identity by, for example, claiming that there is nothing about having an 
LGB identity that makes one particularly suited to joining an LGB lobbying 
organisation. Therefore, it would not make sense for me to claim a standpoint 
epistemology because it would go against my ontology. For this reason I now turn 
to a discussion of queer epistemology and consider how it was productively 
employed in my research.
Whilst feminist epistemology tends only to look at male/female inequality 
in the sex/gender system, ‘queer theory is ... an analysis of the hetero/homosexual 
figure as a power/knowledge regime that shapes the ordering of desires, 
behaviours, and social institutions, and social relations’ (Seidman 1995: 128), and 
does not see the hetero/homo binary as distinct from male/female. Central to 
queer theory is a belief that ‘the original identity after which gender fashions itself 
is an imitation without an origin’ (Butler 1999: 175). Dilley has claimed that there 
are three main tenets of queer research that are transdisciplinary, the primary one 
being an ‘examination of the lives and experiences of those considered non- 
heterosexual’ (Dilley 1999: 462). This chapter is not the place for a lengthy 
exposition of queer theory, as that is the task of a later chapter (4). For the 
purpose of this current chapter it is sufficient to note that queer is a way of looking 
at gay/straight and male/female binaries that attempts to deconstruct them. Under
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this, the very definitions of gender and sexual identity are problematised and 
recognised as contested and contingent.
Postmodern and poststructural notions of performance and the self 
immanent in queer entail a more detailed analysis of the construction of LGB(T) 
identities, whilst simultaneously sustaining a critique of heteronormativity. The 
Foucaultian elements of queer also allow an analysis of power/knowledge regimes 
as they operate both on and inside LGB ‘communities’ and individuals.
Importantly for my research, although queer recognises that an individual’s 
identities are multiple and unstable, this does not, as some (Jeffreys 1994; Kirsch 
2000; Spargo 2000) claim, make collective identity formation unviable under 
queer schematics, as chapter 4 argues. For example, Young (1997) has used Jean- 
Paul Sartre’s idea of seriality (1976) to argue for a contingent group identity. 
Epistemologically speaking ‘researchers who choose a standpoint of queer theory 
choose to contrast it with the metanarrative of compulsory heterosexuality’ (King 
1999: 487). In keeping with other post-foundational and post-modern 
epistemologies, queer is a belief that the ‘grand narrative has lost its credibility’ 
(Lyotard 1984: 37), however, it also ‘houses the analytic tools used to examine 
what is “normal” and “abnormal,” primarily though deconstructing issues of 
sexuality in society’ (Dilley 1999:469).
Queer is, then, an epistemic perspective that allows a sustained and radical 
critique of gender and sexuality without recourse to the pitfalls of a standpoint 
epistemology. The ‘analytic tools’ of queer theory enable the deconstruction of 
the Morton Hall Executive Committee members, which allows a thoroughgoing 
analysis of the identity constructions of the organisation.
Lastly I consider the implications of using participant observation and 
interviews to work with queer theory. This is important as many of the key tenets 
of queer are central to this research, such as gender being an imitation of an 
imitation without origin (Butler 1999) and that ‘knowledge is not “discovered” by 
an academic sleuth who pretends to be an archaeologist uncovering pre-existing 
facts’ (Tiemey 1999: 451). This affects the methods I would use, and 
furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, affects how I would use those
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methods. Talburt claims that ‘if  taken seriously, a queer project would shift 
ethnography’s purposes from representation of gay and lesbian subjects and 
experiences to analyses of practices as they are constructed in social and 
institutional locations’ (1999: 526). The purpose of my research is not to 
document or represent lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender subjects as other, or as 
exotic, for example. Rather it is to attempt to explicate and explore the individual 
and institutional practices of LGB(T) people. The focus is on the as-it-occurs 
interactional methods that Executive Committee members employ in constructing 
a valid and practical identity. For this reason I now turn to a discussion of 
ethnomethodology and what that perspective brings to the study.
Ethnomethodology seeks to understand the ways in which people make 
sense of the world around them. Furthermore, because of its phenomenological 
roots, ethnomethodology also can be used to question the foundations of everyday 
life. These aspects made ethnomethodology particularly suited to my research as I 
was attempting to discover the means by which Executive Committee members 
make sense of their, and others, gender and sexual identity. Furthermore, 
ethnomethodology can provide a greater understanding of the ways in which 
people use categories to make sense of everyday life than some other branches of 
sociology. On this subject, Durkheim argued that;
The sociologist ... must emancipate himself from the fallacious ideas that 
dominate the mind of the layman; he must throw off, once and for all, the 
yoke of those empirical categories, which from long continued habit have 
become tyrannical. At the very least, if at times he is obliged to resort to 
them, he ought to do so fully conscious of their trifling value, so that he 
will not assign to them a role out of proportion to their real importance 
(1966: 32).
However, the sense of these empirical categories remains important and is 
dependant on their use in everyday language. It is axiomatic that people, both 
sociologists and lay people, use categories to describe, understand and define 
everyday life. Moreover, sociologists’ understandings of categories are dependant
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upon their use by members of society, and it is often assumed that these categories 
are visible and identifiable. ‘It is their seeability, their describability, their 
detectability which is of interest to ethnomethodology. ... And, more generally, 
how are identifications and categorisations done and how do they contribute to the 
construction of the social order?’ (Benson & Hughes 1983: 6). These concerns are 
of fundamental importance for this research project; the categorisation of gender 
and sexuality and its relation to the order of Morton Hall is central to my work.
The phenomenological foundations of ethnomethodology also provided an 
excellent basis for a sustained critique of the identity work of Morton Hall 
Executive Committee members. The phenomenology of Husserl is deeply 
sceptical of any notion of truth, and takes up Descartes’ quest for certainty. 
Descartes sought to ‘accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognise to be 
so’ (Descartes 1997: 82). He however ‘noticed that whilst I thus wised to think all 
things false it was absolutely essential that the ‘I’ who thought this should be 
somewhat, and that this truth ‘I  think therefore I  am' was so certain and so assured 
that ... I came to the conclusion that I could receive it without scruple as the first 
principle of the philosophy for which I was seeking’ (Descartes 1997: 92 original 
emphasis). Similarly, in the phenomenological tradition one cannot accept 
anything as a given, rather one has to ‘establish where the certainties lie and one 
must therefore withdraw allegiance from all suppositions that one can abandon’ 
(Sharrock & Anderson 1986: 7 original emphasis). Having set aside any 
previously held assumptions about the world, ‘phenomenological description aims 
to make explicit essential features implicit in the ‘lived-world’ -  the world as we 
act in it prior to any theorising about it. The phenomenological method reveals 
that practical knowledge is prior to propositional knowledge -  knowing that arises 
from knowing how' (Howarth 2000: 671 original emphasis). It should be 
recognised, however, that the end point of phenomenology is not Cartesian 
deductionism, but rather, ‘the phenomenological exercise is done in the name of 
clarification, in pursuit of (among other things) a clearer conception of how 
theories relate to the world as we experience it’ (Sharrock & Anderson 1986: 8).
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It is primarily this refusal to take anything for granted that I take from 
ethnomethodology. This allows a rigorous and thoroughgoing analysis of the 
identity practices of the Morton Hall. What I am concerned with are the methods 
employed by the Executive Committee members to define and categorise gender 
and sexual identity, without recourse to any preconceived notions of how this is 
done.
Analytical Methodology
The tapes of the Executive Committee meetings and interviews were transcribed 
so that the transcripts could be analysed. The transcription noted long pauses (of 
which there were very few) and overlaps and interruptions in the talking. I chose 
not to use a highly technical method of transcription such as that employed by 
conversation analysis. This decision was made on the basis of what I wanted to 
use the transcripts for; that is, I was interested more in the actual arguments of 
Executive Committee members than the details of how they made them on a 
linguistic level. For example, I am not interested in the ways in which the turns at 
talk are managed in the institutional setting of an executive level meeting. This is 
not to say that I am uninterested in the rhetorical devices and flourishes that 
Executive Committee members have used to help sway the debate, but rather to 
say that using a conversation analysis transcription style would tend to eclipse the 
actual contents of the debate. For example, in his analysis of political speeches 
Atkinson (1988) is concerned not with the political content of the speeches but 
with the techniques used by the speakers, such as contrastive pairs and lists of 
three. My primary concern is with what is said rather than how it is said. This, 
however, does not prevent me from analysing the ways in which Executive 
Committee members make particular moves to further their aims in the debate. 
Notwithstanding this, my analysis remains based upon a highly detailed textual 
study of the debate. To this end, ‘like many other qualitative approaches, textual 
analysis depends upon very detailed data analysis. To make such analysis 
effective, it is imperative that you have a limited body of data with which to work
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... Having chosen your dataset, you should limit your material further by taking 
only a few texts or parts of texts’ (Silverman 2000: 828-829). This is what I have 
done. The Executive Committee meetings I attended lasted between three and 
three and a half hours, but the duration of the discussion of trans 
inclusion/exclusion in the meetings was much shorter, the rest of the meetings 
being taken up with other business of Morton Hall. To subject the entirety of the 
transcripts to a detailed textual study would have resulted in a body of work far 
exceeding the quantity required for this thesis. Moreover, I identified the trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate as the sections of the Executive Committee meetings 
that would provide me with the most useful data for my purposes. However, 
whilst it was only the sections relevant to trans inclusion/exclusion that were 
analysed in detail, the remainder of the transcripts provided contextualisation and 
situated the debate within the broader work and business of the organisation.
After the transcription of the interviews and Executive Committee 
meetings the transcripts were, for want of a better word, coded. This however, 
was not coding o f the mechanistic sort. In reading and re-reading the transcripts I 
attempted to identify the particular ways in which Executive Committee members 
advocated either for or against transgender inclusion. For example, it became 
apparent very early on in the research that several Executive Committee members, 
in arguing for exclusion, where drawing a distinction between gender and 
sexuality; this therefore became something that I looked for in the other interviews 
and meetings. Other themes were also identified fairly early on in the research, 
such as the reaction of some Executive Committee members to the possible 
inclusion of heterosexual trans people in the organisation. This raised theoretical 
issues surrounding pollution and fear (discussed in chapter 6) which I sought to 
develop. This led me to think about the importance of transgression in the debate, 
so in re-reading the transcripts I began to look for situations where issues of 
transgression were relevant to the debate. Moreover, I did not wait until all the 
data had been collected before I began the analysis. After the first Executive 
Committee meeting I recorded I started the analysis immediately. I worked my 
way through the section of the meeting pertinent to trans inclusion/exclusion as a
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whole. In doing so I drew out several key themes that are central to the thesis; this 
gave me something to build upon when analysing the remaining transcripts. This 
first analysis is not present in its original form in the thesis; rather sections of it 
represent the basis of the subsequent chapters.
In the methods literature, coding is usually paired with retrieving, implying 
that all sections of the data with a particular code are disaggregated from the 
whole to be retrieved when the time comes for writing up that particular code or 
theme:
This essentially means that recontextualised data needs to be displayed in 
such a way that they can be read easily. The data bits that relate to a 
particular code or category need to be presented together in order for the 
researcher to explore the composition of each coded set. ... This can be 
achieved by organising all the data under a particular code physically in 
the same place; by producing diagrams, matrices, and maps of the code; 
or by using a retrieval function on a microcomputing program (Coffey & 
Atkinson 1996: 46).
I felt that this would be inappropriate because it would lead to the 
decontextualisation of the data. Writing specifically about conversation analysis, 
but applicable to discourse analysis more generally, Silverman notes that one 
should ‘look for particular outcomes in the talk (e.g., a request for clarification, a 
repair, laughter) and work backwards to trace the trajectory through which a 
particular outcome was produced,’ and that one should not be ‘trying to make 
sense of a single line of transcript or utterance in isolation from the surrounding 
talk’ (1998 cited in Silverman 2000: 831). Were I to have looked at all the 
instances in which, for example, an Executive Committee member exhibited 
pollution behaviour regarding transgender (see chapter 6) in isolation I would have 
lost sight of the context of that behaviour. Further, removing and reordering 
coded sections of the data from the whole would have made it very difficult to 
trace the development of the debate as the chronology would be lost. Instead, 
each line of the transcripts were numbered allowing me to note down the precise
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location of each theme in the transcripts. This meant that when doing the analysis 
I could easily find the sections of the data I wanted and see them in the context of 
the debate. Therefore I was able to see what lead into, and came out of, any 
particular section of the data in a manner that would have been more difficult had 
the coded data been put somewhere for retrieval. Further, several extracts from 
the meeting and interview transcripts are relevant to more than one theme. It is for 
this reason that there are some extracts that appear in more than one chapter, as 
they are being analysed on several levels.
One of my methods of analysis is to look at the language games that the 
Executive Committee members play and a study of their ‘moves’ (Lyotard 1984). 
Language games are predicated on a belief that social relations are agonistic. As 
Latimer (2004:759) argues ‘this position presumes that under some circumstances 
it is not enough just to express a position; rather in order to settle matters social 
actors are called upon to be persuasive.’ This was particularly evident in the 
discussions in Executive Committee meetings, especially the transgender 
inclusion/exclusion debate as Executive Committee members tended to occupy 
polarised positions. In this situation the actors voice their opinions in a series of 
moves that attempt to persuade others, often by invoking shared understandings 
and with recourse to materials (such as business plans or terms of reference). 
Counter-move on counter-move then follows until an acceptable conclusion is 
reached.
Lyotard notes that in language games there are rules which ‘are the object 
of a contract, explicit or not, between players’ (1984: 10). These rules define the 
game and altering a rule alters the game and moreover ‘a “move” or utterance that 
does not satisfy the rules does not belong to the game they defines’ (1984: 10). It 
will become clear that there are rules that define the trans inclusion/exclusion 
debate in Morton Hall; for example, it would be outside the rules to express 
transphobic opinions or prejudice when arguing for exclusion -  such a move 
would not belong to the game in hand.
Regarding counter-moves Lyotard writes, ‘each language partner, when a 
“move” pertaining to him is made, undergoes a “displacement”, and alteration of
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some kind that not only affects him in his capacity as addressee and referent, but 
also as sender’ (1984: 16). In the analysis in the foregoing chapter it will become 
apparent how the Executive Committee members are displaced, and that some 
displacements are more effective than others. Lyotard also notes that conversation 
is different to institutional talk in that institutions all have their own discursive 
frameworks in which the language games take place, however, he also argues that 
‘the limits the institution imposes on potential language “moves” are never 
established once and for all’ (1984: 17). Furthermore, these limits are the results 
of previous language games and these limits are only coherent when they are no 
longer part of the game. This is particularly evident with regard to the trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate in Morton Hall. The ad hoc inclusion of trans was the 
limit of previous language games; however, these boundaries are now themselves 
being moved and will only become stable when all the moves in the 
inclusion/exclusion debate have been made.
I now turn to a discussion of the relationship between my data, analysis 
and theory. Coffey and Atkinson claim that ‘we do not use the literature in order 
to provide ready-made concepts and models. Rather, we use ideas in the literature 
in order to develop perspectives on our own data, drawing out comparisons, 
analogies, and metaphors’ (1996: 110). This is however, only one side of the coin; 
the other being the use of ideas in the data and analysis to develop perspectives on 
the literature. To a large extent I have viewed the data through the lens of queer 
theory; that is, a belief that gender and sexuality are both connected and 
constructed. (This should not be taken to imply that I have attempted to ‘force’ 
the data to fit with queer theory.) This has allowed me to identify those accounts 
which are consentaneous with queer, as well as those which are not. This, 
however, was only the first stage in my theorising. As stated in the introduction 
one of my main aims in this thesis is to discover ways in which some Executive 
Committee members are operating in an identity politics mode and how they 
conceptualise collective sexual and gender identity. It is not enough, therefore, 
merely to identify the accounts that were at variance, or otherwise, with queer 
theory, rather a more sophisticated analysis needed to be built up which was
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capable of explaining the Executive Committee members understanding of 
identity. This necessitated a move away from queer theory because whilst it 
critiques identity politics and essentialist identities, it is inadequate for theorising 
the creation and sustenance of an identity politics organisation. At this point 
however, two defining themes in the research became apparent; those of pollution 
and transgression. Therefore I decided to bring various theories on pollution and 
transgression to bear on the data. This was not in an attempt to get the trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate to fit any particular given theory, but to use various 
theorists’ understandings of pollution and transgression to further my 
understanding of the organisation. This is also another ethnomethodological 
influence in the research; ethnomethodology’s phenomenological influence 
ensures that research is faithful to the phenomena under study and furthermore, 
that theorising is closely tied to the observation of the phenomena. This led to a 
two-way relationship between theory and data. Theory was used to critique the 
data, whilst the data was also used to critique theory; this symbiotic 
comprehension of the relationship between theory and data increased my 
understanding of both the theory and the data. For example, in Chapter 7 I apply 
Hegel’s theory of dialectics to the trans inclusion/exclusion debate. In doing so, I 
use the data to critique the idea that there is some particular end that the dialectical 
movement with reach, whilst also using the theory to gain understandings of the 
data. The fact that it was problematic to map a dialectical perspective onto the 
data is not relevant, because attempting to analyse the data in terms of dialectics 
demonstrated some of the complexities of the decision making process that have 
been explored in more detail with regard to other theoretical perspectives.
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3T r a n s g e n d e r  Id e n t it y  a n d  P o l it ic s
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the multiple types of transgender 
identities and politics with regard to Morton Hall’s transgender 
inclusion/exclusion debate. Ekins and King (1996) note that before the nineteenth 
century categorisations of sexual perversions ‘gender blending could be written 
about in terms of simple descriptions of enjoyable experience and preferred 
behaviour’ (Ekins and King 1996: 5). This is far from the case today; to this end I 
attempt to define the terms transgender, transsexual and transvestite, whilst noting 
that all three terms are contested. I elaborate some of the concerns within 
transgender politics; here I am less concerned with the actual political aims of 
transgender politics and more concerned with political philosophy of transgender 
activism although it is often the philosophy that defines the aims. This replicates 
arguments in the wider LGB and feminist communities concerning building 
identity versus deconstructing identity. Thirdly this chapter will begin to consider 
the relationship between transgender people and the LGB community.
Defining Trans
The definitions below are taken from the Gender Trust website 
(http://www.gendertrust.org.uk/indexl.htm). It is these definitions that the 
organisation under study employed in their debate on transgender 
inclusion/exclusion.
Transsexual. A person who feels a consistent and overwhelming desire 
to transition and fulfill their life as a member of the opposite gender.
Most transsexual people actively desire and complete Sex Reassignment 
Surgery.
32
Transvestite. The clinical name for a crossdresser. A person who dresses 
in the clothing of the opposite sex. Generally, these persons do not wish 
to alter their body.
Transgender. A term used to include transsexuals, transvestites and 
crossdressers. A transgenderist can also be a person who, like a 
transsexual, transitions - sometimes with the help of hormone therapy 
and / or cosmetic surgery - to live in the gender role of choice, but has 
not undergone, and generally does not intend to undergo, surgery.
However, these are not definitions that all transgender people would agree with. 
For example, the categories of transvestite and transsexual are presented as 
discrete, whilst Halberstam (1998) writes of a transgender continuum (specifically 
for women, but also, I think, applicable to men) on which one may remain in a 
static position or move along (in both directions) at different times. The above 
definition of transgender is particularly problematic in that it first states that 
‘transgenderists’ may have cosmetic surgery, but then states that they do not 
generally intend to have surgery! In this context I think the latter surgery can be 
seen as castration/penectomy/phalloplasty/vaginoplasty, that is, surgery that 
focuses on the alteration/removal of the genitals. Other transgender writers such 
as Stone (1991) and Bomstein (1995) advocate a much wider definition of 
transgender to include all gender deviants.
So let’s reclaim the word “transgendered” so as to be more inclusive.
Let’s let it mean “transgressively gendered.” Then, we have a group of 
people who break the rules, codes and shackles of gender. Then we have 
a healthy-sized contingent! It’s the transgendered who need to embrace 
the lesbians and gays, because it’s the transgendered who are in fact the 
more inclusive category (Bomstein 1995: 134-5).
This, then, broadens the category of transgender to anyone who acts against 
traditional gender stereotyping and, importantly, recognises the fact that many
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transgender people have not thought of ever taking hormones or having surgery. 
It is this wide definition of transgender that I advocate in the executive meetings 
of the organisation and is discussed further in chapter 8. The inclusion of lesbian 
and gay people in the definition of transgender will be discussed in the last section 
of this chapter.
Bomstein’s definition of transgender has parallels with Garber’s (1992) 
delineation of the ‘third’ as the realm of possibility and potentiality. As a term, 
‘the third sex’ has been in circulation over a hundred years, often signifying 
hermaphrodism or androgyny as distinct from male and female, however, Garber 
employs the term in a slightly different manner. For her, the ‘third’ is something 
that problematises dichotomous thought by illustrating its insufficiency; in this 
instance, the third is that which demonstrates that the division of individuals only 
into the categories male and female is inadequate. ‘What is crucial here ... is that 
“third term” is not a term ... the “third” is a mode of articulation, a way of 
describing a space of possibility’ (Garber 1992: 11). Again, this conceptualisation 
of the third goes far beyond the Gender Trust’s use of transgender with its focus 
on transition. One must recognise, however, that the ‘third’ does not necessarily 
describe the gender of all transgendered people; for instance, in her study of 
transsexuals in Perth, Western Australia, Wilson (2002) found that most of those 
she studied wanted to be seen as ‘normal’, therefore the space of the third was 
inappropriate. This problem of normality versus transgression is discussed further 
in the next section.
In this thesis I shall be using the term ‘transsexual’ to define those who 
have had, or wish to have, some kind of hormone treatment or sex reassignment 
surgery. I shall use ‘transgender’ to define all those who transgress current gender 
norms. The term ‘trans’ is used as shorthand for transgender. The definition of 
the term transgender by the executive members of the organisation is rendered 
problematic in the following chapters (specifically in chapter 5), particularly as 
many appear to use the word transgender, when transsexual would be more 
appropriate.
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When writing on the subject of transgender, pronouns are highly 
problematic. For example, when referring to some one who has transitioned from 
a man to a woman (MTF), should they be called a female transsexual (or 
transwoman) or a male transsexual (or transman)? For the majority of the 
transgender community the answer would be ‘female transsexual’ (or 
transwoman) because the person is presenting as female and believes themselves 
to be female. However, some radical lesbian feminists such as Raymond (1980, 
1996) and Jeffreys (2003) would call such a person a male transsexual as they 
believe that it is impossible to change sex as it is chromosomes which define sex, 
and they cannot be altered. Jeffreys writes, ‘I will refer to FTMs with female 
pronouns and to MTFs with male pronouns in order to highlight their sex class of 
origin. Use of the pronouns of the political class to which these people wish to 
reassign makes political analysis very difficult’ (2003: 123). The situation would 
be relatively simple were it only critical and prejudiced non-transsexuals who 
would call a MTF a male transsexual, however, Webb, a MTF transsexual also 
uses the term. Even as a transsexual, Webb believes it erroneous for a MTF 
transsexual to claim to be a woman, and that such a claim is detrimental to both 
women and transsexuals. He claims that ‘I cannot see that we will ever strike a 
chord with others in society if we insist that it is the world that has misunderstood 
us, rather than us having chosen a particular method of coming to terms with our 
feelings’ (Webb 1996: 194). In such a situation, I think the most satisfactory way 
forward is to refer to individuals by the gender which they would rather be 
referred; this is what I do throughout the thesis.
This also raises the question of the nature of the transvestite and 
transsexual. Does a male-to-female cross-dresser have male or female 
subjectivity? Does a pre-operative female-to-male transsexual have male or 
female subjectivity; what about post-operative? What is the relevance of body 
parts and clothing to subjectivity? Garber (1992) asserts that a passing cross­
dresser, even when called by a female name, does not have female subjectivity, 
rather it is male subjectivity in drag; the man’s idea of womanhood. The gender 
identity specialist, Stoller, claims that,
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The transvestite fights this battle against being destroyed by his [sic] 
feminine desires, first by alternating his masculinity with the feminine 
behaviour, and thus reassuring himself that it isn’t permanent; and 
second, by being always aware that even at the height of the feminine 
behaviour -  when he is fully dressed in women’s clothes -  that he has the 
absolute insignia of maleness, a penis (1968, cited in Garber 1997: 96).
In this account, biology is everything; a man cannot have female subjectivity 
because he has a penis. However, if, following Butler (1999), there is a 
discontinuity between sex and gender, and if sex itself is constructed, male and 
masculine could just as well signify a man or woman, and female and feminine 
could signify a man or woman as well. This destroys Stoller’s thesis because it 
illustrates that the penis is not the ‘absolute insignia of maleness’. This overrules 
Stoller’s synechdochal collapse of the penis into masculinity, and provides a more 
radical theory of cross-dressing that opens up possibilities of subversion 
unavailable in the earlier account. This question of subjectivity can be seen in the 
debates between radical feminists and transsexuals discussed in the following 
section.
P o litic is in g  T ra n sg e n d e r
Broad (2002) highlights some of the divisions within transgender politics, 
indicating that ‘transgender politics’ is not unified, and is as complex as LGB and 
feminist politics. Furthermore he argues that transgender can be seen as just 
another separate identity politics grouping and campaign, but it can also be seen as 
part of queer politics. Importantly, Broad notes that there are both ‘identity- 
producing’ (2002: 245) and deconstructive elements to transgender politics; he 
shows ‘that many in the transgender community were quite invested in adopting a 
transgender identity and consciousness, creating transgender group boundaries, 
and claiming that identity through everyday negotiations of it’ (2002: 245). 
However, Broad also argues that there are transgender activists who are concerned
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with disrupting those boundaries and identities and who celebrate their outsider 
status.
These differences make it especially hard for an LGB organisation to 
decide whether to widen its remit to include transgender as there are multiple 
politics. This is evident in the fears and concerns of some Executive Committee 
members. It is generally the case that it is post-operative transsexuals who have 
the greatest investment in the identity constructing strategy, although there are 
exceptions, because they have invested so much time and effort into changing sex. 
Consequently it is transsexuals whom the Executive Committee members seem 
most supportive of, whilst not wishing to be associated with the more 
deconstructive elements of transgender politics.
Related to this is Roen (2002) who sees transgender as a postmodern 
position relating to fluidity whilst regarding transsexual as more modernist; ‘a 
state of being that assumes the pre-existence of two sexes between which one may 
transition’ (2002: 501-2). Roen also identifies a hierarchy of crossing and passing, 
claiming that political and academic pronouncements can often prioritise crossing, 
whilst trans communities often prioritise passing. Referring to her research 
participants who politicised their transgendered identities Roen claims that ‘they 
effectively accused those who wish to pass of false consciousness’ (2002: 504) for 
believing in a binary construction of gender. She argues that the expectation for 
transsexuals is that they wish to pass as either women or men and that those who 
do not are not seen as transsexual. Roen conceptualises this dichotomy as 
‘both/neither’ and ‘either/or’ where ‘both/neither refers to a transgender position 
of refusing to fit within categories of woman and man, while either/or refers to a 
transsexual imperative to pass convincingly as either a man or a woman’ (2002: 
505 original emphasis). This is a useful conceptualisation that extends Broad’s 
(2002) distinction between identity production and deconstruction. Roen also 
refers to Bomstein’s (1995) labelling of passing transsexuals as engaging in 
‘gender terrorism.’ For Bomstein, the gender terrorists are those in society who 
seek to uphold and defend normative gender roles against their transgression; this 
can often be an unholy alliance between the religious right, radical feminists and
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some sections of the transsexual community. Passing transsexuals are placed in 
this category because of their focus on a binary switch from male to female or 
female to male and the ‘right gender, wrong body’ discourse. Morton Hall 
privileges transsexual identity over transgender identity as evidenced by its using 
definitions from the Gender Trust, an organisation specifically for transsexuals 
and those suffering from gender dysphoria, and a focus on legislation solely 
affecting transsexuals, such as the Gender Recognition Act 2005 (see chapter 5 for 
a more detailed analysis of this piece of legislation and its place in the debate). 
Given this it could be argued that those in the organisation advocating the 
exclusion of transgender are, under Bomstein’s view, gender defenders, in that 
they do not wish to ally themselves with those who cross gender boundaries.
Having said this, Roen notes that there are other factors that affect the 
extent to which one can adopt a both/neither or either/or identity. Crossing is 
dependant on the extent to which one can safely be out without fear of 
intimidation and harassment, whilst passing depends on one being in a position to 
access the medical technologies that facilitate a transsexual passing. ‘This 
suggests that both ... are problematic in terms of their exclusivity and their failure 
to account for socio-economic factors’ (Roen 2002: 511). This is an important 
recognition of the fact that whether one crosses or passes can be about more than 
just what the individual concerned desires. However, within the trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate in Morton Hall there was no discussion of any socio­
economic factors that could impact upon transgendered lives, rather the central 
focus of the debate was specifically on identity; whether a transgendered person 
could count as lesbian, gay or bisexual and the extent of their knowledge of LGB 
issues.
Ekins (2005) traces the developments in the work of the endocrinologist 
Harry Benjamin, a key figure in the development of transsexual surgery. He 
identifies a shift in Benjamin’s work from a focus on diversity in the beginning to 
a greater focus on heteronormativity in his later work. Significantly,
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His frequent later emphasis on the ‘normality’ of his transsexual patients 
and their emergence as unremarkable members of their reassigned sex, 
typically heterosexual and conventional, led inevitably to a privileging of 
a certain sort of transsexual experience and outcome at the expense of 
other kinds (Ekins 2005: 310).
This privileging of the ‘normal’ postoperatively heterosexual transsexual could be 
a reason why several Executive Committee members thought that transsexuals 
should not be in an LGB organisation. The focus on a heteronormative outcome 
leaves intact the male/female binary and does not question a transsexual’s sexual 
orientation as the ideal outcome is unproblematically heterosexual. Moreover, the 
medical discourse on transsexuality stresses the ‘independence of sex and gender 
identity and the immutability of the latter’ (King 1996: 94); gender identity is 
fixed, whilst biological sex can be altered via surgical means. This is the only 
discourse in which transsexuality can make sense. If one follows a performative 
or constructionist account of gender there is nothing essential about being male or 
being female, which problematises what a sex change actually means. The only 
way in which one can theoretically conceptualise transsexuality is by viewing 
male and female as discrete categories with specific attributes. This is the basis of 
the diagnostic criteria for Gender Identity Disorder (GID) in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual IV (DSM-IV). The 
DSM-IV states that ‘there must be a strong and persistent cross-gender 
identification ... there must also be evidence of persistent discomfort about one’s 
assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex’ (APA 
2000:576). For cross-gender identification to take place there has to be a 
difference between male and female. The idea of an ‘inappropriate gender role’ 
also presupposes an appropriate gender role with which the transsexual is at 
variance with. Therefore gender roles must be viewed as fixed. The diagnostic 
criteria for GID in childhood is farcical; for example, boys ‘avoid rough and 
tumble play and competitive sports and have little interest in cars and trucks or 
other nonaggressive but stereotypical boys’ toys’ (APA 2000: 576), whilst girls 
‘prefer boys as playmates with whom they share interest in contact sport, rough
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and tumble play and typical boyhood games’ (577). The diagnostic criteria rest 
upon a failure to conform to traditional gender stereotypes which only make sense 
in a particular social and cultural context. As the references to ‘stereotypical’ and 
‘traditional’ in the above quotes illustrate, there is a lack of biological or 
neurological basis for GID; it is purely based on a psychiatrist’s view of how men 
and women should behave.
The heteronormative construction of transsexuality is one of the main 
critiques of transsexuality made by both non-transsexuals and some transsexuals 
themselves; that transsexuality is a method of social control employed by the 
medical establishment to reinforce gender role. It is this debate to which I now 
turn. Billings and Urban show that ‘transsexualism is a socially constructed 
reality which only exists in and through medical discourse’ (1996: 99). This is 
analogous to Foucault’s claim that after 1870, whereas ‘the sodomite had been a 
temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species’ (1998: 43). As 
evidence for their claim, Billings and Urban cite the fact that people who wish to 
have sex change surgery have read all the literature on the subject and present 
themselves to the medical establishment as textbook cases. They also note that 
physicians can often prompt their patients into giving the ‘correct’ answers to their 
questions as this quote demonstrates (1996: 111);
Physician: ‘You said you always felt like a girl -  what is that?’
Patient: [long pause] ‘I don’t know.’
Physician: ‘Sexual attraction? Played with girls’ toys?’
This illustrates the physician disciplining the patient into presenting their story in a 
manner that fits the diagnostic criteria for GID shown above. Billings and Urban 
term this ‘the con.’ In all other circumstances, they claim, presenting to a clinician 
with textbook symptoms would be met with suspicion, however in the case of 
transsexuality there is no such suspicion, and as the extract above shows, 
physicians can collude in the con. This can also be evidenced in the 
autobiographical accounts of transsexuals, which often demonstrate a similar
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narrative of playing with toys ‘meant’ for the other sex or having playmates of the 
opposite (biological) sex.
This aspect of transsexual surgery is often a major part of radical feminist 
critiques of transsexuality, such as Raymond (1980, 1996) and Jeffreys (2003). As 
mentioned above, Raymond refuses to refer to a male to female transsexual as a 
woman as she believes that the defining feature of sex is chromosomes, something 
which cannot be changed. For Raymond, patriarchy and its associated sex role 
stereotyping is the main cause of transsexuality; ‘a patriarchal society and its 
social currents of masculinity and femininity is the First Cause of transsexualism’ 
(1980: xviii original emphasis). The second major cause is the medical 
establishment as it has flourished around transsexual surgery; this is the 
‘transsexual empire’, and has grown up since the 1950s. Raymond is also scathing 
of the MTF transsexuals who wish to become part of the women’s movement;
As the [MTF] exhibits the attempt to possess women in a bodily sense 
while acting out the images into which men have molded women, the 
[MTF] who claims to be a lesbian-feminist attempts to possess women at 
a deeper level, this time under the guise of challenging rather than 
conforming to the role and behaviour of stereotyped femininity 
(Raymond 1980: 99).
It seems, then that the transsexual cannot win; either she is merely acting 
according to traditional stereotypes, or in attempting to challenge such stereotypes 
she is invading women’s space and dividing ‘real’ women. Moreover, any women 
who are happy to work with transsexual women, such as the Olivia records 
company with Sandy Stone, are seen as colluding in their own oppression. Whilst 
Raymond’s concern is with the MTF transsexual, Jeffreys’ is with the FTM; she 
argues that ‘FTM transsexualism is a vital issue for lesbian politics, because the 
vast majority of the women who transition have identified as lesbian, or at least 
lived with the lesbian community and conducted relationships with lesbians’ 
(Jeffreys 2003: 124). She sees FTM surgery as destroying lesbians in favour of a
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male heterosexual outcome, that is, the medical profession is indulging in the 
worst kind of surgical erasure of homosexuals.
Riddell (1996) attempts a critique of Raymond’s The Transsexual Empire 
(1980) on two levels, those of accuracy and theory. On the first level, for instance, 
she demonstrates that transsexual surgery did not begin in the 1950s but can be 
traced back to the 1930s and that gender identity clinics cannot be said to be the 
gender policing vanguard of the medical establishment given the hostility of the 
general medical profession to those working in such clinics. On the second level 
Riddell critiques Raymond’s view that sex is biologically determined according to 
chromosomes and further argues that ‘behind Ms Raymond’s argument that sexual 
difference -  biology apart -  is exclusively a product of the male-defined values of 
a patriarchy, lies an absolutist view of sex difference’ (Riddell 1996: 181). True 
enough. However, Riddell herself appears to have an absolutist view of gender 
difference; for example she concurs with (unspecified) sex researchers who claim 
that core gender identity is immutably fixed at the age of eighteen months. 
Furthermore, she argues that ‘we [transsexuals] do not seek to change sex, but to 
modify a biological anomaly so that genuine human existence as the women or 
men we are already is possible’ (Riddell 1996: 185 my emphasis). Here it is 
gender that is pre-determined, rather than sex. This is the ‘wrong body’ discourse, 
a position from which it is difficult to counter the arguments of those such as 
Raymond, given that the majority of ‘wrong body’ arguments are based upon the 
very stereotyped notions of masculinity and femininity that she is arguing against.
It is the case that in the inclusion/exclusion debate none of the Executive 
Committee members made similar pronouncements to Jeffreys or Raymond, 
however there are parallels between Raymond’s claim that transsexuals’ 
involvement in lesbian politics is harmful and the assertion by some Executive 
Committee members belief that including transgender in the remit of the 
organisation would dilute its purpose, particularly if the transgender person 
identified as heterosexual. In both cases one can see that for identity politics 
groups, the identity of those involved is more important than whether they are in 
agreement with the aims of the group. Just as Raymond claims that a male to
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female transsexual cannot be a lesbian feminist because she does not have the 
experience of growing up female in a male dominated society, some Executive 
Committee members claimed that transgender people should not be in the 
organisation because they have no knowledge of being lesbian, gay, or bisexual. 
This is an issue I return to later in this, and other, chapters, particularly chapter 8.
It must be noted that it is not just non-transsexuals who mount the type of 
critique that Raymond does. Webb (1996), a transgender activist makes similar 
points, as he believes that ‘male transsexuals [MFT] perpetuate misogyny when 
they indulge in a manipulative game of getting others to collude in their fantasy 
that they are women’ (Webb 1996: 192). In addition, he also asks three questions 
that he thinks transgender activists should ask themselves (1996: 194);
• ‘Should we admit that our sex reassignment was a mistake and do 
what we can to identify as the men we are?’
• ‘Should we campaign for hormonal intervention and sex 
reassignment surgery to be terminated?’
• ‘How can transsexual and transvestite inclination be channelled into 
challenging gender-role stereotyping rather than reinforcing it?’
The last question is probably the most significant in its implications for political 
action given that transgender activism, particularly transsexual, has a tendency to 
reify gender norms, as evidenced by the ‘wrong body’ discourse most 
organisations employ. This is aptly demonstrated by the webpage on the Press for 
Change website on Trans Equality Monitoring (http://www.pfc.org.uk/node/1408). 
Press for Change is a UK based organisation that claims to campaign for all trans 
people. The following is their introduction to trans equality monitoring:
Increasingly, organisations are wanting to monitor the number of trans 
people among their staff or client group. They feel this is becoming 
necessary in order to show that they are complying with new equalities law 
such as the Public Sector Gender Duty.
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However, the monitoring of trans people is not a legal requirement and, 
where undertaken, does have certain pitfalls which need to be avoided and 
concepts that need to be understood.
This document is intended to point these out and ensure that organisations 
implement best practice methods in monitoring.
The document then goes on to state that questions on transgender status should not 
treat transgender as a third sex, or as a sexuality. PFC advocated that:
Questions on gender identity should always be in their own section.
Different trans people describe themselves with different labels and what one 
person adopts happily offends another. For this reason, we recommend the 
use of descriptive questions that do not rely on a particular terminological 
adherence:
Is your gender identity the same as the gender you 
were assigned at birth?
1 Yes 1 No
Do you live and work full time in the gender role 
opposite to that assigned at birth?
r  Yes r  No
However, whilst this avoids the pitfalls as terming transgender a third sex or a 
sexuality, this sort of question assumes that those answering are transsexual. The 
questions have the assumption that there are only two possible genders that one 
could identify as and that one is either one or the other. These questions could 
‘happily offend’ a trans person who saw themselves as having a gender that is 
either in between male and female, or as unrelated to male and female. These 
types of monitoring questions are only ‘best practice’ if one only wants to monitor 
transsexuals and not transgender people.
This also has implications for the inclusion/exclusion debate for the 
organisation studied. In its privileging of transsexual over transgender and its 
distancing from heterosexual cross dressers, the organisation can be seen to be 
upholding a belief in essential gender characteristics. Therefore one might 
question, on the basis of Webb’s opinions, whether transgender people would 
actually want to be part of the organisation in the first place. This, however, serves
/
/
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to highlight the divisions and tensions within transgender politics and identity; it is 
clear that some transsexuals do wish to be part of the organisation, quite possibly, 
in part, for the very reason that the organisation does not really challenge gender- 
role stereotyping.
A major concern for both individual trans people and for transgender 
politics is passing. Passing is a person being read as the gender in which they are 
attempting to present, and, as such, is connected to the identity-making versus 
deconstructionist debate outlined above. Both Garber (1992) and Whittle (1996) 
have considered passing and its relationship to subversion and the gender-fuck. 
Garber uses the term ‘marked transvestite’ to designate a ‘cross-dresser whose 
clothing seems deliberately and obviously at variance with his anatomical gender 
assignment’ (1992: 354). This is the cross-dressing of those such as Boy George 
and Annie Lennox, who, whilst not attempting to ‘pass,’ nevertheless wear 
sartorial accoutrements of the opposite sex. In this instance, Annie Lennox does 
not have a prosthetic penis, nor does Boy George have prosthetic breasts. It is 
possible that because of this the marked cross-dresser has more subversive effects 
than the unmarked. One reason for this is that if the unmarked cross-dresser is 
successfully passing they are indistinguishable from everyone else. Conversely a 
marked cross-dresser, by their very incongruity, stands out. However, Whittle
(1996) disagrees with this, below.
The relationship between the cross-dresser and passing, which in turn is 
related to being marked or unmarked, is important. Regarding a vestmentary 
guide for male-to-female transvestites Garber writes that ‘this is advice for the 
passing male-to-female transvestite, not for the radical drag queen who wants the 
discontinuity of a hairy chest or moustache to clash with a revealingly cut dress’ 
(1992: 49 original emphasis). This demonstrates that there are major differences 
within those who cross-dress, which render talking about cross-dressers as a 
unified category impractical. It also raises questions about the subversive 
potentials of different variants of cross-dressing; whether some are more radical 
than others. Here I would argue that the discontinuity between biological sex and 
clothes worn is the most likely to subvert gender norms. This performance has
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radical effects that the passing transvestite does not have. In attempting to be of 
the opposite sex the passing transvestite can in some cases reify the notion of two 
asunder genders, rather than problematising binary genders, although this is not 
always the case. I believe that this is the case whether the passing transvestite is 
transsexual or otherwise.
Garber also shows how cross-dressing is part of the mainstream, citing 
historical figures, both male and female, who have cross-dressed. She also details 
the cross-dressed shows staged by male soldiers and sailors, and Harvard’s Hasty 
Pudding Theatricals. That cross-dressing has been a normalised part of the 
mainstream demonstrates that the idea of drag as universally subversive, or 
transgressive, is highly contentious. As Garber claims, ‘far from undercutting the 
power of the ruling elite, male cross-dressing rituals here seem to serve as 
conformations and expressions of it. Indeed, what is fascinating about the study of 
transvestism is precisely that it is outlawed in some circumstances, appropriated as 
a sign of privilege in others’ (1992: 66). Further to these more socially privileged 
sites of cross-dressing, other subcultures have cross-dressing, and gender-bending, 
as normal and accepted practices. An example of this is the hard 
rock/goth/industrial/cyber music scene, both at the level of artists and club/gig 
goers. For instance, Brian Molko (Placebo), Brian Warner (Marilyn Manson) and 
Trent Reznor (Nine Inch Nails) are all gender non-conformists; sometimes 
wearing skirts and make up. Further it is common to attend a rock club and find a 
man or two wearing make up or a skirt. As Garber quips ‘now, it’s not unusual for 
one male rocker to say to another “May I borrow your eyeliner?”’ (1992: 357). In 
this case the cross-dressing is marked, in that there is no intention to exactly look 
like, or be, a woman; it is merely the wearing of a skirt instead of trousers. 
However, the extent to which this is a conscious troubling of sex/gender norms, or 
part of the wider, slightly anarchic, anti-establishment nature of the genre is open 
to debate. In the trans inclusion/exclusion debate there was no real discussion of 
this kind of transvestite behaviour; the focus was solely on the sexuality of the 
cross-dresser. Transvestism was only discussed under the spectre of the 
heterosexual cross-dresser joining the organisation and diminishing the aims of the
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organisation. The above type of transgender behaviour is also largely precluded 
by the definitions of transgender being employed by the organisation for the 
purpose of the debate. I advocated widening the definition of transgender to 
include all behaviour that transgresses gender norms, which would have included 
this marked transvestism, however this was not taken up. Here we can see that 
transgender as ‘third’, as a space of possibility and potentiality being refused by 
the organisation in favour of a far more normative rendition of transgender 
experience.
Whittle (1996) provides a different way of conceptualising the relationship 
between passing and the gender-fuck. He writes of Loren Cameron’s presentation 
in his self-portraits. Cameron’s (nude) self portraits show a muscular man striking 
bodybuilding poses, with a well defined chest, legs and arms, flame tattoos on the 
thighs, forearms and collar bone, with short hair and a styled beard. Also present 
is a vagina and very slight scaring providing evidence of a double mastectomy. 
Whittle notes that were Cameron dressed, he would pass, and therefore would 
become hidden, as one would not suspect his ‘secret.’ For Whittle, ‘the gender 
outlaw is nearly always hidden in passing and, as a result, the gender defenders are 
fucked, in that their rules become meaningless because they are constantly broken, 
and nobody knows when or where or how that is happening’ (1996: 212). Whilst 
it is true that by passing (successfully) one is rendering oneself invisible, I read 
Bomstein’s (1995) term ‘gender outlaw’ to refer to those who decided to try to 
live outside of gender rather than to try to pass, although I think that Whittle has a 
different understanding of the term. Given that Bomstein claims that ‘non­
supporters of any movement to deconstruct gender would also, unfortunately, 
include those transgendered people who subscribe fully to the culture’s definitions 
of gender and seek to embody those definitions within themselves’ (1995: 132) it 
seems likely that those who would hide themselves in passing would actually be 
gender defenders rather than gender outlaws.
‘Gender outlaw’, for Whittle, appears to refer to all those who choose not 
to remain in their biological sex. In his analysis the passing transsexual is, contra
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Bomstein, subversive by virtue of the fact that they do pass; one can no longer 
discover the gender ‘truths’ of a person by merely looking at them.
Remaining with Cameron’s self portrait, Whittle goes on to remark, 
‘however, Cameron chooses not to pass. Normally the nature of ‘not passing’ 
means that head’s aren’t really fucked, because gender rules are not transgressed, 
they are only highlighted. ... However, if the gender outlaw who can pass, 
refuses to pass, then they once again, present the gender fuck’ (1996: 212). I 
concur that refusing to pass when one can, like Cameron, is fucking with gender; 
however the assertion that not passing per se does not is problematic. Moreover, 
‘not passing’ requires more clarification. If it is someone who wished to pass, but 
fails, then arguably ‘head’s aren’t really fucked,’ not least because the individual 
concerned wished to pass and therefore was not transgressing gender, but 
remaining in a binary model. However, if it is someone choosing not to pass, like 
Cameron, then gender rules are highlighted because o f  their transgression. As 
expanded upon in chapter 7 Foucault (1977) and Bataille (2001) show that the 
effect of a transgression is to reveal the limit. Significantly, the whole discourse 
of passing relies on binary constructions of gender (you must pass as either male 
or female) therefore to not pass then one is, almost by default, transgressing binary 
gender roles. For Whittle it appears that the only manner in which transgender can 
be transgressive is if someone who can pass refuses to do so; this eclipses all those 
who do not pass and have no desire to do so, even if they could. Whether one 
agrees with the specifics of with Whittle or Garber, it is clear that transgender does 
a significant amount of transgressive work; it can trouble stable notions of 
masculine and feminine and call those categories into question. As will become 
apparent throughout this thesis, these are not categories that many of the Executive 
Committee members want called into question. Moreover, the transgressive 
potential of transgender creates a problematic relationship between trans and LGB 
activism; it is this relationship to which I now turn.
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Putting the ‘T’ in ‘LGB’
Whilst a major focus of this thesis is the relationship between transgender and 
sexuality, this section will introduce some of the key themes in this debate in a 
wider context than the organisations debate, as well as to place this debate in its 
historical setting. Two quotes will serve to introduce this discussion; the second is 
from an interview conducted with a Executive Committee member prior to the 
debate reaching executive level. The views expressed, are, however, broadly 
representative of those who favoured exclusion.
Transvestites and transsexuals polarise the problems of gay activism. At 
one level they are accused of sexism because of their concern with 
traditional femininity, but it must be remembered that the masters are not 
supposed to dress as slaves, and men who dress as women are giving up 
their power as men. Their oppression is similar to that experienced by 
gay men and all women (Brake 1976: 187 in Ekins and King 1996: 168).
Lou: if you have a male to female transgender person and the male is
still going through gender reassignment, then to all intents and 
purposes that individual is a woman because they self identify as 
a women. As regards their sexuality, if their sexuality is still that 
they're attracted to women that would make them lesbian, 
therefore they would be eligible, if they were attracted to men 
then to me they would be heterosexual, so what possible 
understanding of lesbian and gay issues would they have. That’s 
not to say they don’t have understanding of issues because of the 
transgender situation and the information and the learning people 
can get from transgender individuals is vast we all should learn 
from everyone else, but it’s how wide do you cast the net in 
membership otherwise it could go down the road of heterosexual 
people with particular fetishes that are discriminated against 
wanting to join a lesbian and gay group? Would they fit in?
Would they understand automatically what the difficulties are or 
can be of being a gay man or a lesbian or whatever? That’s
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where the difficulty is, it’s not against them per se, but its about 
the issues and where they're coming from.
The first thing to note is that for Brake, transvestites and transsexual are, at least 
biologically, male; female transsexuals or transvestites are non-existent in his 
account. Notwithstanding this, he does counter claims that male transvestites and 
MTF transsexuals retain male (and heterosexual) privileges. Also, his claim that 
men who dress as women renounce their power as men is a response to those such 
as Stoller (see above) who argue that a male transsexual always has the knowledge 
that he retains ‘the absolute insignia of maleness,’ that is, a penis. The central 
point to take from Brake however, is the belief that the oppression of transvestites 
and transsexuals is in some way similar to that of women and gay men; this would 
tend to advocate a broad coalition politics encompassing all those who are 
disadvantaged by the current heteronormative sex/gender system. Lou, however, 
raises an oft repeated argument that transgender people should only be able to join 
LGB organisations if they, in their gender of choice, identify as lesbian, gay, or 
bisexual. This relies on a separation of sex and gender that will be discussed 
further in chapter 5. Similarly to all those opposed to trans inclusion in the 
organisation Lou does not attack trans people for their choices, but rather 
questions whether they should be in an LGB organisation.
Whilst Brake argues that there are similarities in the oppression of trans 
people and LGB people, Lou claims that trans people would have no knowledge 
of the oppression of LGB people, indicating that he sees a difference between such 
oppressions. This, however, belies the fact that historically transgender and 
homosexuality have had a complex relationship. Magnus Hirschfeld invented the 
term ‘transvestite’ and argued that transvestism was not a sign of homosexuality 
and that the majority of transvestites were heterosexual, however this has not 
prevented a conflation of transvestism and homosexuality in the minds of a large 
section of the public. Writing of chat shows on which transvestites appeared 
Garber (1992) observes that many audience members question the guests’ sexual 
identity and that this is something that both the hosts and the transvestites
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themselves are at pains to refute. Moreover, cross gender behaviour (not 
necessarily cross-dressing) is often seen as a sign of homosexuality; such 
examples include boys not wishing to be seen as sissies for not playing games 
such as football or rugby. This, I believe, is related to what Garber terms 
‘transvestite panic’; that is, ‘the fear on the part of some gay men today and some 
male homosexuals earlier in the century that they themselves will be coded, and 
dismissed, as effeminate ... and the correlative fear on the part of some lesbians 
that they will be coded as “masculine”’ (1992: 137). It is clear therefore that the 
relationship between transvestism and homosexuality is a troubled one.
This is further complicated by the involvement of trans people is gay 
activism. Rivera (2002) tells of how she was involved with the inception of the 
gay liberation movement in America, charting her involvement in the Gay Activist 
Alliance (GAA) and the Gay Liberation Front (GLA) and her subsequent 
sidelining in the organisations. She also remarks that the organisers of the 
celebrations for the fourth anniversary of Stonewall attempted to stop drag queens 
from performing; this leads her to say ‘it really hurts me that some gay people 
don’t even know what we gave for their movement’ (Rivera 2002: 81). This 
would indicate that trans people have always been a part of the lesbian and gay 
movement, whether explicitly acknowledged by that movement or otherwise. I 
return to this regarding transsexuals below. Rivera states that the GLF was better 
than the GAA as it covered a broader spectrum of people; ‘we’re all in the same 
boat as long as we’re oppressed one way or the other, whether we are gay, 
straight, trans, black, yellow, green, purple, or whatever. If we don’t fight for each 
other, we’ll be put down’ (2002: 80). This forms a response to Lou’s questioning 
of how far the net of membership should be cast; heterosexual people with 
particular fetishes who are discriminated against should be part of the organisation 
because of the similar roots of oppression.
The relationship between homosexuality and transsexuality is also a 
difficult one. Many of the pioneers of sex change surgery viewed transsexuals as 
heterosexual in their ‘true’ gender. Ekins writes that ‘at the end of his [Harry 
Benjamin’s] first of the three phases, he states that his patients are ‘invariably
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heterosexuals within the category of transgender (and non-trans heterosexuals) 
within the organisation. In saying that only LGB trans people should be in the 
organisation Ricky is excluding trans people who are heterosexual from the 
organisation on the basis that they have not experienced living as a homosexual 
and therefore have no knowledge of the issues. In Van Gennep’s terms, trans 
people are on one rooms and do not move from one to the other. A heterosexual 
transsexual could, quite feasibly, have started their journey in the gay or lesbian 
room. Chapter 8 discusses some of the implications of this view with regard to 
rhizomatics and the construction of sexual and gender identity; this chapter 
focuses specifically on the exclusion of heterosexual trans people from the 
organisation.
I argue that Ricky’s rejection of heterosexual transgendered people can be 
seen as pollution behaviour (Douglas 1991b). As already shown in the previous 
chapter one could argue that a heterosexual (post op) trans person would have an 
understanding o f LGB issues because prior to transition they may have been 
perceived by others as homosexual, or self identified as such before deciding they 
were transgendered. Therefore the arguments against inclusion can be seen as an 
attempt to retain the purity o f Morton Hall which would be spoiled by the addition 
of trans people and issues. It is also possible that Ricky is exhibiting the fear that 
widening the remit of Morton Hall to include transgender would radically alter the 
activities o f the organisation as well as putting the organisation in a potentially 
problematic position of representing heterosexual people who may be 
homophobic. As Young (1997) argues, identity politics organisations rely on a 
distinction between us (the oppressed) and them (the oppressors) which dictates 
that the oppressors can never work for the benefit o f the oppressed (see Chapter 
5). The other point that Ricky raises could be termed the ‘floodgate argument’; if 
heterosexual trans people are welcomed into Morton Hall, then other heterosexual 
sexual minorities may also want to be represented by the organisation, and soon 
every variety of sexual deviant would be clamouring to join the organisation. This 
evidences my claim in Chapter 4 with regard to Rubin’s (1989) ‘line’ (dividing 
good and bad sexual behaviours and identities) that those on the deviant side of
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seemed to be no other label to give my undiagnosed and apparently 
unique condition ... There followed a very stressful period after my 
fellow Wren discovered my feelings for her and threatened to report me 
to the Commanding Officer. Not long afterwards I was given medical 
discharge with the diagnosis of ‘homosexual tendencies’. I knew this 
was wrong, but what was I? (1996: 30).
Although not particularly satisfied with the label of ‘lesbian’ Rees felt that it most 
appropriately described her situation, moreover, he was regarded as a lesbian by 
colleagues, resulting in discharge from the military. His fellow Wren and the 
Commanding Officer obviously had no knowledge of transgender identity and 
presumed that a woman attracted to another woman could only be' a lesbian. 
Although his experience would differ from a ‘real’ lesbian in a similar situation, 
there would still be parallels that would give him ample understanding of the 
experiences of the discrimination suffered by lesbians. He, as a post-operatively 
heterosexual male arguably has a greater understanding of lesbian oppression than 
a ‘real’ lesbian who has not been dismissed from her job because of her sexuality.
Furthermore, in her discussion of female masculinity Halberstam (1998: 
150) remarks that;
So while it is true that transgender and transsexual men have been 
wrongly folded into lesbian history, it is also true that the distinction 
between some transsexual identities and some lesbian identities may at 
times become quite blurry. Many FTMs do come out as lesbians before 
they come out as transsexuals (many, it must be said, do not). And for 
this reason alone, one cannot always maintain hard and fast and definite 
distinctions between lesbians and transsexuals.
Halberstam then goes onto cite several FTMs who were a part of the lesbian 
community, and continued to be so after transition. Assuming that these FTMs 
retain their attraction towards women, Lou’s assertion that a heterosexual 
transsexual has no knowledge of homosexuality serves to eradicate the pre­
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transition lives of these men (see chapter 8 for a discussion of how coming out 
narratives stabilise and fix identity). Halberstam notes that many transsexual men 
wish to retain links with lesbian/queer communities and cultures and that ‘much 
transsexual discourse now circulating tries to cast the lesbian pasts of FTM as 
instances of mistaken identities’ (1998: 150). This is essentially what the 
discourse articulated by Lou serves to accomplish; a heterosexual FTM was 
always male and therefore not a lesbian. Highly complex desires and identities are 
being forced into the narrow binaries of sex and gender in a move to obfuscate 
complexities that would problematise gay and lesbian identities.
Similarly to Rivera who argues for a broad politics, Bomstein employs a 
very wide definition of transgender, arguing that ‘it’s the transgendered who need 
to embrace the lesbians and gays, because it’s the transgendered who are in fact 
the more inclusive category’ (1995: 135). This is based upon the fact that lesbian 
and gay sexuality is itself transgendered desire; in this society women are meant to 
desire men, whilst men are meant to desire women, therefore those who do not are 
crossing heteronormative gender roles. In arguing this, Bomstein claims that gays 
and lesbians suffer more for violations of gender roles, as these are visible in daily 
life, rather than sexual behaviour, as this happens, generally, in private. Bomstein 
is aware that this is not an easy aim; it will appear to negate the gains of gays and 
lesbians, render bisexuals invisible and dilute transgender specific campaigns, 
however, ‘it’s the only point all these groups have in common, it’s the only flag 
around which they all could rally’ (Bomstein 1995: 135). The main problem with 
this, acknowledged by Bomstein, is that it requires gay and lesbian people to 
recognise their own ‘transgressively gendered’ position. As will become apparent 
in chapter 5 the Executive Committee members’ separation of gender and sexual 
identity make this an unlikely outcome; so long as LGB politics employs an ethnic 
model of identity a broad coalition of transgender, including sexuality, will remain 
a distant hope.
The psychiatric discourse on transsexuality also reveals tensions between 
gender and sexual identity. The first version of the DSM (III) that did not contain 
an entry for homosexuality was also the first to contain an entry for ‘Gender
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Identity Disorder of Childhood’; something that Sedgwick sees as ‘part of the 
same conceptual shift’ (1993: 157). Butler (2004) also comments that some have 
argued that GID was a new way of pathologising homosexuality under the criteria 
of a misdirected gender identity. Sedgwick cites Richard Green who claims that 
‘parents of sons who entered therapy were ... worried that the cross-gender 
behaviour portended problems with later sexuality’ (Green cited in Sedgwick 
1993: 162). Cross gender behaviour in childhood, is then, seen by some as an 
early indicator of adult homosexuality; something which the psycho-medical 
establishment must try to prevent at all costs. Green also notes that parents may 
bring children to him because they have been bullied, this is analogous to Feder
(1997) who cites a case study in which it is significant that a ‘feminine’ boys’ 
classmates said to him ‘you can’t be a little girl’ (Rekers and Vami cited in Feder 
1997: 195). This illustrates that peer pressure is a disciplining force used on 
children with the approval of psychiatrists. There is no question that the children 
doing the disciplining should be seen as pathological for exhibiting non- 
acceptance of difference, for example. This is also similar to the diagnostic 
criteria for GID in girls; one of the criteria is that strangers may often misidentify 
a little girl for a boy (APA 2000). In this case strangers appear to know something 
of the girl’s self of which she herself is unaware. Both are examples of social 
disciplining fostering a binary model of gender, which is supported by the medical 
profession. What is important to take from these examples is not whether cross 
gender behaviour in childhood is actually an indictor of homosexuality, but rather 
that many people believe that it is. Work done in primary schools by Renold 
(2000, 2005) demonstrates that there is pressure for children, particularly boys to 
conform to traditional gender roles to avoid being called gay. Furthermore the 
multi-agency Education for All campaign that seeks to eradicate homophobia in 
schools shows an awareness that it is not only homosexual pupils who suffer 
homophobic abuse, but that it can also happen to children exhibiting cross-gender 
behaviour. Given that the organisation is one of those involved with the 
Education for All campaign this problematises the organisation’s exclusion of 
transgender; this will be explored in more detail in chapter 5.
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Conclusions
This chapter has given an introduction to some of the complexities of transgender 
identities and politics and has begun to draw out several themes that will form the 
basis of successive chapters. It is evident that the question of transgender 
inclusion within the organisation is highly problematic because of the radically 
different types of transgender politics; the differences between identity-producing 
and identity-deconstructing politics, both trans and LGB, will be a central theme 
of this thesis. If the transgender community does not have a unified politics then it 
is difficult for the organisation to decide on inclusion or exclusion. Moreover, as 
will become apparent in the following chapters, those advocating the exclusion of 
trans people from the organisation tend to reference the identity-producing 
elements of transgender politics as this supports difference, whilst those 
advocating for inclusion tend to reference the identity-deconstructing elements of 
transgender politics as this supports similarity. As will become clear, the 
organisations responses to the prospect of widening its remit to include 
transgender will illuminate the particular models of identities that the Executive 
Committee members themselves use.
Furthermore, this chapter illustrates that there is no easy distinction 
between transgender and transsexual, nor is either of them inherently transgressive 
or subversive. Nor should transgender and transsexual necessarily be seen as 
being in opposition to each other. A significant line of analysis in this thesis 
concerns the differing treatment of transsexuals and transgenders by Morton Hall, 
and my claim that, in particular, the figure of the heterosexual trans person is 
transgressively defining for the organisation. However, this is not because this 
dichotomy is inherent, but rather because it is instituted by Executive Committee 
members during the debate. Much of the subsequent analysis demonstrates that 
the transgender/transsexual binary is, at the least, unstable.
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4LGB Id e n t it y  a n d  P o l it ic s
This chapter will situate the organisation’s trans inclusion/exclusion debate within 
the context of lesbian and gay, and queer theories, and will prefigure claims in 
chapter 5 that the organisation is attempting to sustain an ethnic/essentialist model 
of identity against an ever increasing deconstructive impulse. I begin with an 
historical sketch of lesbian and gay identities and activism showing that gay 
politics operates on a spectrum between identity creating and 
deconstructionist/liberationist politics. In the following section I elucidate the 
queer critiques of identity, particularly those of Sedgwick and Butler, enabling me 
to be able to deconstruct the process of inclusion/exclusion in the organisation in 
latter chapters.
Mapping Gay Activism
The history of gay identity and activism can be seen as a struggle between 
universalising and minoritising views of homosexuality and between 
constructionist and essentialist views of identity. The minoritising view is 
‘viewing homo/heterosexual definition ... as an issue of active importance 
primarily for a small, distinct, relatively fixed homosexual minority,’ whilst the 
universalising view is seeing it ‘as an issue of continuing determinate importance 
in the lives of people across the spectrum of sexualities’ (Sedgwick 1990: 1). 
There is a tendency for minoritising political strategies to rely on essentialist 
understandings of identity and for universalising strategies to rely on a 
constructionist understanding of identity. However, this does not have to be the 
case; one could view homosexuality as innate and of importance for everyone, 
regardless of sexuality. This section will map the history of the construction of a 
gay identity and gay activism from the Renaissance up to the present with
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reference to these terms. This will contextualise the current debate with relation to 
the historical construction of a distinct homosexual identity.
It is now a generally well accepted fact that homosexuality as an identity is 
a relatively recent phenomenon, although the exact date for the foundation of a 
gay identity remains a site of dispute. For some, such as Foucault (1998) the time 
period is the late nineteenth century, whilst for others, such as Norton (1992) the 
date is much earlier and can be traced back to the molly subculture of the early 
eighteenth century. It is also often, accurately, said that one cannot use modern- 
day terms such as homosexual to refer to those who engaged in same sex sexual 
activity in the past. This is further complicated by the fact that words like 
'sodomite' or 'bugger' that were used to describe such people conveyed more 
meaning than simply 'homosexual'; they were linked to debauchery more 
generally, as well as to the biblical destruction of the cities of the Plain - Sodom 
and Gomorrah. It is also worthy of note that at this time (late sixteenth century) 
that 'outside an immediately sexual context, there was little or no social pressure 
for someone to define for himself what his sexuality was’ (Bray 1988: 70). Bray 
evidences this by citing trial records in which the defendants did not think that 
they had done anything wrong because they did not live up to the then current 
stereotype of a sodomite or catamite. Bray notes that a this time, although there 
were very strong legal proscriptions against homosexuality, buggery was to a large 
extent ignored, unless it also disturbed the peace and fell without patriarchal 
mores. At this time 'homosexual' was not an available identity, and what one did 
in bed was not a defining feature of oneself.
Norton (1992) claims that the beginnings of a gay subculture in this 
country can be traced back to the royal court at the end of the sixteenth century, 
and the court of James I, who himself was gay and wrote what is probably the first 
defence of homosexual love. However, one has to wait until the 1700s before one 
can see a visible gay subculture. This is largely due to the efforts (ironically) of 
the Societies for the Reformation of Manners that existed in the eighteenth century 
and aimed to reduce the vice and debauchery they saw in society. This echoes
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Foucault’s assertion that to prohibit something is to enable that something to also 
speak on its own behalf. For Norton
The attempt to suppress vice actually may have facilitated the expression 
of homosexuality. And the pressure of persecution may have persuaded 
gay men that it would be in their interest to form associations to meet in 
public places. Self preservation is a powerful impetus to the formation of 
a subculture (1992: 52).
This emergent subculture was that of the molly. This encompassed molly houses, 
rooms in inns or in private homes, where men could come and meet other men for 
friendship and/or sex, as well as ‘sodomites walks,’ where men would cruise for 
sex. Moreover, ‘the molly subculture as a unified subculture, rather than simply a 
disparate collection of people and behaviour, was reinforced by the communal use 
of a specialised dialect’ (Norton 1992: 92 original emphasis). This dialect 
included the use of ‘maiden names’ -  female names by which the mollies were 
known.
This brings us to the topic of the effeminacy, or otherwise, of the mollies, 
which can be linked to the trans inclusion/exclusion debate in Morton Hall. They 
partook of much feminine behaviour; Ned Ward, a pamphleteer, wrote in 1709 
that ‘mollies “are so far degenerated from all Masculine Deportment that they 
rather fancy themselves Women, imitating all the little Vanities that Custom has 
reconcil’d to the Female Sex, affecting to speak, walk, curtsy, cry, scold and 
mimic all manner of effeminacy’” (cited in Norton 1992: 97). However, Norton 
notes that although they adopted many feminine habits in the privacy of the molly 
houses, the mollies did not see themselves as women trapped in men's bodies: this 
notion can be traced to the sexologists of the nineteenth century. Whilst I have no 
particular desire to impose contemporary terminology onto the mollies, I think 
their behaviour could usefully be termed transgender, as they adopted aspects of 
femininity, but were quite happy with being male. This demonstrates that cross 
gender behaviour is a long standing aspect of gay and bisexual history which the 
Executive Committee members of Morton Hall are seemingly unaware of. Much
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of the anti-inclusion discourse in the debate centred on the separation of gender 
and sexual identity, with claims that the two are completely unrelated. However, 
‘effeminacy and transvestism with specifically homosexual connotations were a 
crucial part of what gave the molly houses their identity’ (Bray 1988: 88). This 
shows that the construction of collective sexual identity is a culturally and 
historically specific phenomenon.
The reaction of the general public to the mollies was one of deep suspicion 
and fear. The relationship between same sex sexuality and naturalness was a 
paradoxical one. On the one hand homosexuality was seen as the most 
abominable sin imaginable, and was the vice that no-one dared name. On the 
other hand man was seen as having a natural propensity to vice, as well as being 
naturally superior to women; this led to the situation in which it was thought that 
men would seek out other men for sexual pleasure unless it was prohibited. A 
particularly frank and illuminating letter to the London Journal of the 14th May 
1726 illustrates this point “‘if the Legislature had not taken prudent Measures to 
suppress such base and irregular Actions, Women would have been a Piece of 
useless work in the Creation, since Man, superior Man, has found out one of his 
own Likeness and Nature to supply is lascivious Necessities’” (cited in Norton 
1992: 123). This argument makes homosexuality, rather than heterosexuality, 
natural and evidences a very great fear that homosexuality will break out and 
destroy the fabric of society. This anonymous epistler appears to be in very great 
fear of homosexuality, especially given his pseudonym of ‘Philogynus’ (woman- 
lover); ‘no enemy is so monstrous as that which one fears lurking within’ (Norton 
1992: 123). The concepts of fear and danger will be explored in relation to the 
trans inclusion/exclusion debate in chapter 6. At this point it is sufficient to note 
that the reasons of some Executive Committee members for advocating exclusion 
can be attributed to fear, and it is entirely possible that they are insecure in their 
own gender identity.
In the Victorian era there were no groups or organisations that advocated 
homosexual equality, however, there were those such as Havelock Ellis, J. A. 
Symonds and Edward Carpenter who wrote and worked on the subject of
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homosexuality from a liberal perspective. For example, Carpenter wrote that ‘we 
call a man a criminal, not because he violates any eternal code of morality -  for 
there exists no such thing -  but because he violates the ruling code of his time’ 
([1889] cited in Weeks 1977: 68). Ellis, whilst attempting to show that 
homosexuality is natural, and not synonymous with vice, decay and debauchery, 
distinguished between the invert and the pervert. ‘Inversion’ was a congenital 
condition and therefore natural, whilst ‘homosexuality’ was any physical or sexual 
same sex contact. Ellis was to write that one should make it hard to acquire 
homosexual perversity (1942). This ‘led to some peculiar distinctions between 
‘inversion’, which was regarded as ‘natural’, and therefore unavoidable and 
tolerable; and ‘perversion’, which was vice adopted by weak natures and therefore 
to be condemned’ (Weeks 1977: 62). Although there tends no longer to be a 
division between invert and pervert as far as sexuality is concerned, it appears that 
there is with regard to gender identity. I argue that transsexuality can be seen as 
‘inversion’ because it relies on medical discourses of gender and transition, whilst 
transgender is the ‘perversion’ because it is voluntary and not excused by recourse 
to biology/endocrinology.
The 1957 Wolfendon Report advocated the legalisation of homosexuality 
in certain circumstances; however the government was unwilling to act upon the 
report. This is, in part, one of the reasons for the foundation in 1958 of England’s 
first homophile organisation; the Homosexual Law Reform Society (HLRS). The 
HLRS was not a self help group, or a support organisation for homosexuals, rather 
it was specifically directed at legal change. Moreover, the organisation was 
searching for respectability and attempted to alert the public to the need for a 
reform of sexual offences legislation. The HLRS decided ‘to divert its primary 
work not at the homosexual community but at progressive public opinion, and 
ultimately, even more narrowly, at amenable M.P.s and other prominent public 
officials’ (Weeks 1977: 170 original emphasis). The organisation was not a 
community based one, and was largely prepared to work with whoever would 
further the aims of the HLRS; this made it successful in the short, but not long 
term. Furthermore, the HLRS evaded the question of the desirability or otherwise
61
of homosexuality; it is clear therefore, that they were working within a traditional 
liberal model in which the state should not interfere in people’s personal lives. 
However, despite these traditional beginnings, the Committee for Homosexual 
Equality (CHE) grew out of the North-Western Committee of the HLRS; in 1967 
they noted that they did not see homosexuality as a medical problem and that they 
thought the role of social workers in improving the lives of homosexuals was 
limited. This was the beginning (in the UK at least) of gay men and lesbians 
claiming that they were the best placed people to understand homosexuality, as 
opposed to external ‘experts’ such as lawyers, policemen and members of the 
medical profession.
In America, contemporaneous with the HLRS was the Mattachine Society 
(founded in 1951), which for many is the epitome of an assimilationist political 
strategy; it sought acceptance from the heterosexual establishment for 
homosexuals and relied on (heterosexual) ‘experts’ on homosexuality to dictate 
their understandings. This is similar to the HLRS, as both attempted to work 
within established political frameworks and sought assistance from heterosexual 
allies. However, this view ignores the radical beginnings of Mattachine. Henry 
Hay and the other founder members of the society were Marxists, and structured 
the society along communist lines, partly in order to work safely in the McCarthy 
era. However, their Marxism led them to develop a systemic analysis of 
homosexuality, focusing on structural oppression rather than simple prejudice; 
they ‘rejected a narrowly pragmatic approach to the situation of the homosexual, 
focusing only on a set of reform goals, and ... [sought] a theoretical understanding 
of the homosexual’s inferior status’ (D’Emilio 1983: 64). It was only at a 
conference held in 1953 that the leaders of Mattachine changed and it began to 
follow the assimilationist politics for which it is better known. At this stage they 
‘urged homosexuals to adjust to a “pattern of behaviour that is acceptable to 
society in general and compatible with [the] recognised institutions ... of home, 
church, and state.’” Furthermore ‘their reliance on professionals as the agents of 
social change pushed them to abandon collective, militant action by the 
Mattachine Society’ (D’Emilio 1983: 81). In Sedgwick’s terms, the early
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Mattachine Society was universalising as, for example, they saw the beginnings of 
oppression in heterosexual family life, whilst the latter focus on assimilation is far 
more minoritising, applying only to the homosexual him/her self. Homophile 
groups in Britain in the 1960s were far from devising a similar radical 
understanding of homosexual oppression, the focus remaining on reforming the 
law on homosexuality.
At the beginning of this period there was not much of a gay ‘community’ 
in the UK, however from the 1960s onwards a more easily identifiable gay 
community begun to appear. Magazines for gay men, such as Spartacus and 
Jeremy were a major part of this development; however these magazines were 
never in production for long and were aimed at a specific type of gay man: pretty, 
young, well-off and fashionable. Also central to the formation of a more coherent 
gay community was the gay liberation movement, in particular the creation in 
1970 in London of the Gay Liberation Front (GLF) by two men who had met each 
other in America. For the GLF it was axiomatic that gay liberation ‘could not be 
done by others fo r  the homosexual, but only by homosexuals themselves, acting 
openly and together’ (Weeks 1977: 186 original emphasis). Whilst the GLF 
suffered from internal struggles almost from its inception, this ideology permeated 
into other, more reformist, groups that were formed during the 1970s in Britain. It 
is to this time that one can trace some of the exclusionary practices employed by 
some of the Executive Committee members of Morton Hall. Central to these 
reform organisations was ‘an allegiance to the belief that homosexuals themselves 
could best respond to specific problems and special needs’ (Weeks 1977: 209). 
The converse of this is the belief that heterosexuals are not capable of 
understanding the problems and needs of homosexuals; it is this ideology the 
supports claims that heterosexual transgender people are not welcome in Morton 
Hall as they will not understand LGB issues.
This is, however, to oversimplify the situation. Although gay liberation 
and activism tended to assume that homosexuals were a separate and distinct 
minority within society, transgendered people were also included within that 
minority. It is work quoting Weeks’ explanation of this at length:
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For, if gender identity is socially ascribed on the basis of cultural 
assumptions, and not inherent in individuals by nature of their biological 
appearance, then transvestites and transsexuals are obviously people on 
whom society has been unable to impose its conventional gender 
expectations. There is an obvious affinity in the causes of social 
hostility to both homosexuality and transvestism, and this was generally 
recognised in the early gay liberation movement (Weeks 1977: 224).
This demonstrates that arguments that rely on separating gender and sexuality as a 
reason for excluding transgender from Morton Hall are historically specific. Both 
in the recent, and more distant, past there has been a relationship between non- 
normative sexualities and non-normative gender performances. This, at the very 
least, renders claims that transgenderism and homosexuality are unrelated as 
historically contingent and problematic.
Gay liberation offered a more radical (and universalising) analysis of 
sexuality than that provided by reform organisations such as the CHE (in 1971 the 
‘C’ was changed from ‘Committee’ to ‘Campaign’). For liberationists ‘the 
liberation of the homosexual can only be achieved within the context of a much 
broader sexual revolution’ (Altman 1974: 72). Gay liberation showed an 
awareness of the interconnectedness of sexuality and gender and prefigured much 
of queer theory (Seidman 1997). Writing before Foucault and poststructuralism, 
Altman claims ‘society has so defined us that homosexuality becomes a constant 
part of us rather than a role we can take up and discard when convenient’ (1974: 
231). However, during the 1980s, helped by the onset of the AIDS epidemic and 
(lack of) government response, identity politics began to replace the earlier gay 
liberation movement. Seidman argues that ‘identity politics has strained either 
towards an interest-group politic aimed at assimilation or an equally troubling 
ethnic-nationalist separatism’ (1997: 137); moreover, the interest-group politics is 
also often based upon ethnic/nationalist constructions of identity. I, therefore, 
briefly explain the ethnic/essentialist model of identity. One can trace the 
foundations of this model to the latter decades of the nineteenth century and
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Foucault’s claim that ‘homosexuality appeared as one of the forms of sexuality 
when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a kind of interior 
androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been a temporary 
aberration; the homosexual was a species’ (Foucault 1998: 43). Those who 
engaged in same sex sexual activity were no longer merely doing just that, rather a 
whole new identity, that of the homosexual, began to coalesce around them. 
Through scientific, medical and juridical knowledges and institutions a 
homosexual identity was created; there was now a homosexual person, rather than 
a person who has same-sex sex. This is what was implicitly recognised by Altman 
in the above quote; however, whilst liberationists rejected this in favour a 
polymorphous perversity and innate bisexuality, those favouring identity politics 
fail to question homosexuality as an identity and, in fact, often reinforce this 
notion, as will become apparent throughout this thesis. Moreover, the growth of 
gay communities in cities facilitated identity creation; a modem gay man,
May migrate from rural Colorado to San Francisco in order to live in a 
gay neighbourhood, work in a gay business, and participate in an 
elaborate experience that includes a self-conscious identity , group 
solidarity, a literature, a press and a high level of political activity. In 
modem, Western, industrial societies, homosexuality has acquired much 
of the institutional structure of an ethnic group (Rubin 1984: 286).
Furthermore, Seidman (1996) argues that social constructionism also aided the 
foundation of an ethnic identity; ‘as much as these perspectives challenged 
essentialist or universalistic understandings of homosexuality, they contributed to 
a politics of the making of a homosexual minority. Instead of asserting the 
homosexual as a natural fact made into a political minority by social prejudice, 
constmctionists traced the social factors that produced a homosexual identity 
which functioned as the foundation for homosexuals as a new ethnic minority’ 
(1996: 9). As the term ‘ethnic’ would suggest, this model of gay identity is based 
on racial minorities, that is, all gay people are seen as sharing the same subject
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position and as experiencing homophobia in the same way regardless of other axes 
of difference.
The creation of homosexuality as a land of ‘ethnic’ identity led to a 
particular type of political ideology. In her work on bisexual identity and bisexual 
inclusion/exclusion from various pride marches and conferences, Young (1997) 
illustrates some of the key components of identity politics organisations. She 
notes that the inability to find a viable and sustainable definition of bisexual 
identity creates problems when attempting to work within the identity politics 
frameworks of the majority of lesbian and gay organisations. Similarly within 
Morton Hall there was much debate over the term ‘transgender’ itself; what 
particular definition would be used and how wide that definition would be. Young 
argues that ‘identity based political movements have generally shared a common 
set of assumptions about the relationship between identity, ideology and 
behaviour, political commitment and trustworthiness’ (1997: 34). Four key 
assumptions are that: first, people in the same identity group will have a common 
belief concerning the nature of their oppression; second, that particular oppression 
is the primary one for people within that group; third all members of an identity 
group are natural allies by virtue of their shared position and fourth that those in 
the category which ‘oppress’ those in the identity group all benefit from the 
oppression and that the ‘oppressor’ can never work for the betterment of the 
oppressed.
Young believes that these assumptions themselves originate from two 
foundational binaries; the split between us and them and the split between active 
oppressor and active resistor. Under the former ‘identity politics movements 
represent people who share a common identity and who are oppressed as a group 
on the basis of that identity by people who share a different, “opposite” identity’ 
(1997: 55). The second binary describes a situation in which those in the 
oppressor group are complicitous with the power system and will actively defend 
their position; against this the members of the oppressed group actively resist their 
oppression and build solidarity and partnerships with others in the oppressed 
position. However, because of the complexity of both oppression and identity it is
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rarely, if ever, that simplistic. Not everyone who is queer shares the same 
relationship with non-queers because of the intersection of multiple other axes of 
difference and oppression. This has led some (privileged) organisations and 
individuals to speak on behalf of all queers in a way that ignores, for example, 
race, class, gender or age. Furthermore ‘one of the most common -  and most 
devastating -  manifestations of these assumptions is an unwillingness to work 
sincerely to establish coalitions with people who share political goals even as they 
inhabit different subcultures’ (Young 1997: 57). The four key assumptions 
outlined above can all be exemplified in the trans inclusion/exclusion debate; in 
illustrating this I argue that the organisation follows an ethnic/essentialist model of 
identity (see chapter 5)
Most salient for the purpose of this thesis is the fact that all gay people are 
believed to share the same view of their oppression and that the ‘oppressor’ can 
never work for the benefit of the ‘oppressed’. For instance, when bisexual or 
transgender inclusion in lesbian and gay events is discussed a main argument 
against such inclusion is that there is infiltration of the ‘oppressor’ into the 
minority group; a bisexual is tainted by heterosexuality and is therefore 
unwelcome, whilst a male to female transsexual wanting access to women-only 
spaces is really a man and therefore also unwelcome, (Hemmings 2002; Gamson 
1996). Of fundamental importance is the notion that ‘underlying that ethnicity is 
typically the notion that what gays and lesbian share -  the anchor of minority 
status and minority rights claims -  is the same fixed, natural essences, a self with 
same-sex desires’ (Gamson 1996: 396). Whilst this form of politics may be 
successful in achieving short term goals for a specific group of people, it will 
always be exclusionary, both towards sympathetic ‘oppressors’ (in this case, 
heterosexuals) and those who share a differing nature of oppression.
This model of identity has come under heavy criticism from those in both 
feminist and LGB movements; ‘in the 1980s, there was a reaction to this 
ethnic/essentialist model by marginalised social interests (e.g., gay people of 
colour and sex radicals), by activists wishing to renew a more radical gay politics, 
and by a new cadre of scholar-intellectuals trumpeting the politics of difference’
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(Seidman 1993: 110). This ‘new cadre of scholar-intellectuals’ are, amongst 
others, the queer theorist working in the wake of people such as Derrida and 
Foucault who began to critique the very idea of a sexual identity, thereby heavily 
problematising current political activism. Although the ethnic model was 
culturally dominant there were increasing calls from dissident voices within gay 
and lesbian communities that begun to be heard, resultantly, ‘from minor 
skirmishes in the mid-to-late 1970s to major wars through the 1980s, the concept 
of a unitary lesbian or gay male subject was in dispute’ (Seidman 1993: 118). The 
achievement of queer was to shake ‘the ground on which gay and lesbian politics 
have been built, taking apart the ideas of a “sexual minority” and a “gay 
community”, indeed of “gay” and “lesbian”, and even “man” and “woman”’ 
(Gamson 1996: 395). The following section will elucidate some of major 
concerns of queer theory.
Queering Identity
Queer theory is less a matter of explaining the repression or expression of 
a homosexual minority than an analysis of the hetero/homosexual figure 
as a power/knowledge regime that shapes the ordering of desires, 
behaviours, and social institutions, and social relations - in a word the 
constitution of the self and society (Seidman 1995: 128).
Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the dominant.
There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers. It is an 
identity without essence (Halperin 1995: 62 original emphasis)
“Queer” theories ... work to challenge and undercut any attempt to 
render “identity” singular, fixed, or normal (Hall 2003: 15)
The preference for “queer” represents, among things, an aggressive 
impulse of generalisation; it rejects a minoritising logic of toleration or 
simple political interest-representation in favour of a more thorough 
resistance to regimes of the normal (Warner 1993: xxvi)
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Queer is, then, several things: first, it is defined against the normal, against 
Rubin’s (1984) ‘charmed circle’ of heterosexual, monogamous and vanilla sex. 
Second, it rejects fixed and stable identities in favour of multiple, fluid identities. 
Third, it is a universalising political strategy that seeks to provide a thorough­
going understanding of the position of sexual minorities in society. Importantly, 
queer is not restricted to those who are lesbian, gay or bisexual; anyone who 
rejects dominant sexual ideology can be queer. Queer critiques many of the pillars 
on which identity politics is based; if identity is fluid, then to what does ‘gay 
identity’ refer? Queer is not amenable to Young’s (1997) understanding of 
identity politics, and, indeed, actually argues against some of them. Because 
queer is an identity without an essence those who identify as queer will originate 
from different subject positions and will have differing opinions on the nature of 
their oppression. Furthermore, queer’s analysis of oppression is more 
sophisticated than that of identity politics; the oppressor is not heterosexuals per 
se, but rather a compulsory binary sex/gender system that attempts to divide 
individuals into the categories of male or female, straight or gay. Therefore one 
could be heterosexual and still reject the dominant sex/gender ideology, and be 
supportive of queer politics.
However, the situation is more complex when one considers Young’s 
foundational binaries (between us and them, and between active oppressors and 
active resistors) and queer politics. The four quotations opening this section 
clearly place queer in opposition whatever is ‘normal’. Whilst ‘resistance to 
regimes of the normal’ is arguably a more sophisticated analysis of homosexual 
oppression than that offered by identity politics it still institutes a split between 
queers (us) on one hand and ‘normals’ (them) on the other. Similarly queer can be 
seen as an active resistance to normative constructions of sexuality as exemplified 
by the celebration of non-normative sexualities within queer theory and politics. 
Queer also identifies active oppressors who work to uphold binary understandings 
of gender and sexuality, such as revisionist psychiatry and the definitions of 
medicalisation of gender identity (Butler 2004, Sedgwick 1993). This, however, is
69
not necessarily an insurmountable problem, rather it is recognition that ‘in efforts 
to define a sexual identity outside the norm, one needs first to place oneself inside 
the dominant definitions of sexuality’ (Namaste 1996: 199). The task then 
becomes to analyse the relationships between us and them, heterosexuality and 
homosexuality, maleness and femaleness, as well as the origins of such 
relationships.
Judith Butler and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s works of the early 1990’s are 
often regarded as foundational of queer theory. The impact of Gender Trouble 
(1999 [1990]) was enormous, whilst Bodies that Matter (1993), if less 
groundbreaking, clarified some of Butler’s ideas. Epistemology o f the Closet 
(1990) is also an oft cited text. However, whilst Butler and Sedgwick are similar 
in some ways, they differ in approach and understanding in some contexts. An 
obvious difference is the theoretical grounding of each theorist; Butler is a 
philosopher and is well versed in feminist theory and demonstrates an increasing 
desire to use psychoanalysis in her work; Sedgwick has a background in literary 
theory and often uses a more deconstructive method. The focus of both theorists 
also differs; Butler is concerned with the formation of identity, including gender 
and sexual identity; whilst Sedgwick shows more concern with gay and lesbian 
identity, often specifically gay male identity (Sedgwick 1985).
I now intend to compare Butler and Sedgwick in three broad areas that are 
of particular pertinence to my research. These areas are the relationship of sex to 
gender; issues of identity, including collective; and performativity.
Butler begins with the claim that gender is the ‘cultural meanings that the 
sexed body assumes’ (1999: 10), which suggests that there is no connection 
between sex and gender -  masculine could identify a female body and feminine 
could identify a male body. The problem that Butler has with this argument is that 
this does not explain how a sex or gender is given, nor does it question the 
construction of the category ‘sex’. She opines that ‘if the immutable character of 
sex is contested, perhaps this construct called “sex” is as culturally constructed as 
gender; indeed, perhaps it was already gender, with the consequence that the 
distinction between sex and gender turns out to be no distinction at all’ (1999:10-
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11). Therefore if sex is itself gendered it is nonsensical to term gender the cultural 
figuration of sex. Butler claims, furthermore, that gender is the means by which 
‘“sexed nature” or “a natural sex” is produced and established as “prediscursive,” 
prior to culture, a politically neutral surface on which culture acts’ (1999: 11). 
This construction of sex in terms of gender stabilises the idea of binary sex as 
natural, with the consequence that those who transgress are regarded as not 
natural. Conversely, however, that sex is now not an immutable category raises 
the potential of radical change, of a radical destabilisation of ‘sex’. This argument 
would render the claims of certain Executive Committee members that sex refers 
to sexuality whilst gender refers to gender identity nonsensical. That Executive 
Committee members, including those advocating exclusion, appear more 
supportive of transsexuals than transgendered people is, in part, because they view 
sex as mutable whilst gender is immutable. In this way, transsexuals should be 
supported because their gender is fixed and their body requires altering to fit that 
gender. If Butler is correct, however, sex and gender are culturally constructed, 
rendering both open to transgression; the effect of this is that transsexualism 
cannot necessarily be seen as a normative upholding of gender norms, more 
worthy of support than transgender. This point is important to note, as there is a 
general dichotomy in the constructions of transgender made by the Executive 
Committee members between transsexuals (acceptable) on one hand and 
transvestites (unacceptable) on the other. However, Butler’s assertion shows that 
this does not have to be the case and that there is nothing inherent about 
transsexuality that makes it less radical that transvestism.
Sedgwick starts from a similar place to Butler, arguing that the traditional 
view of gender and sex was that sex was purely chromosomal, whilst gender was 
the cultural construct mapped in binary opposition onto sex, ‘in a cultural system 
for which “male/female” functions as a primary and perhaps model binarism 
whose apparent connection to chromosomal sex will often be exiguous or 
nonexistent’ (1990: 27-8). This analysis is, however, not satisfactory as ‘sex’ as a 
signifier is infinitely broader and more varied than chromosomal sex, and she cites 
the fact that sex and gender are often terms conflated by those not fully conversant
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with feminist theory as only one problem. Sedgwick posits that many feminists in 
linking women’s oppression to women’s bodies (their sex) severely problematises 
the productiveness of the sex/gender distinction and further, that sex/gender 
delineates a site of struggle as opposed to a solid definition. Here Sedgwick 
makes a practical, but needed, distinction between sex and gender for the purpose 
of her book; gender relates to all the differences between men and women; sex 
relates to sexuality.
This points to further difficulties with the idea of a sex/gender, 
nature/nurture system, in that it is almost impossible to adequately map sexuality 
onto such a binary. On this basis, Sedgwick argues that whilst gender and 
sexuality are related, they are not coextensive. Nevertheless, Sedgwick does argue 
that in contemporary society ‘sexuality’ refers to an individual’s preferred gender 
of object choice, rather than any of the others ways in which one could 
differentiate sexual behaviour. This brings her closer to Butler, as Sedgwick terms 
what for Butler is sex and gender solely as gender; this is ‘to reduce the likelihood 
of confusion between “sex” in the sense of “the space of differences between male 
and female” (what I’ll be grouping under “gender”) and “sex” in the sense of 
sexuality’ (Sedgwick 1990: 29). This is not to deny interconnections between 
gender and sex, but rather to distinguish them analytically. Central to this is the 
fact that Sedgwick views sexuality as being about more than just gender, although 
that is how it is currently constructed.
Much work critical of identity politics (Spelman 1990; Fuss 1989) has 
focused on the troubling of collective identity; all women, or all homosexuals do 
not share the same structural position, therefore it makes no sense for them to be 
grouped together as a cohesive body. I intend to consider the ways in which one 
can deliberate collective identity from a queer perspective. Here I am less 
concerned with causes of identity, be they constructed, essential, performative and 
so on. Rather I intend to look at whether one can conceptualise groups whilst 
maintaining a poststructural frame of reference. It is first necessary to discuss 
some of the ways in which in which it has been argued that poststructural/queer 
theory forecloses the collective.
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Kirsch argues against Foucault’s conception of power, claiming that, ‘if we 
proceed beyond the philosophical or psychological level and confront the political 
as collective action, does it not make more sense to view power as a mechanism 
rather that a driver of social control’ (2000: 24). He objects to the primacy 
Foucault gives to power as a discourse capable of controlling and shaping society, 
seeing it rather as an effect of agency. He further argues that ‘it is certainly easier 
to deconstruct theories of social being than to construct modes of social action’ 
(2000: 31, original emphasis), within the confines of the academy. This seems to 
miss the point that it might be necessary to deconstruct theories of social being 
before one can (re)construct modes of social action. One must understand one’s 
identity before one can use it as a basis of collective action. As Hall argues, 
‘historicising and “deconstructing” are ways of differentially imagining our future 
as well as understanding our past. Identity is always fiction, in the sense that it 
must suppress complexity and isolate a defining characteristic (or a limited set of 
characteristics) from a wide range of possibilities, but to say this is in no way to 
deny the fact that I may be killed or imprisoned because of it’ (2003: 46). Even 
Marx, whom Kirsch takes as exemplary of those who favour action over theory, 
first had to take apart the prevalent notions of the capitalist mode of production as 
the benevolent product of Enlightenment rationality, before he could propose the 
ways and means of overthrowing capitalism. It is important to remember that, for 
Butler, ‘the category of women does not become useless through deconstruction, 
but becomes one whose uses are no longer reified as “referents,” and which stand 
a chance of being opened up, indeed, of coming to signify in ways that none of us 
can predict in advance’ (1993: 29). Deconstruction can, then, by questioning the 
referents, open up new forms of political action that have been hitherto un-thought 
of.
Furthermore, Kirsch argues that ‘the use of “power” for queer theorists is 
itself reflective; you can subvert its hegemony by refusing to conform to its 
practices. In so far as being political involves the exercise of power, individual 
action is political, it is subjective’ (2000: 36). The assumption Kirsch makes here 
is that because the political action of subversion is individual it cannot therefore
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benefit the collective. However, if all queers practised individual acts of 
subversion all the time, would that not at the very least trouble regimes of 
normative heterosexuality? Whilst this probably would not solve all the problems, 
it would be a step in the right direction; it is a mistake to dismiss individual action 
as readily as Kirsch does. As will become clear, Kirsch’s main problem is that he 
is unable to conceptualise modes of political action that fall outside the politics of 
the old left.
According to Kirsch, queer theory is an extreme, anti-political and highly 
relativist reaction to essentialising theories of identity and experience. He argues 
that ‘claiming that categories, labels, and identities are restrictive has the same 
social effect as arguments against affirmative action which claim that all 
categories should be eliminated’ (2000: 59), adding that the detrimental effects of 
anti-affirmative action theories are evident, however, sadly not providing any 
example of such deleterious effect. I would argue that whilst those who are 
categorised, labelled and identifies duly suffer discrimination, further reinscribing 
these categories in affirmative action plans can have a negative impact because 
specific groups are singled out for special treatment, rather that attempting to 
change the attitudes of the entire population.
Kirsch also posits that ‘for those of us that believe alliances are necessary, 
identity is based on a commonality of experience. “Class” and “lesbian” and 
“homosexual” are categories of analysis precisely because they refer to the 
position of people in relation to others’ (2000: 59-60). This is a highly 
problematic statement; the main point of much anti-essentialist work has been to 
show that, for example, all women or gay people do not have a commonality of 
experience. Moreover, Kirsch presumes that class, lesbian and homosexual are 
stable categories that refer to a stable other. This is not the case; partly because of 
the intersection of multiple categories, the members of a category, such as 
‘homosexual’ have a differential relationship with others in the same category as 
well as those without. Ironically Kirsch himself implicitly recognises this; if he 
did not, ‘lesbians’ would not have been included in his list. If ‘homosexual’ was 
an adequate category of analysis then one would not require a second analytic
74
category of female homosexuals; it shows a (minor) recognition that not all 
‘homosexuals’ share the same relations to others. However, Kirsch does not 
recognise this and treats identity categories as unproblematic markers of society. 
One of the central themes of queer politics is that identity politics is exclusionary; 
this problem is clear in Kirsch’s work. If ‘identity is based on a commonality of 
experience’ that identity will exclude those who have not shared in the common 
experiences; political alliances are therefore based on personal experiences, rather 
than a shared political ideology for which common experience is not required. 
This is a theme that will be expanded upon in chapter 8.
Further evidence of Kirsch’s misunderstanding of queer comes in his 
assertion that ‘the self as non-conformist [the queer subject] becomes part of a 
stance that disengages politics as a reality of daily life’ (2000: 79). I would argue 
the converse; taking a conscious non-conformist stance explicitly brings politics 
into daily life. Part of the problem here is Kirsch’s unproblematic usage of the 
term ‘politics;’ he uses it to signify traditional oppositional politics and does not 
see the benefits of other forms of political action. Kirsch is, I believe, trying to 
institute a dichotomy into Butler’s work, which I do not recognise. He repeatedly 
makes claims such as, ‘the notion that women, people of colour or any other 
minority will be better off obtaining a consciousness that refuses to engage its 
oppressors ignores the people trying to make sense of their own subjugation’ 
(Kirsch 2000: 90). He also poses the question that as performativity is an 
individual act, how can one move from that to collective action. I argue that a 
queer ‘consciousness’ is a means for people to make sense of their subjugation and 
furnish them with new a creative politics with which to counteract the oppressors; 
it does not negate the existence of heterosexist oppressors. At the risk of sounding 
trite, if there was no heterosexism and homophobia, there would be no queer 
theory. With regard to the individualistic nature of performativity, I do not see 
this as precluding collective action. Kirsch appears to be implying that all 
members of a group must be virtually identical for collective action to take place. 
This negates the fact that ‘people are difference from each other’ (Sedgwick 1990: 
22), whilst they may share the same/similar relation to material effects. Kirsch
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also does not recognise that there are queer groups (such as Queer Nation, ACT- 
UP, and Outrage) that take part in collective political action and see a belief in the 
performative/constructionist nature of identity as constitutive of their collective 
identity. Hall (2003) notes that ‘the intellectual energy of and perspectives on 
strategic alliance promoted by “queer theory/theories” have motivated many of us 
[academic queer theorists] to volunteer our time, to engage in protest marches, and 
to work strenuously in political campaigns and campus forums to challenge 
narrow notions of sexual “propriety”’ (2003: 83). In contrast to this there is no 
notion in Queer Theory and Social Change that Kirsch has partaken in any form 
of collective political action on issues around sexuality.
It should also be noted that Butler has not claimed that gender and 
sexuality became performative only since the writing of Gender Trouble. She was 
merely discussing and analysing how identities have been constructed up to that 
time, and beyond. If one accepts this, then the identities of all those involved in 
Kirsch-approved modes of collective action were performatively constructed as 
well. This heavily problematises the assertion that one cannot have a performative 
identity and partake in collective action. Butler’s point is not that gender identity 
miraculously became an identity without essence in 1990, but that it has always 
been so. Furthermore, to deny that gender has an essential basis is not to deny that 
it has material effects.
Kirsch claims that ‘the recognition of common goals can give rise to an 
identification based on a common purpose,’ and that furthermore, ‘nor is it 
necessary actually to experience the reality of your cohorts to identify with 
common causes’ (2000: 101, original emphasis). He argues that, for example gay 
men and lesbians should work together to fight homophobia and overcome gender 
differences. I would agree with this point, however, this is the complete opposite 
of what Kirsch claimed forty pages previously. However, whilst I do not believe 
that political identity requires shared experiences, for the majority of Executive 
Committee members shared experience appears as the definitive marker of 
collective identity. This is evidenced by the claims that heterosexual 
transgendered people would not be welcome in the organisation as they would not
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know what it was like to be lesbian, gay or bisexual in a heterosexist society, and 
will be expanded upon in chapter 6.
The 1999 preface to the second edition of Gender Trouble helps to situate 
and clarify the earlier work; Butler writes of how she saw universality as a 
negative term, but later recognised that it has ‘important strategic uses precisely as 
a non substantial and open ended category as I worked with an extraordinary 
group of activists first a board member and then as board chair of the International 
Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (1994-7)’ (1999: xvii). Here she 
realises that universality could be useful, if remaining unstable and historically 
contingent. Identity can be deployed so long as its contingency is recognised; this 
however relies on those employing identity categories actually recognising this -  
as will become apparent throughout this thesis many Executive Committee 
members actively refuse the indeterminacy of identity in the process of advocating 
identity politics. In order to deploy any form of strategic essentialism one must 
first realise that the essentialism is strategic, rather than foundational.
Butler heavily questions the traditional notion that there is a stable 
category called ‘women’ that feminism can claim to represent. This is different 
from claiming that feminism does not represent anyone and is therefore redundant. 
Butler, somewhat counter-intuitively, claims that ‘the feminist subject turns out to 
be discursively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to 
facilitate its emancipation’ (1999: 4), this is based upon Foucault’s conception that 
juridical power operates to construct the subject it comes to represent, as well as 
Derrida’s notion of supplementarity. Therefore, feminists must also try to 
comprehend how it is that the power structures that facilitate emancipation also 
come to create ‘women’ as a subject. Furthermore, on a more political level there 
is a major contention regarding who is signified by ‘women’, asking the important 
question ‘is there some commonality among “women” that pre-exists their 
oppression, or do “women” have a bond by virtue of their oppression alone?’ 
(1999: 7). Whilst this is something that remains largely unconsidered by 
Executive Committee members, it is analytically useful. If the LGB subject is 
discursively constituted by the organisation, then it is the organisation itself that is
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excluding trans people, rather than there being any immanent reason why trans 
people should not be part of the organisation. The constitution of the LGB subject 
and the methods of its construction are central themes of this thesis and will be 
present in the following chapters.
Sedgwick is concerned with the minoritising logic of categorisation; she 
notes that the term ‘sexual orientation’ has come to refer solely to the sex of one’s 
object choice, rather than any of the other axes available to distinguish one 
person’s sexual practice from another’s. Similarly, her ‘Axiom 1’ is ‘people are 
different from each other’ claiming that ‘it is astonishing how few respectable 
conceptual tools we have for dealing with this self-evident fact’ (1990: 22). She 
remarks that it is mainly axes of class, race, gender and sexuality along which 
people are divided, axes which are generally so crude that the resultant 
categorisation is often meaningless. Sedgwick believes that much recent thought 
has been a crusade for such a crude taxonomy, and that, furthermore, there is less 
facility to think about individual differences. Whilst this has arguably changed in 
the seventeen years since the writing of Epistemology o f the Closet, the backlash 
against work which destabilises identity demonstrates that, for some, the 
taxonomic impulse is still strong. As will become apparent throughout this theses 
the organisation is attempting to enforce the crude taxonomy; the trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate is an attempt to rigidly define the boundaries of sexual 
identity. Regarding the ‘traditional’ axes of difference Sedgwick writes that 
‘Marxist, feminist, postcolonial, and other engage critical projects have deepened 
understandings of a few crucial axes of difference perhaps necessarily at the 
expense of more ephemeral or less global impulses of differential grouping’ 
(1990: 24). She then goes onto list many factors that complicate a simplistic 
definition of sexual orientation, such as a focus on particular body part; frequency; 
or the importance of ‘sexuality’ to an individuals self identity. These claims 
demonstrate the problematic, also identified by Butler and others, of universal 
accounts of existence. When looking at collective identity it illustrates the need 
for an understanding of the foundations of a collectivity that takes into account
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that each member of the group will be different to each other; yet they are able to 
work together.
An area that Sedgwick covers which Butler does not is the fact that claims 
to hold a non-heterosexual identity are often disbelieved or questioned in ways 
that someone claiming an identity based on, for instance, race, gender or religion, 
would not be questioned. Sedgwick draws parallels with the Biblical story of 
Esther, and its Racinian rendition. Esther declares her Jewishness to Assuerus, 
and her Jewishness is not debated, or called a phase, nor is there a discussion that 
Assuerus is a Jew in disguise, or a repressed Jew. This demonstrates a uniqueness 
in sexual identity that is not evident in coming out as, say, black, female, fat or 
Jewish; indeed, it would be difficult to ‘come out’ in some of these situations, as 
they are, more or less, self-evident. This could possibly be because it is only 
relatively recently that ‘homosexual’ has taken on a meaning as an identity, rather 
than having people who engage in certain acts, who have certain desires, but are 
not defined by them. It is however, not enough merely to question the 
construction of homosexual identity to dismantle it. Further, many people do 
decide to self-identify as gay or lesbian, and feel that it describes their lives, 
beliefs and, indeed, existence. Here Sedgwick notes that ‘even more at the level 
of groups than of individuals, the durability of any politics or ideology that would 
be so much as permissive of same-sex sexuality has seemed, in this century, to 
depend on definition of homosexual persons as a distinct, minority population, 
however produced or labelled’ (1990: 83 original emphasis). Similarly I would 
argue that any politics or ideology that is not permissive of same-sex sexuality 
also relies on this minoritising logic, although contrived in negative terms. This 
again raises Butler’s question (above) of whether the category of ‘homosexual’ is 
generally created by political expediency, by both anti-homophobic and 
homophobic groups, or whether it does suffice to describe a discrete and self- 
evident population. Sedgwick believes that ‘the homosexual’ has remained as a 
category, ‘not in the first place because of its meaningfulness to those whom it 
defines but because of its indispensableness to those who define themselves as 
against it’ (1990: 83). This poses challenges in explaining collective identity,
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particularly, political groups. If the homosexual identity is being sustained by 
those who define against it, rather than homosexuals themselves, does the constant 
iteration of gay rights, with its consonant homophobic disapproval, further solidify 
a stable homosexual identity which may not be in the best interests of gay, lesbian 
and bisexual people. If this is the case, the question of how to break this 
destructive cycle remains. This view is further enhanced by the claim that ‘the 
historically shifting, and precisely the arbitrary and self-contradictory, nature of 
the way homosexuality (along with its predecessor terms) has been defined in 
relation to the rest of the male homosocial spectrum has been an exceedingly 
potent and embattled locus of power over the entire range of male bonds, and 
especially over those that define themselves, not as homosexual, but as against the 
homosexual’ (Sedgwick 1990: 185). Queer theory is itself implicated in this 
contradiction at the same time that it also studies this dilemma (Namaste 1996); I 
use this idea of supplementarity as a means to analyse and critique the identity 
work of Executive Committee members, therefore I show that in strictly defining 
the remit of the organisation to exclude transgender they are (albeit inadvertently) 
solidifying heterosexual identity as the other.
Sedgwick identifies two ways in which gender has been used to understand 
same-sex desire. The first is inversion; homosexuals are seen as the inverse of 
their ‘true sex’ -  gay men are sissy boys whilst lesbians are butch. Sedgwick 
notes that some claim that this delineates the heterosexual nature of desire. This 
view, however, produces a strange paradox; if a gay man is ‘a woman’s soul 
trapped in a man’s body’ (1990: 87), then the gay male couple would, according to 
this logic, be lesbians! The contrasting understanding is that of gender separatism; 
here the man-loving-man and woman-loving-woman are seen as at the very heart 
of that gender; there is no element of border crossing. Each view leads to very 
different political models. For instance, the gender-separatists would not condone 
actions that blurred the differences between genders. However, as chapter 5 on 
ethnic sexual identities will demonstrate, there is also another schema for thinking 
about gender and same-sex desire, that is, that gender and sexual desire are not 
connected. In this case gender identity is completely separated from and irrelevant
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to sexual identity. The problem with this theory is that in contemporary society, 
as recognised by Sedgwick, sexual orientation is defined by gender.
I now turn to a discussion of drag, performativity and identity. Since 
Gender Trouble was first published in 1990, drag as a political act came to be seen 
by many as the paradigmatic example of performativity. This, however, is another 
of the many misunderstandings of Butler’s work, as she writes that drag is merely 
an instance of gender performance; ‘it would be a mistake to take it as the 
paradigm of subversive action, or, indeed, as a model for political agency’ (1999: 
xxii). Furthermore, clarifying her earlier work she comments that ‘if drag is 
performative, that does not mean that all performativity is to be understood as 
drag; ... [and] I never did think that gender was like clothes’ (1993: 230-2). These 
comments address criticisms that Butler’s work is individualistic and largely 
apolitical. The foregoing evaluation of gender performativity should be read with 
this is mind.
Butler’s main contention regarding drag is that it ‘implicitly reveals the 
imitative structure o f  gender itse lf-  as well as its contingency’ (1999:175 original 
emphasis). She believes that drag subverts the space between a ‘true’ gender and 
sex; further, it demonstrates an inconsistency between three factors: chromosomal 
sex, gender identity and gender performance. Butler’s claim is not that gender 
parody is an imitation of an original, rather it is a parody of the very notion of an 
original. This substantiates the argument that there is no foundational referent to 
which gender refers. Whilst drag does, to some extent at least, imitate gender I 
would question its radicalism and subversion. This is based upon how one defines 
drag. Nowhere does Butler attempt to differentiate drag artists and transvestites. 
The Oxford English Dictionary definitions of the two words are pertinent here. 
Drag is ‘feminine attire worn by a man; also, a party or dance attended by men 
wearing feminine attire’ whilst a transvestite is ‘a person with an abnormal desire 
to wear the clothes of the opposite sex’. Here drag is something that is normalised 
because it is mainly in a party/dance setting, whilst the transvestite is seen as a 
deviant because the cross-dressing is not carried out in the ‘correct’ setting. Drag 
artists are seen as almost mainstream entertainment; witness the success of Lily
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Savage or Dame Edna Everage. People have indulged in (theatrical) drag for 
centuries; the seventeenth century molly houses, for example, or on the stage. 
This theatrical, hyperbolic performance has not entailed a radical reconfiguration 
of gender norms. However, with regard to wearing the clothes of the opposite sex 
as they would wear them, I believe there is a possibility for subversion; here the 
man (or woman) wears the same clothes that women (or men) wear, in public 
settings. This is an important point; Butler claims that drag imitates gender, 
however, drag only imitates some highly theatrical, stylised and hyperbolic 
version of gender, whereas transvestites, or indeed transsexuals, have the potential 
to imitate gender in a much more significant way. Nevertheless, there is 
something that many people find unsettling about those who wear the clothes of 
the opposite sex; this will be expanded upon in later chapters, especially chapter 6. 
Butler claims that drag reveals that gender is an imitation of an imitation without 
origin, however, one must question whether the drag artist, or a trans person more 
generally, realises this. For many people who wear clothes of the opposite sex, 
such as passing transsexuals or fetishistic transvestites, it is vitally important that 
there is an origin of the imitation. If there is no original ‘feminine’ which the 
passing MTF transsexual is attempting to imitate their entire transsexual project is 
rendered nonsensical. Similarly, for the fetishistic transvestite the arousal is 
caused by wearing women's clothes, not clothes that can be worn by anyone. I 
remain unconvinced that these practices reveal the imitative nature of gender in 
the way that Butler asserts that drag does. That Executive Committee members 
are more supportive of transgender behaviour that does not question binary gender 
will become clear in chapter 5.
This, however, does not negate the fact that ‘because there is neither an 
“essence” that gender expresses or externalises nor an objective ideal to which 
gender aspires, and because gender is not a fact, the various acts of gender create 
the idea of gender, and without those acts, there would be no gender at all* (1990: 
178). Gender gains its materiality via the constant reiteration and repetition of 
gender acts; ‘gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in 
exterior space through a stylised repetition o f acts' (179 original emphasis). It
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must be recognised that because gender is performatively constructed does not 
mean that gender does not have tangible and material effects. Much work on 
identity politics presupposes that they must be based on a foundational identity in 
order for collective action to take place. However, as Nietzsche (2003b [1887]) 
claimed over a hundred years ago, ‘there is no “being” behind doing, working, 
becoming; the “doer” is a mere appanage [sic] to the action ... [people] make the 
same phenomenon first a cause, and then, secondly, the effect of that cause’ 
(2003: 26) These theories merely indicate a different way of conceptualising 
identity and therefore opens up new ways of subverting gender; new modes of 
politics. As I have already commented, traditional identity politics can serve to 
reinscribe the heteronormative ideal: Butler agrees; she argues that the focus on 
binary opposition obscures the discursive formation of that binary. However, the 
‘reconceptualisation of identity as an effect, that is, as produced or generated, 
opens up the possibilities of “agency” that are insidiously foreclosed by positions 
that take identity as foundational and fixed’ (1990: 187 original emphasis). This is 
the radical queer activism that authors such as Kirsch (2000) fail to see as politics.
Bodies that Matter clarifies and expands upon ideas of drag and 
performativity. Butler discusses the film ‘Paris is Burning’ which describes the 
lives of a group of drag queens. She claims that the film ‘calls into question 
whether parodying the dominant norms is enough to displace them; indeed 
whether the denaturalisation of gender cannot be the very vehicle for a 
reconciliation of hegemonic norms’ (1993: 125). Butler writes that there is no 
certain relation between subversive acts and drag; rather, the important part in 
claiming that gender is like drag is to reveal the mimetic structure of normative 
heterosexuality. This mimetic nature opens up possibilities for destabilisation, 
because there is no original that gender copies; however, drag may not be the best 
example of subversive activity. Notwithstanding this, ‘drag is subversive to the 
extent that it reflects on the imitative structure by which hegemonic gender is itself 
produced and disputes heterosexuality’s claim on naturalness and originality’ 
(Butler 1993: 125).
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Referring to Austin’s claims that performative acts are a type of 
authoritative speech (I name this . . I pronounce you ...) Butler argues that ‘if the 
power of discourse to produce that which it names is linked with the question of 
performativity, then the performative is one domain in which power acts as 
discourse’ (1993: 225 original emphasis). Butler further explains that 
performative speech gains its power not simply by its iteration, but through the 
conventions in which it is uttered; ‘the citational legacy by which a contemporary 
“act” emerges in the context of a chain of binding conventions’ (1993: 225). It is 
through the reiterative process of discourse that power is realised.
Butler opines that whilst drag is one way to theorise cross-gender 
identification, one must not conflate cross gender identification with 
homosexuality. She comments that most drag artists are, in fact, straight which 
complicates any possible link between drag and homosexuality. However, Butler 
claims that the use of this analysis is that it demonstrates the manner in which 
heterosexual genders formulate themselves ‘through the renunciation of the 
possibility of homosexuality’ (1993: 235 original emphasis).
Conclusions
In response to claims that those who question identity categories depoliticise 
theory, Butler argues that ‘as much as identity terms must be used, as much as 
“outness” is to be affirmed, these same notions must become subject to a critique 
of the exclusionary operations of their own production’ (1993: 227). Who are 
represented by different affiliational terms? Are the choices of terms affected by, 
for instance, class? Who is excluded by this taxonomic process? These are all 
questions that need to be asked before one can hope to understand collective 
identity. In this context Butler believes that the ‘necessity to mobilise the 
necessary error of identity (Spivak’s term) will always be in tension with the 
democratise contestation of the term which works against its deployment in racist 
and misogynist discursive regimes’ (1993: 229). If political identity is then, a 
necessary error, whatever affiliatory term is used, be it queer, gay, or something 
else, it will have to remain contingent and flexible so that it can represent as
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munch as is possible those it claims to represent. These themes will be present 
throughout the remaining chapters; the exclusionary effects of the terms lesbian, 
gay, bisexual and transgender will be considered.
This chapter has situated the inclusion/exclusion debate within the larger 
framework of LGB history and activism, which has demonstrated that the context 
of the debate is historically and culturally specific. Debates concerning inclusion 
and exclusion surrounding issues of gender and sexuality are nothing new, nor will 
they be resolved in the near future, however, this shows that Morton Hall’s 
decision on the matter is unlikely to be the last word for the organisation. As 
subsequent chapters show, whilst Morton Hall has fixed the identity of the 
organisation for now, the fixing is precarious and likely to change.
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5E t h n ic /E s s e n t ia l is t  Id e n t it ie s
In Chapter 4 on queer theory it was stated that the organisation tended to rely on 
an ethnic/essentialist model of identity; the current chapter will demonstrate this. 
Later chapters consider how transgender identities are seen as a polluting 
influence (Chapter 6) and as transgressive (Chapter 7), however, this chapter 
focuses on the separation of gender and sexuality. I argue that the separation of 
sexual identity from gender identity is central to the construction of Morton Hall’s 
identity. This chapter also asserts that many Executive Committee members rely 
upon essentialist and minoritising views of gender and sexuality that tend to 
contribute to the ethnicisation (Seidman 1993) of sexual orientation. I elaborate 
on the ways in which Young’s (1997) understandings of identity politics 
organisations fit Morton Hall and claim that all her criteria can be fulfilled, 
particularly with regard to the identity of the organisation as a whole, rather than 
the individual Executive Committee members. I also highlight several 
contradictions in the debate that are as yet unresolved. I demonstrate that whilst 
many Executive Committee members articulate views that tend to fix and 
essentialise sexual and gender identity they are also accepting of some other views 
that tend to destabilise identity to some extent.
As Chapter 3 has indicated, transgender identity can be very closely linked 
to sexual identity, to the extent that some have argued that sexual orientation is 
better conceptualised as cross-gender behaviour. This chapter will demonstrate 
how this perspective has been repudiated by the majority of Executive Committee 
members. Most Executive Committee members, throughout the debate, have 
referred to transgender people, however, in most cases it is apparent that they are 
actually referring to transsexual people.
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Ethnic Homosexualities
This section seeks to understand some of the ways in which the Executive 
Committee members construct an ethnic identity politics model of sexual and 
gender identity (see Chapter 4 for more details on this style of politics). The 
following extract come from the final meeting where trans inclusion/exclusion 
was discussed and therefore represent the conclusions of the organisation. Evelyn 
was chairing this particular meeting, and is summing up many of the comments 
made by committee members earlier in the meeting.
Evelyn: can I suggest, I think, someone made a point to me that it is right 
that transgender issues are not exclusive to issues of sexuality, it 
would be a bit like saying lesbian gay bisexual and black people 
or lesbian gay bisexual and disabled people, a kind of added 
group on the end and I think that’s very logical because I've had 
lots of difficulties, on one hand my heart is saying well this is a 
group that is oppressed has enormous difficulty and 
discrimination and shouldn’t we support that because we 
understand some of that, if we can’t always relate to it, on the 
other hand thinking we can’t do that but I kind of I support the
view that we make it clear that we are here to support
transgender people who are lesbian gay or bisexual and then in 
any way we can help articulate the argument for transgender 
people in [area] to receive funding and perhaps support them as 
Ashley is suggesting seems to me a good way forward.
Here we have the oft repeated claim that transgender issues and sexuality are 
different; the difference between transgender and LGB is the same as the 
difference between LGB and disability or race. This could either be a real attempt 
to create distance between sexuality and transgender issues, or it could 
demonstrate an awareness of the difficulties of representation; adding the ‘T’ on 
the end would not be enough on its own to resolve the problem, part of a
recognition that ‘for all the name changes, queer politics has yet to reflect any real
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transformation in analyses or agendas’ (Young 1997: 51). As a way of 
circumventing this problem, Lauren suggested (in an interview) that Morton Hall 
could ‘acknowledge that sexuality is an essentially contested concept and is based 
on gender of object choice, and that there might be people who don’t fit neatly 
into these first categories [LGB], but we will still undertake to help them if we 
can’. This would mean that Morton Hall would define its remit as LGB, purely 
for the purpose of funding, but would retain an understanding that that definition 
was a simplistic one that obscured the realities of gender and sexual identities. 
Evelyn says that we (LGB people) understand some of the oppression suffered by 
transgender people, (even ‘if we can’t always relate to it’), leading her to think 
that the organisation should support trans people; this shows that she is aware that 
there are similarities in the experience of oppression and discrimination suffered 
by both lesbian, gay and bisexual people and transgender people, however, in 
saying that we can’t always relate to the difficulties and discrimination of trans 
people she succeeds in putting enough space between the two groups of people to 
support trans exclusion. In saying this, Evelyn is giving support to one of 
Young’s key assumptions (elucidated upon in Chapter 4) that people in the same 
identity group will share an understanding of their oppression.
Evelyn claims that we cannot always relate to the trans experience of 
oppression, and therefore by default cannot fully share an understanding of their 
oppression, however, the converse of this is the implication that all LGB people 
can relate to the difficulty and discrimination experienced by other LGB people. 
This move homogenises all LGB experience in an attempt to foster a sense of 
collective identity that excludes trans people. This move says that the experience 
of living in a heterosexist society is the same for gay men, lesbians and bisexuals 
and eclipses differences between those groups, furthermore, it denies the historical 
differences in lesbian and gay male politics. Evelyn then goes onto to advocate 
the organisation supporting LGB trans people as well as helping non LGB trans 
people find funding for an organisation of their own. That Evelyn argues that one 
has trouble relating to trans experiences implicitly says that one must relate to a 
particular identity position, or political issue, to be able to campaign on it; Lauren
states that ‘I don’t believe that for a moment that everyone who campaigns for 
choice with regard to abortion has had, or will have, an abortion, yet they can 
campaign for those aims, so why do you need to be of a specific identity to try to 
further stated aims?’ However, as will become apparent (below) being of a 
specific identity is paramount for Morton Hall. This also evidences Young’s 
second claim regarding identity politics -  that the oppression relating to that 
identity is the primary oppression for people in that group. This extract, from the 
first meeting in which trans inclusion/exclusion was discussed, reinforces this:
Lauren: So, for example, one is a transsexual lesbian -  who do you go to for help?
Morgan: You are part of the LGB.
For the transsexual lesbian, then, their sexuality is of greater importance than their 
gender identity. They are part of the LGB organisation because of their sexuality 
rather than their gender identity. Similarly, Evelyn, in the above extract, states 
that Morton Hall is here to help lesbian, gay and bisexual trans people. However, 
this misses the point of Lauren’s question. This is not about an ‘ordinary’ lesbian, 
or an ‘ordinary’ transsexual, but about a lesbian transsexual, who may well have 
significantly different issues from other lesbians. For example, she could be 
having problems with a local lesbian community group because she is a 
transsexual. For most Executive Committee members there appears to be a 
complete lack of understanding that any of the oppressions suffered by transsexual 
LGB people could be because the person is a transsexual and lesbian, gay or 
bisexual.
Here we find support for Seidman’s claim that ‘gay identity politics moves 
back and forth between a narrow single interest-group politic and a view of 
coalition politics as the sum of separate identity communities, each locked into its 
own sexual, gender, class or racial politic’ (1993: 105). Evelyn’s statement 
institutionalises the separation of gender and sexual politics and defines separate 
organisations for each; although LGB transgender people will be supported, it will 
be on the basis of their sexual identity rather than their gender identity. She is
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therefore advocating a coalition politics between two groups that are both locked 
into their own specific sexual and gender politic, and both presumably having a 
shared sense of their oppression, and so on. In this separation of gender politics 
from sexual politics we can see one of the differences between the ethnic identity 
politics mode of organising and the earlier gay liberation politics examined earlier. 
For gay liberationists, the movement was not only about sexuality but also about 
gender; ‘gay liberation is more than a movement to liberate eros; it is a gender 
revolution. The struggle against the homo/hetero dichotomy is intertwined with 
the struggle against a sex role system that views masculinity and femininity as 
mutually exclusive categories of gender identity’ (Seidman 1993: 113-4). It is 
therefore evident that some of the queer arguments for trans inclusion employed in 
the debate are not particularly new, as gay liberation was articulating them thirty 
years ago. In part one can see identity politics as a reaction to earlier gay 
liberation discourse that viewed the self as essentially polymorphously perverse 
and inherently bisexual (Altman 1974), and as an attempt to fix identity in more 
static terms, partly in response to the AIDS crisis. Moreover, queer can be viewed 
as a return to some of the ideas of gay liberation, although without its 
‘millennialism and vanguardism’ (Seidman 1993: 114). This is part of ongoing 
debates in gay politics between those that advocate assimilation and inclusion in 
heterosexual society or difference and critique of that society; in essence debates 
over what being gay, lesbian or bisexual means. It is important to note that 
although excluding transgender people from the organisation, Evelyn (and the 
organisation as a whole) is still supportive of trans people, in that the desire to 
gain funding for a separate trans group is expressed. However, if and when a 
separate trans group is created, this would formally institute a categorical 
difference between sexuality and gender, with both organisations probably 
following an ethnic/essentialist model of identity.
On this point it is worth reinforcing the fact that, as Chapter 4 argues, 
whilst gay liberation was concerned primarily with homosexuality, transgender 
was generally included within the definition of homosexuality. As Weeks argues 
‘there is an obvious affinity in the causes of social hostility to both homosexuality
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and transvestism, and this was generally recognised in the early gay liberation 
movement’ (1977: 224 see Chapter 4). Homosexuals, transvestites and 
transsexuals are all people on whom society has failed to enforce gender 
normative behaviour, therefore they can often suffer the same fates. This means 
that an argument for trans inclusion can be made on the grounds that similar issues 
affect both LGB and trans issues; this point is made by Mel in an interview. In 
response to a question asking why she became involved with Morton Hall, she 
replied ‘to bring the common issues between transgenderism and the gay 
community forward. There are a lot of common issues as far as hate crime, 
housing, adoption and marriage are concerned.’ However, for the majority of 
Executive Committee members the only issues that were mentioned with regard to 
trans people related to transition and gender recognition, as will be elucidated in 
the following section. This is to illustrate that an identity politics or ethnic model 
of identity would not necessarily have to exclude transgender from the 
organisation. In Chapter 8 I touch upon how ‘queer’ could also operate in a 
similar fashion.
In the concluding meeting on the subject of transgender 
inclusion/exclusion there was a short discussion concerning the need for some 
kind of public pronouncement, so that (heterosexual) trans people do not put 
themselves forward for election onto the Executive Committee.
Jackie: just in terms of the elections is there going to be some statement 
made, so the transgender community know because some might 
put themselves forward for election, to make it clear they need to 
be lesbian gay or bisexual 
Jerry: I think we probably need a more general statement that says 
Morton Hall is involved in campaigning on equality for lesbian 
gay and bisexual people whether they are older younger 
transgender BME [black and minority ethnic] disabled you know 
Evelyn: we do need to make that absolutely clear that people are seeking 
election on the basis of their sexuality not their gender
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This clearly demonstrates that Morton Hall relies upon ethnic, essentialist and 
minoritising understandings of gender and sexual identity. The boundaries of the 
organisation are being sharply defined by Jackie, Jerry and Evelyn given that it 
relates to the necessity of a public statement on trans exclusion from the 
organisation; such a statement needs to be made so that transgender individuals do 
not put themselves forward for election onto the Executive Committee. In 
essence, the ‘transgender community’ need to know that they are unwelcome in 
the organisation; moreover, this quote demonstrates that Jackie thinks that such a 
‘community’ does exist. In the area covered by the organisation, whilst there are 
obviously transgender individuals, there is not a transgender community in the 
same sense that one could speak of a gay community. This does however, perhaps 
reveal that Jackie thinks that a transgender community could, or should, exist. 
This is comparable to the third of Young’s key assumptions about identity politics 
-  all members of an identity group are natural allies by virtue of their shared 
position -  all transgender people should be natural allies and form a community by 
virtue of their shared identity. This negates any difference between transgender 
people; between male-to-female and female-to-male transsexuals; between pre-op, 
post-op and non-op transsexuals; between transsexuals, transvestites, transgenders 
and other genderqueers who have no desire to change gender; between those who 
think gender is essential and those who think gender is fluid. It ignores the 
multiplicity of, and differences in, transgender identity and politics discussed in 
Chapter 3. Jackie also implies that such people are all either unproblematically 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or by inference, heterosexual; this is perhaps more likely 
for a gender essentialist transsexual, however someone who is genderqueer will 
have far more difficulty in defining themselves as such.
In this extract one can clearly see the two foundational binaries identified 
by Young (1997) in operation, those of ‘us and them’ and ‘active oppressors and 
resistors’. With regard to the first binary, ‘there are only two main groups, for all 
practical purposes, and they are easily distinguishable from each other: we know 
who belongs in each group (e.g., blacks and whites, women and men, 
homosexuals and heterosexuals)’ (Young 1997: 55). Jackie, Jerry and Evelyn are
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all emphasising that the remit of Morton Hall is solely sexuality; it is sexuality 
which distinguishes the two groups from each other. The common identity for 
those who are part of the organisation is homosexuality and heterosexuals are 
clearly unwelcome. Jerry claims that Morton Hall is ‘involved in campaigning on 
equality for lesbian, gay and bisexual people.’ However, campaigning for LGB 
equality is something that can be done by anyone, regardless of their sexual 
preferences, as Lauren argues at several points in her interview (see Chapter 8). 
Here one can see that Jerry is deploying a minoritising understanding of sexuality; 
homo- and bi- sexuality are only of importance to those who identity as LGB. 
Those who identify as LGB are also seen as having a similar view of the causes of 
their oppression. That Evelyn says that people have to be seeking election on the 
basis of their sexuality, rather than gender, demonstrates a belief that there is 
something special about having a lesbian, gay or bisexual identity that will 
predispose people to sharing the aims of the organisation.
Furthermore, Jackie says that ‘some might put themselves forward for 
election’ which indicates a fear that the organisation would be corrupted and 
polluted by non-LGB trans people. This suggests that if such trans people were to 
join the governing body of the organisation, its direction would be materially 
affected in a detrimental way. This is an example of Young’s fourth assumption 
about identity politics; ‘those in the “oppressor” group all benefit directly, 
consciously, and equally from the subordination of the “oppressed” group, and 
thus are rarely or never allies of the oppressed (e.g. all men, regardless of race, 
class, etc, enjoy higher status and more power than do all women; there’s no such 
thing as a heterosexual ally to queer movements); and so forth’ (Young 1997: 55). 
Here we can see a fear that heterosexual people would be joining the organisation, 
and that heterosexuality, regardless of any other minority position, places them in 
the ‘oppressor’ class as opposed to the ‘oppressed’ LGB class, Jackie’s point is 
reinforced by Evelyn, who says that people must be ‘seeking election on the basis 
of their sexuality not their gender’. This clearly marks the organisation as solely 
about sexuality, and separates this issue from gender; only LGB people can 
campaign and work on LGB issues. This proclamation also effectively excludes
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any heterosexuals, who may or may not be trans, who are supportive of LGB 
rights from being in the organisation. This relates back to the binary between 
active oppressors and active resistors that is so important for identity politics 
organisations. Under this categorisation:
Members of the oppressed identity group naturally resist the power 
structures that facilitate their oppression and that confer privileges upon 
those who belong to the other, opposite, oppressing identity group; unless 
they are suffering from extreme self hatred, they feel solidarity with 
others who share their identity and they act accordingly. Hence 
oppressed people need only mobilise “our own kind” in order to 
strengthen our movements and achieve our goals. (Young 1997: 55).
This assumption that all those who identify as LGB will share similar 
perspectives, and that Morton Hall need only have LGB people in the 
organisation, is evident in the above Executive Committee meeting extract. This 
further illustrates the minoritising nature of Morton Hall’s comprehension of 
sexual identity; the organisation can only have LGB members because non LGB 
members would be active oppressors who would work contrary to the aims of 
Morton Hall.
Sexuality, then, for the Executive Committee members is about far more 
than the sex of the person you fuck; it is a discrete, stable identity that means one 
will have certain opinions about one’s oppression. This, of course, raises the 
problem of defining sexuality; what does one have to do to be a good lesbian, gay 
man or bisexual? I posit that to be a good LGB individual for the organisation one 
has to believe that an LGB sexual orientation is the marker of an identity that is 
unproblematically separate from heterosexuality and therefore says something 
more about the individual that the gendered location of their desires. Moreover, 
there should be a shared understanding of homophobia and of the politics of 
eradicating it; that politics being traditional lobbying as opposed to, for example, 
forms of NVDA (non-violent direct action). Furthermore, the politics is 
assimilatory, that is, Morton Hall works within the existing parliamentary and
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legislative frameworks and does not constitute a radical rethinking of heterosexual 
morality. This is, at least, the perspective of the organisation itself, for the 
individual Executive Committee members have varying opinions on the efficacy 
of more confrontational styles of activism. In interviews several Executive 
Committee members were supportive of the activism carried out by people like 
Peter Tatchell and Outrage!, and the Lesbian Avengers. Some people, such as 
Ricky claimed that the more extreme demands of Outrage!, such as equalising the 
age of consent at 14 made it easier for other organisations, such as Morton Hall to 
push for 16. However, some people interviewed were completely against the 
more confrontational activism and called it ‘hot-headed’. This is by way of 
illustrating that the viewpoints on different modes of activism of the Executive 
Committee members vary widely. If there are such divergent views on this, then it 
is also highly likely that there are dissimilar opinions on what the direction of the 
organisation should be. As well as indicating that all LGB people do not have a 
shared understanding of their oppression and its resistance, this also could be used 
as an argument for greater inclusivity. The Executive Committee members have 
dissimilar views on activism and politics, yet are able to work together 
successfully, therefore sharing a common belief as to the nature of one’s 
oppression is not necessary for the functioning of Morton Hall.
That people must seek election solely on the basis of their sexuality rather 
than gender is an indication that the organisation regards gender of object choice 
as the defining characteristic of sexuality. Seidman writes, ‘the ethnicisation of 
gay desire has presupposed the privileging of gender preference to define sexual 
and social identity, which, in turn has been the basis upon which a gay community 
and politics are forged’ (1993: 123). This is reminiscent of Sedgwick’s oft quoted 
claim that ‘it is a rather amazing fact that, of the very many dimensions along 
which the genital activity of one person can be differentiated from that of another 
... precisely one, the gender of object choice, emerged from the turn of the 
century, and has remained, as the dimension denoted by the now ubiquitous 
category of “sexual orientation’” (1990: 8). It is therefore important that all 
members of the organisation, particularly the elected ones, are in agreement with
this view of sexuality. Gender of object choice must be seen as the most 
important, if  not only, defining factor of sexuality; if other factors do exist, they 
must be viewed as of secondary importance. Paradoxically, the contrary, that 
gender is not the be all and end all of sexuality is embedded within the 
organisation, in that it does include bisexuality. Although not necessarily true for 
everyone, bisexuality can be the label of choice for those who think that ‘love 
counts more than gender’; indeed this was the title of the 2005 UK National 
Bisexual Conference (BICON). I am unsure, however, that bisexuality is more 
than nominally included in the organisation, as nothing has been done specifically 
for bisexuals by the organisation. Bisexuality is not seen as being different from 
being gay or being lesbian in the way that, for example, being lesbian is seen as 
being different from being gay. When homophobia is discussed there is 
recognition that gay men and lesbians experience it differently, but no recognition 
that a bisexual man and bisexual woman might experience phobic responses 
differently from gay men and lesbians respectively. However, bisexuality and 
transgender are treated differently by the organisation. I was on the Morton Hall 
Executive Committee for three years, and identified as a bisexual. Throughout 
those three years I was in a monogamous relationship with a woman; there was no 
notion that I should not be in the organisation because, to some one who did not 
know me, I appeared to be in a heterosexual relationship. This therefore means 
that bisexuality must possess some quality that makes it acceptable to Morton Hall 
that transgender lacks. I suggest that this quality relates to the fact that bisexuality 
remains about who one chooses for a partner, whilst transgender is seen to be 
about gender identity. Notwithstanding this, it is still evidence that a man can be 
in a relationship with a woman, but still be permitted in the organisation. There is 
nothing inherent about being in an opposite-sex relationship that bars someone 
from membership of Morton Hall, or being on its executive body. I argue that a 
heterosexual transgender person would be in a similar position. It should also be 
bome in mind that bisexuality has not always been unproblematically linked with 
lesbian and gay. Many lesbian and gay organisations (not Morton Hall) have been
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exclusive of bisexuals over accusations of retaining heterosexual privilege and 
general fence sitting.
This all leads to the, somewhat perplexing, conclusion that for the 
organisation’s identity gender is simultaneously of definitional importance and 
completely unrelated to sexuality. Without gender, the definition of sexuality 
employed by the organisation could not exist, however, this has not led to a 
recognition that sexuality and gender, whilst not the same, are interconnected in 
ways that, for example, sexuality and class or sexuality and race are not. By this I 
do not mean that race or class do not affect sexual identity, but suggest that few 
would contend that a particular class or racial position would predispose one to 
homosexuality. However, there are many that believe that cross-gender behaviour 
in childhood is an early indicator of possible homosexuality later in life (Sedgwick 
1993; Butler 2004; Swidey 2005). Sedgwick notes that ‘the same DSM-III that, 
published in 1980, was the first that did not contain an entry for “homosexuality”, 
was also the first that did contain a new diagnosis, numbered (for insurance 
purposes) 302.60: “Gender Identity Disorder of Childhood”’ (1993: 156 original 
emphasis). Sedgwick suggests that this is a subtle way of dealing with the 
problem of feminine boys (although supposedly gender-neutral, it is easier for a 
boy to be diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder than a girl), which in the 
psychoanalytic model means attempting to eradicate homosexuality. This 
demonstrates close, albeit constructed, connections between gender and sexuality 
that could have been profitably employed by the organisation. Interestingly, there 
is a partial acknowledgement of these connections by the organisation in that it is 
part of the Education for All campaign, which recognises that it is not only gay 
pupils who can suffer from homophobic abuse and bullying. The campaign’s 
cornerstone document states that ‘the effects of homophobic bullying are not 
limited to lesbian, gay and bisexual young people. An educational culture where 
homophobic bullying exists can affect anyone singled out as different’ (Stonewall 
2005: 2). In order for a pupil who does not identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual to 
be the victim of homophobic bullying there is a likelihood that they have exhibited 
some form of cross gender behaviour that has been interpreted as a sign of
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homosexuality. All it takes, as the campaign realises, is for someone to be (or be 
seen to be) ‘different’. So far, this chapter has shown that several of the Executive 
Committee members believe that only homosexual people can have any 
understanding of what it is like to live in an homophobic society, however, if 
‘homophobia affects all pupils and students -  lesbian, gay, bisexual and straight’ 
(Stonewall 2005: 2) then this is plainly not true. A straight pupil who was bullied 
throughout school because he or she was perceived to be queer may well have 
more knowledge of homophobia than a queer pupil who was not bullied. 
Moreover, Chapter 8 shows how the majority of Executive Committee members 
rely on an understanding of sexual orientation that fixes sexuality as an immutable 
truth. If sexual identity is a truth then it should only be those people who posses 
that truth who would become victim to homophobic bullying. The Education for 
All campaign, then, introduces some level of confusion into the final decision of 
Morton Hall to exclude transgender from its remit. Notwithstanding this, the 
connections between gender and sexuality have been largely marginalised by the 
conception of transgender as transsexual, as a subsequent section (below) 
explains.
Jerry comments that a statement is needed that makes it clear that the 
organisation is there to campaign for equality for LGB people, regardless of age, 
race, disability or gender identity; this also admits that the difference between 
sexuality and race, disability, age etc, is the same as the difference between gender 
and sexuality. Transgender people (or BME’s, the disabled, older or younger 
people) are only welcome in the organisation if they are also lesbian, gay or 
bisexual. Also the notion of ‘campaigning for equality’ suggests an assimilatory 
approach to politics; the aim is equality with heterosexuals. This is in opposition 
to both gay liberation and queer politics, both of which advocate an end to the 
current sex/gender system whereby people have to confine themselves to 
male/female and gay/straight dichotomies. This is evidence of the perception that 
‘people who belong to the same identity group have more or less the same 
political analysis o f (at least) the oppression they share (e.g., that all women share 
a feminist analysis of women’s oppression)’ (Young 1997: 54). However, I would
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take this one stage further: not only is it necessary that all members of an identity 
group share the same understanding of their oppression, but also for them to share 
an understanding of the means to end that oppression. In the case of an identity 
politics organisation, such as the one studied, the ‘means’ tends to be assimilatory, 
and based upon a civil-rights discourse. In her work on choice and sexual identity, 
Whisman (1996) also finds this tension between the minoritising and 
deconstructive logics of identity, and is worth quoting at length.
On the one hand is a minority-model approach that seeks equality and civil 
remedies for a (presumably clearly defined) homosexual minority in a 
world dominated by a heterosexual majority. This approach represents 
exactly what a good number of gay men -  and lesbians -  want: the ability 
to go about their daily lives without being variously encumbered, to say 
nothing of endangered, by a range of negative social responses to their 
sexual preferences. They neither have nor see the need for a radical and 
critical analysis of the underlying structure of the society that oppresses 
them. On the other hand are a number of so far only loosely connected 
approaches that are highly critical of the underlying structures of sexuality, 
gender, and family that characterise contemporary Western societies. This 
approach includes, though is not necessarily defined by, a critique of the 
heterosexual-homosexual binary that the minoritising approach rests upon 
(Whisman 1996: 123).
The problem rests in the fact that, as shown by Gamson (1996), both approaches 
are valid and neither are fully tenable. That both sides of the debate make some 
sort of sense means that decisions such as on trans inclusion or exclusion are about 
far more than simply widening, or not, the remit of the organisation, rather they 
can illuminate, and define, the political strategies employed by an organisation. 
Both the minoritising and deconstructive logics can be seen in operation in Morton 
Hall. The minoritising approach relies upon the complete separation of gender 
identity and sexual identity; in part this is accomplished by viewing transgender as 
transsexual, which is the subject of the following section.
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Reading Transgender as Transsexual
One of the key signs that Executive Committee members tend appear to mean 
transsexual when they say transgender is that of Gender Recognition. Throughout 
the meetings there have been several references to the Gender Recognition Act 
2004 (GRA), with various Executive Committee members claiming that Morton 
Hall does not have the capacity to help individuals through the process of legally 
changing their gender, for example. Furthermore the GRA has been used to 
separate gender and sexuality, as it is only applicable to transitioning trans people. 
Therefore, this section will explore the GRA in greater detail, to illustrate that it 
only deals with transsexuals and is of no relevance to other trans people.
The Explanatory Notes to the GRA state that ‘the purpose of the Gender 
Recognition Act is to provide transsexual people with legal recognition in their 
acquired gender’ (www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/en2004/2004en07.htm). Section 2 of the 
GRA enacts that:
(1) In the case of an application under section l(l)(a) [living in the other gender], 
the Panel must grant the application if satisfied that the applicant-
(a) has or has had gender dysphoria,
(b) has lived in the acquired gender throughout the period of two years 
ending with the date on which the application is made,
(c) intends to continue to live in the acquired gender until death, and
(d) complies with the requirements imposed by and under section 3.
Section 3 sets out the medical evidence required by the Gender Recognition Panel:
(1) An application under section 1(1 )(a) must include either-
(a) a report made by a registered medical practitioner practising in the field 
of gender dysphoria and a report made by another registered medical 
practitioner (who may, but need not, practise in that field), or
(b) a report made by a chartered psychologist practising in that field and a 
report made by a registered medical practitioner (who may, but need not, 
practise in that field).
(2) But subsection (1) is not complied with unless a report required by that 
subsection and made by-
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(a) a registered medical practitioner, or
(b) a chartered psychologist,
practising in the field of gender dysphoria includes details of the diagnosis of the 
applicant's gender dysphoria.
(3) And subsection (1) is not complied with in a case where-
(a) the applicant has undergone or is undergoing treatment for the purpose 
of modifying sexual characteristics, or
(b) treatment for that purpose has been prescribed or planned for the 
applicant,
unless at least one of the reports required by that subsection includes details of it.
It is therefore clear that only those who have had some kind of sex reassignment 
surgery are covered by this act. The documentation provided by the Gender 
Recognition Panel (the body constituted by the GRA to adjudicate on gender 
reassignment applications, hereafter GRP) provides further information. The 
criteria outlined above are for Standard Track applications. Fast Track 
applications also exist (with slightly different criteria), but are only available in the 
first two years of the GRP and are specifically for those who transitioned more 
than six years ago. Here the medical evidence required is slightly different -  it 
can be having, or having had, gender dysphoria or having had surgery to modify 
sexual characteristics. Setting aside the fact that getting such surgery without a 
diagnosis of gender dysphoria would be problematic, the definition of surgery is 
interesting. ‘Surgery’ is not specifically defined, but includes changes to external 
primary genitalia, however, ‘surgical changes to the interior and/or secondary sex 
organs (such as sterilisation, mastectomy or hysterectomy) without any other 
modification may be sufficient but the report will need to explain why no further 
surgery was undertaken’ (Gender Recognition Panel 2006a: 14 my emphasis). It 
is clear that primary sex organs are the signifier of one’s true gender; if there is 
discontinuity it must be explained. Furthermore, if one’s claim is that one has 
gender dysphoria (which has to be proven for the Standard Track, but not Fast 
Track, applications (Gender Recognition Panel 2006b)) then this has to be 
evidenced by either a registered medical practitioner or a chartered psychologist
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working in the field of gender dysphoria; a list of such acceptable specialists being 
provided by the GRP. This demonstrates that it is only those who undergo 
transition within a particular medical model that will be affected by the GRA.
However, even using the GRA as a means to institute the separation of 
gender and sexuality, intentionally or otherwise, as several Executive Committee 
members did, is not without its problems. This is because ‘to receive a full 
Gender Recognition Certificate, a transsexual person must be unmarried and not in 
a UK civil partnership’ (Gender Recognition Panel 2005: 2). In this country a 
marriage can only legally occur between a man and women, and a civil 
partnership can only legally occur between two people of the same sex, therefore 
if the man in a marriage gained a full Gender Recognition Certificate (GRC) they 
would be female in the eyes of the law, and therefore in a lesbian marriage, which 
is illegal. If someone fulfils all the criteria for a GRC, but is married, they receive 
an interim certificate which can be used to annul the marriage. After the 
annulment and granting of a full GRC, they could then have a civil partnership 
ceremony, which, as a lesbian couple, would bring them within the remit of 
Morton Hall. The issue of transsexuals and marriage raises also raises questions 
around same sex marriage and civil partnerships. A male-to-female transsexual 
who identifies as a lesbian and who has not applied for a Gender Recognition 
Certificate remains, in the eyes of the law, male and is therefore able to marry 
another woman, raising the possibility of same sex marriages, as opposed to civil 
partnerships. This has not been thought through by the Executive Committee 
members, and is further evidence that there are some issues that will effect LGB 
identified trans people that are not applicable to non-trans LGB people.
In order to apply for a GRC, the person has to have been living in their 
acquired gender full time for a minimum of two years (six for the fast track 
applications), for which evidence has to be shown. This further demonstrates that 
transgender individuals, who do not live full time in the opposite gender, for 
whatever reason, cannot apply for a GRC. Moreover, in applying for a GRC the 
transsexual stabilises and fixes their gender identity. As section 2(1 )(c) of the 
GRA states (above) the applicant must intend to live in their acquired gender for
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the rest of their life, thus allowing for no future changes. Secondly, obtaining a 
GRC means that the person can have their birth certificate altered to show their, 
new, legal gender. Whilst someone with a GRC is not entitled to claim that they 
have not been through the gender recognition process, to all intents and purposes 
the history of the transsexual in their birth gender is obliterated. This relates to the 
discussion in Chapter 8 on the ways in which transsexuality, as opposed to 
transgenderism, expresses an ultimate truth about identity and being.
The extracts below illustrate how the GRA has been deployed in the trans 
inclusion/exclusion debate. They are from two different meetings (the last and 
penultimate on the subject), but concern the same subject
Robin: Generally speaking the discussions have gone round the fact that 
with the gender reassignment act, which firmly comes under the 
Equal Opportunities Commission, we have a capacity issue in 
terms of the number of staff that are there to be able to pick up and 
run with, and train and answer all the questions round that. It 
would be quite difficult.
Jerry: I feel that around the gender reassignment issues and the policy 
changes there really needs to be an organisation which thoroughly 
understands that law and has a capacity to, you know, work with 
policy members and the community to develop peer support and 
advice services around a certain law which does legally belong the 
Equal Opportunities Commission. We don’t have the community 
resources for that area, I don’t have enough resource for LGB.
Here one can clearly see that the Gender Recognition Act is being used to distance 
transsexuals from Morton Hall. It is framed in the language of capacity and 
resources; Morton Hall does not have the expertise to deal with queries from the 
public with regard to the legislation and process of gender recognition. This, as I 
have said elsewhere (Chapters, 5 and 7), ignores the fact that were Morton Hall to 
include transgender within its remit it would be possible for them to apply for
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extra funding on that basis. Transgender is being conceptualised as transsexual, 
as the above analysis demonstrates; issues of gender reassignment and recognition 
are only applicable to transgender people who intend to transition, or have 
transitioned. The needs of those who are transgender, but have no wish to 
transition from one gender to the other are left without recourse to any 
organisation.
Both Robin and Jerry claim that the GRA legally belongs to the Equal 
Opportunities Committee (EOC), a move which further serves to distance it from 
Morton Hall. This is a successful attempt at excluding transgender from the 
organisation. If the legislation is the responsibility of another organisation, then 
there is no need for Morton Hall to do anything about it. Given that for most 
Executive Committee members, transgender appears to mean transsexual, this 
effectively removes transgender from the possible remit of the organisation. 
However, I am unsure as to why both Jerry and Robin are of the opinion that the 
GRA ‘belongs’ to the EOC. If the legislation could be said to belong to any 
organisation, then it would be the Gender Recognition Panel, which is a 
government body with no official link to the EOC. There is not even a link to the 
Gender Recognition Panel website from the EOC website (www.eoc.org.uk as of 
June 2006). The EOC is able to provide support for transsexuals who have 
suffered discrimination under the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, but they have a 
paucity of information on gender recognition. Whilst on the subject of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 (SDA) it is worth noting that this also only applies to 
transsexuals; section 2A(3) states that discrimination on the grounds of gender 
reassignment occurs ‘if he treats B less favourably than he treats or would treat 
other persons, and does so on the grounds that B intends to undergo, is 
undergoing, or has undergone gender reassignment,’. Section 82(1) defines 
‘gender reassignment’ as ‘a process which is undertaken under medical 
supervision for the purpose of reassigning a person’s sex by changing 
physiological or other characteristics of sex, and includes any part of such a 
process.’ Although a slightly wider definition than the GRA (e.g. not having 
genital surgery does not have to be justified), the SDA only applies to those
104
transgender individuals who undergo a process of transition; those who do not are, 
at the time of writing (June 2006), without legal protection. Regardless of the 
accuracy of Robin and Jerry’s claims, the argument that the GRA comes under the 
EOC was effective at distancing transsexuality from the remit of Morton Hall.
When interviewing Lauren, (after the meetings from which the previous 
extracts come from), the subject turned to this conflation of transsexual with 
transgender, and she summarised the main points succinctly:
I think the argument really runs along the lines of ‘we deal with issues of 
sexuality not transsexual transition or gender reassignment’. It seemed to 
be a very extreme differentiation; it was ‘we’re not going to deal with the 
medical profession and gender reassignment surgery but we are going to 
deal with sexuality’, they weren’t actually looking at the grey areas in 
between of transgender. I mean one of the participants said that there 
were seven types of transgender -  I thought that just underlined a 
misunderstanding of what the concept of transgender is, as opposed to 
transsexuality. Providing sort of categories of transgender that seemed so 
fixed to my mind, to my understanding of transgender, was completely 
wrong because the whole point of transgender to me is to question and 
query perceived or common understandings of gender per se.
For most Executive Committee members, then, transgender means transsexual, 
which in turn means gender reassignment and medical issues. This defines 
transgender solely as not identifying with one’s body; rather than being something 
that can potentially destabilise the categories of gender, the only understanding of 
transgender that has been drawn upon by Morton Hall to any extent is one in 
which gender is not troubled. This notion is further discussed in Chapter 6 when 
considering the polluting effects of the heterosexual transvestite. In the same way 
that sexual identity is seen as defining some kind of truth about a person, 
transgender identity is seen as doing the same, so much so that for one member 
there are seven types of transgender. This was a highly specific claim employed 
by someone advocating trans exclusion; however it served to situate them as
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someone knowledgable on trans issues in the meeting. Notwithstanding this, I 
cannot fathom what these seven types of transgender are, it appears to be, as 
Lauren suggests, another example of Executive Committee members not fully 
comprehending the meaning of transgender. The only connection between 
transgender and the number seven that I can find relates to the seven criteria 
established by John Money for correct sexual development in the foetus after 
conception (Money 1986). Also, by suggesting that there are seven types of 
transgender suggests that all transgender people fit in one of seven boxes that 
express the truth about themselves.
Once again, this extract illustrates the disjuncture between the stabilising 
and deconstructive understandings of trans identity explored in Chapter 3. 
Lauren’s view of transgender is that it does not express an immanent truth about a 
person and is something that questions the very nature of gender in society; this is 
the type of view that was met with much hostility by several Executive Committee 
members. It is clear, therefore, that Morton Hall is an identity politics 
organisation founded upon an ethnic understanding of sexual orientation that 
relies upon a crowbar separation of gender and sexuality. I now turn to the 
formation of an identity politics grouping in order to consider what the identity 
refers to.
From Series to Groups
The foregoing has shown that Morton Hall follows an identity politics model; the 
identity of the Executive Committee members is of paramount importance for the 
organisation. However, this does not address the question of what it is that causes 
these people to come together in the first place. In other words, what is the subject 
of the organisation? For Fuss, under the ‘identity politics’ theory, the category 
‘women’ only exists in the context of feminist politics; the politics does not 
represent, but creates the unity ‘women.’ Furthermore, ‘many anti-essentialists 
fear that positing a political coalition of women risks presuming that there must 
first be a natural class of women; but this belief only masks the fact that it is a 
coalition politics which constructs the category women in the first place’ (1989:
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36 original emphasis). This fits with the understanding of identity politics 
outlined above; the split between ‘us’ and ‘them’ demonstrates that sexuality is an 
oppositional identity, whilst the ‘active oppressor’ and ‘active resistor’ binary 
demonstrates it is oppression which is the basis for the identity (Young, S. 1997 
(NB I am using initials here to differentiate between two authors with the same 
surname being used in this section)). It is the ‘power structures that facilitate their 
oppression’ (Young, S. 1997: 55) which define Morton Hall; it is LGB groups that 
generate the category.
This theory provides part of the answer to the problem of collective 
identity, but it is by no means entirely satisfactory. Firstly, as the foregoing 
analysis shows, ‘identity politics’ does not solve the problem of essentialising 
LGB(T) people, some group within the categorisation will invariably be privileged 
in any political grouping of LGB(T) people. As Butler claims, ‘feminist critique 
ought to ... remain self-critical with respect to the totalising gestures of feminism’ 
(1999: 18-19), similar claims can be made regarding LGB/queer theory and 
politics. However, the primary objection to this conception of identity politics is 
that there is no discussion of what causes the formation of a coalition ‘which 
constructs the category of women.’ This view also leaves those who choose not to 
act politically on the basis of an identity out of the construction of the group. 
‘These questions all point to the need for some conception of women [or non­
heterosexuals] as a group prior to the formation of self-conscious feminist [or 
queer] politics, as designating a certain set of relations or positions that motivate 
the particular politics of feminism [or queer activism]’ (Young, I. M. 1994: 722). 
I. M. Young posits Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of seriality as a solution to the 
impasse. In Critique o f  Dialectical Reason (1976) Sartre defines different 
gatherings of people from an ensemble to a class, largely dependent on the level 
and type of interaction between group members. It is the terms ‘series’ and 
‘group’ which I am interested in with regard to explaining the basis of collective 
action. Sartre ‘uses the term series to signify an ensemble each of whose members 
is determined in alterity by the others ... [whilst] a group is an ensemble each of 
whose members is determined by the others in a relationship of reciprocity,’
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(McGee 1989). Here ‘alterity’ signifies a relationship among strangers whilst 
‘reciprocity’ indicates that the parties each know something about the other, and 
that, contra alterity, they care about the relationship.
The idea of seriality provides a way of understanding collective sexual 
identity in a way that allows one to move away from the problematic nature of 
identity politics. For a few Executive Committee members the central aim of the 
organisation is to campaign for equality on LGB issues, rather than build or 
support an LGB community. This perspective will be analysed with regard to 
seriality, below. First, however, I will explain the series in greater detail.
‘Groups arise from and often fall back into a less organised and unself­
conscious collective unity’ (Young, I. M. 1994: 724): this is the series. Members 
of a series are defined as such because they share their position with others in a 
similar context. This Sartre calls the practico-inert reality; the constraints and 
resistance to material and social objects. Furthermore ‘a series reveals itself to 
everyone when they perceive in themselves and Others their common inability to 
eliminate their practical differences’ (Sartre 1976: 277). It is important here to 
note that membership of a series mainly denotes an individual’s circumstance with 
regard to the external world; as such it is not the foundation of an identity. 
Similarly there is no need for every member of a series to possess the same 
qualities, indeed their only link is their relationship to a particular practico-inert 
structure, nor is it necessary for each member to be aware of others in the same 
situation.
For gender or sexuality to be properly considered a series one must, at least 
partly, define what practico-inert structures these series relate to. With regard to 
women, I. M. Young claims the constitution of the series is enforced 
heterosexuality. She argues that ‘the material practices of enforced 
heterosexuality serialise women as objects of exchange and appropriation by men, 
with a consequent repression of autonomous female desire’ (1994: 729). I would 
also contend that non-heterosexuals are serialised as such by the ‘material 
practices of enforced heterosexuality,’ but in a different way to that of women. 
Lesbians, gay men, bisexuals &c. are defined as other to heterosexuals, and suffer
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discrimination and oppression at the hands of compulsory heterosexuality. All 
those who do not identify as straight, in my opinion, share the same relation to the 
practico-inert structure of enforced heterosexuality and therefore constitute a 
series.
Importantly, claiming membership of a series says nothing about a 
person’s characteristics or identity; it is merely ‘the name of a structural relation to 
material objects as they have been produced and organised by a prior history’ 
(Young, I. M. 1994: 728). However, this is not to say that an identity group 
cannot emerge from a series, indeed one comes out of the other. The central point 
is that ‘women need have nothing in common in their individual lives to be 
serialised as women’ (Young, I. M 1994: 735). This avoids the philosophical 
problems generated by either essentialist or anti-essentialist theories illustrated 
above. Sartre describes a fused group as being the immediate result of a collection 
of members of a series. Any activity is largely disorganised and it is easy for the 
group to fall back into seriality. To indicate a group where there is a fully-fledged 
sense of reciprocity the term pledged group is used; ‘a pledged group is a group 
which develops from a fused group through an organised distribution of rights and 
duties enforced by a pledge’ (McGee 1989). It is largely at this level, or higher, 
that political action takes place. It must also be remembered that not all groups of 
women, queers &c. are political groupings. Furthermore, groups can arise out of a 
multiplicity of series, such as gender, class, sexuality and race. However, as a 
generalisation a group will refer back to the series whence it came, as ‘feminist 
organising and theorising always refers beyond itself to condition and experiences 
that have not been reflected on, and to women whose lives are conditioned by 
enforced heterosexuality ... who are not feminists, and are not part of feminist 
groups’ (Young, I. M 1994: 738).
The social collective of LGB people can, then, be conceptualised as a 
series, from which different types of groups may rise up. Lauren’s opinion, in her 
interview, on identity claims is exemplary of this:
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Any identity claim is always already a political assertion which has a 
context and a purpose, because other wise why would you make an 
identity claim, you know. If you weren’t in a context where you needed 
to define yourself in relation to someone else you wouldn’t have an 
identity, because you wouldn’t need one, so your identity only becomes 
important or necessary to be stated or whatever, it only becomes 
necessary as an identity claim in relation to someone else or some other 
people, context or situation.
In describing the series, Sartre (1976) uses the example of people waiting in a 
queue for a bus. These people are part of a series because they all share a 
relationship to the practico-inert structure of the public transportation system. 
Aside from this they would not think of themselves as a group of ‘bus users’, 
however, Sartre argues that if the bus was late then they may start talking to each 
other and decide to do something about the lateness of the bus (sharing a taxi, 
delegating one of the number to phone the bus company &c.). This would result 
in a fused group, which may well just fall back into the series after the problem 
was remedied. If, however, bus lateness was an ongoing problem they may decide 
to create a more formal group to lobby the bus operator for a more efficient 
service, which would be a pledged group. Whilst this is a fairly mundane 
example, it does exemplify the relation between the series and group. One can 
also see this in Lauren’s extract. In Sartre’s example the context of the identity 
claim of ‘bus user’ is the lateness of the bus, whilst the purpose is to remedy that 
lateness. A similar claim can be made with regard to sexual or gender identity; 
everybody is in some way part of a series relating to gender and sexual identity, 
but a group will only form under certain circumstances.
The idea of seriality is useful because it provides an explanation of how 
many people, with different perspectives on LGB(T) identity and politics can 
come together. In the series, there is nothing about sharing the same relationship 
to the practico-inert reality which means that identity, beliefs or practices are 
shared. Groups then form when members of a series pledge their support to a 
particular end, thus resulting in a group that should be more focused on aims than
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identity. This therefore illustrates how Executive Committee members can work 
together regardless of individual differences. Further, the series goes some way to 
explaining the exclusion of trans; transgender people are in a different series, 
sharing a different relationship to their material surroundings. Whilst this may 
explain the current behaviour of the Executive Committee members, it is not a 
wholly satisfactory theory. It cannot explain Lauren’s belief that anyone 
(regardless of identity) who supports the aims of Morton Hall should be 
welcomed. Sartre’s idea of the series fails to take into account the fact that one 
may support a cause that they have no personal relationship to. Although some of 
the problems of minoritising/essentialising logics are solved, ultimately the 
series(s) from which one originates is of primary importance when defining the 
group. To return to the analogy of the bus passengers, someone may wish to join 
the group to campaign for a better service, who is not actually a bus user, but who 
nevertheless feels that it is a worthwhile campaign to be a part of. Thinking 
through the complexities of this position forms part of Chapter 8.
Conclusions
This chapter has considered the notion of identity as employed by Morton Hall, 
arguing that it relies on a separation of gender and sexuality that fosters an 
ethnic/essentialist/minoritising LGB identity. It has been shown that this is aided, 
in no small part, by the fact that for many of the Executive Committee members 
transgender is conceptualised as transsexual which serves to further distance 
transgender from the potential remit of the organisation. Having described the 
type of organisation that Morton Hall is, the following chapters consider ways in 
which transgender generally, and heterosexual cross dressers in particular, are 
defmitionally important for the organisation.
I l l
6P o l l u t io n /D a n g e r /F e a r
This Chapter considers the responses of certain Executive Committee members to 
the wide definition of transgender employed by Morton Hall in the course of this 
debate. The definitions of transsexual, transvestite and transgender used by 
Morton Hall are those provided by the Gender Trust, and I quote them again here:
Transsexual. A person who feels a consistent and overwhelming desire to 
transition and fulfil their life as a member of the opposite gender. Most 
transsexual people actively desire and complete Sex Reassignment Surgery. 
Transvestite. The clinical name for a cross dresser. A person who dresses in 
the clothing of the opposite sex. Generally, these persons do not wish to alter 
their body.
Transgender. A term used to include transsexuals, transvestites and cross 
dressers. A transgenderist can also be a person who, like a transsexual, 
transitions - sometimes with the help of hormone therapy and / or cosmetic 
surgery - to live in the gender role of choice, but has not undergone, and 
generally does not intend to undergo, [sex reassignment] surgery 
(http ://www. gendertrust.org. uk/index 1. htm)
It is interesting that these are the definitions adopted by Morton Hall as they tend 
to exemplify a particular discourse of transgender identity which seeks to 
normalise such behaviour and does not challenge essentialist gender norms. These 
are explored further in other chapters (3 and 5); in this chapter I am concerned 
primarily with the effects that the inclusion of transvestites and cross dressers in 
the definition of transgender has on certain Executive Committee members’ 
discussions.
The chapter seeks to understand the ways in which identity is 
accomplished through interaction, and views the creation of identity and
112
community as a collective social activity. It is interaction between the Executive 
Committee members that constitutes their being, their sense, or otherwise, of 
belonging, and of the borders. The point at which we make the other visible, the 
point at which we create or destroy the margins, is the point where our ‘usness’, 
our sense of belonging, becomes manifest (Cohen 1982, 1985). This is not a 
psychoanalytic problem, but rather one in which social practices of ordering and 
categorisation are made manifest. As Silverman (1993), notes, it is not possible to 
look inside people’s heads, to know definitively what they are thinking or their 
intentions, however, what we can do is to look at the ways in which people 
attempt to classify others, to look at what lines are drawn where and how and 
tentatively explore what drawing lines in these particular ways accomplishes. The 
interactional construction of community studied in this chapter follows on from 
the previous chapter, because
.. .community as a concept... is invariably fraught with problems, not least 
because it has invariably been invoked as a basis for an essentialist 
understanding of identity and belonging (Hetherington 1998: 50).
As Douglas claims,
...not only marginal social states, but all margins, the edges of all 
boundaries which are used in ordering the social experience are treated as 
dangerous and polluting (1991a: 56).
These dangerous and polluting, but ordering, boundaries are the central subject of 
this chapter. I argue that transgender exists in a state of liminality and, because of 
this, is a source of pollution, danger and fear for some people. Furthermore in 
attempting to situate such transgender individuals as outside Morton Hall, the 
boundary and remit of the organisation as solely LGB is constituted and sustained.
From Liminality to Pollution
Following Van Gennep (1960), society is like a house with rooms and 
interconnecting corridors; whilst it is safe in the rooms, the passage between them 
is dangerous. This is a narrative of rites of passage from one ordered and 
structured world to another involving release and separation from one and
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reaggregation and acceptance into the other. Furthermore the site between the two 
stages is a state of nihilistic free-fall in which anything can happen; this is the 
limen or margin. This model can usefully be applied to transition and transgender 
identity. One can see a transsexual’s transition from man to woman as just such a 
rite of passage; the individual moves from the ordered world of the man, through 
the limen via hormones and sex reassignment surgery, to the ordered world of the 
woman. This is the model of transition that is most often advocated by 
‘transgender’ groups such as the Gender Trust, Transgender Wales and Press for 
Change, (see chapter 8). However, for a transgender individual, such as a cross 
dresser, the situation is not so clearly defined; there is not a transition from one 
world to another, rather the individual remains in the state of liminality. This 
positions them as outside of, and other to, the ordered worlds of male and female 
and ‘danger lies in transitional states, simply because transition is neither one state 
nor the next, it is undefinable. The person who must pass from one to the other is 
himself in danger and emanates danger to others’ (Douglas 1991b: 97). The 
person who decides not to pass from one side to the other and remain in a state of 
transition, is, therefore an even more dangerous person as they are not performing 
the rite as is expected. This person can, then, be a polluting influence on others, 
given that ‘a polluting person is always in the wrong. He has developed some 
wrong condition or simply crossed some line which should not have been crossed 
and this displacement unleashed danger for someone’ (Douglas 1991b: 114).
The following two extracts are from an interview with Ricky conducted 
before the trans inclusion/exclusion debate came up for Morton Hall in which he 
explains his views on transgender inclusion. This is an eloquent elucidation of 
some central concerns which are also shared by some others within the 
organisation.
If the person is a transgendered individual whether male-to-female or 
female-to-male they would be able to join the LGB group if they 
identified as L, G or B, whether it be pre op or post op. Does that make 
sense?
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Referring back to Van Gennep’s idea of rooms and corridors one can see that, for Ricky, 
trans people can join Morton Hall if they are situated in one of the rooms marked 
‘lesbian’, ‘gay’, or ‘bisexual’, but not ‘heterosexual’. Ricky continues:
So if you have a male-to-female transgender person still going through 
gender reassignment then to all intents and purposes that individual is a 
woman because they self identify as a women. As regards to their 
sexuality, if their sexuality is still that they’re attracted to women that 
would make them lesbian therefore they would be eligible. If they were 
attracted to men then to me they would be heterosexual, so what possible 
understanding of lesbian and gay issues would they have. That’s not to 
say they don’t have an understanding of issues because of the transgender 
situation and the information and the learning people can get from 
transgender individuals is vast, we all should learn from everyone else.
But it’s how wide do you cast the net in membership? Otherwise it could 
go down the road of heterosexual people with particular fetishes that are 
discriminated against wanting to join a lesbian and gay group. Would 
they fit in? Would they understand automatically what the difficulties 
are or can be of being a gay man or a lesbian or whatever? That’s where 
the difficulty is. Where I have an issue is with people who are 
transgender being involved it’s not against them per se but it’s about the 
issues and where they’re coming from does that make sense?
This quote was useful when analysing the separation of gender and sexuality in 
chapter 3 that has played a large part of the debate, however, in this chapter I use 
this quote again to focus on themes of pollution and contagion, having considered 
the gender/sexuality topic in Chapters 3 and 5. This is exemplary of the 
arguments put forward in favour of exclusion in that no transphobic views are 
expressed; in fact, such a position is explicitly repudiated by Ricky at the end of 
the extract. Rather the question is whether it is appropriate that Morton Hall 
should represent transgendered people. As Chapter 5 demonstrates the dominant 
argument is that trans people are only represented if, in their gender of choice, 
they identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual. Central to this chapter is the inclusion of
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heterosexuals within the category of transgender (and non-trans heterosexuals) 
within the organisation. In saying that only LGB trans people should be in the 
organisation Ricky is excluding trans people who are heterosexual from the 
organisation on the basis that they have not experienced living as a homosexual 
and therefore have no knowledge of the issues. In Van Gennep’s terms, trans 
people are on one rooms and do not move from one to the other. A heterosexual 
transsexual could, quite feasibly, have started their journey in the gay or lesbian 
room. Chapter 8 discusses some of the implications of this view with regard to 
rhizomatics and the construction of sexual and gender identity; this chapter 
focuses specifically on the exclusion of heterosexual trans people from the 
organisation.
I argue that Ricky’s rejection of heterosexual transgendered people can be 
seen as pollution behaviour (Douglas 1991b). As already shown in the previous 
chapter one could argue that a heterosexual (post op) trans person would have an 
understanding of LGB issues because prior to transition they may have been 
perceived by others as homosexual, or self identified as such before deciding they 
were transgendered. Therefore the arguments against inclusion can be seen as an 
attempt to retain the purity of Morton Hall which would be spoiled by the addition 
of trans people and issues. It is also possible that Ricky is exhibiting the fear that 
widening the remit o f Morton Hall to include transgender would radically alter the 
activities of the organisation as well as putting the organisation in a potentially 
problematic position of representing heterosexual people who may be 
homophobic. As Young (1997) argues, identity politics organisations rely on a 
distinction between us (the oppressed) and them (the oppressors) which dictates 
that the oppressors can never work for the benefit of the oppressed (see Chapter 
5). The other point that Ricky raises could be termed the ‘floodgate argument’; if 
heterosexual trans people are welcomed into Morton Hall, then other heterosexual 
sexual minorities may also want to be represented by the organisation, and soon 
every variety of sexual deviant would be clamouring to join the organisation. This 
evidences my claim in Chapter 4 with regard to Rubin’s (1989) ‘line’ (dividing 
good and bad sexual behaviours and identities) that those on the deviant side of
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the line do not show solidarity with one another but are desperate to cross the line 
into acceptable behaviour, often at the expense of other (more) deviant sexualities.
Ricky has had previous experience of trans inclusion/exclusion debates in 
another lesbian and gay group of which he was part:
When I was involved in [company LG group] we had a major 
discussion on bisexuals are transgender issues because every time 
there was a problem within the company that they received from an 
individual who identified as transgender they were always referred 
to the lesbian and gay group, without any thought as to whether we 
were the best group for the transgender individual.
However, one can see a difference between the two organisation. One can see that 
referring trans individuals to a group not able to support them could be 
problematic, however, the purpose of the debate within Morton Hall was to decide 
whether the remit should be widened so as to include trans issues. When asked 
whether Morton Hall should take a similar line to Ricky’s previous organisation, 
he replied:
Morton Hall shouldn’t be exclusive at all, but I think it would be useful 
to have Morton Hall Transgender and have a group for transgender 
individuals. A group like [national trans group], a group of intelligent 
individuals who have got something to give; share knowledge; share 
experience. Have each [organisation] working on the issues that are of 
relevance to them because there are some trans issues which are not, as 
far as I can see but my knowledge on transgender issues is not 100% 
brilliant, but there are some issues that trans people have that have no 
relevance to lesbian and gay lifestyles. And even although, yes, lesbians 
and gay men have come a long way with, you know with, equality of 
opportunity there is still lots to be done and are we watering down what 
we’re doing by trying to encompass every discriminated minority.
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The essence of Ricky’s viewpoint is that heterosexual (trans) people are ‘coming 
from’ somewhere that could be detrimental to the work of Morton Hall. In this 
extract Ricky’s pollution behaviour is more explicit than in the first; he 
specifically states that widening the remit of Morton Hall would have a damaging 
effect on the campaigning ability of the organisation. This does not consider some 
of the ways in which LGB and trans issues (including transition) can be 
connected. For example, Halberstam writes of a ‘masculine continuum’ from 
‘androgyny -  soft butch -  butch -  stone butch -  transgender butch -  FTM’ (1998: 
151), stressing that some FTMs identify as lesbian butches prior to transition. 
Furthermore, as Chapter 3 states, some lesbian feminists view transsexuality as an 
oppressive machine that works to the destruction of lesbians (Raymond 1980; 
Jeffreys 2003). This shows that there are issues of transsexual transition that are 
of relevance to LGB people. This is one of the many examples of transgender 
being conceptualised as transsexual; the only trans issues that I can think of that 
are not of direct relevance to LGB people centre on the medical and legal aspects 
of transition. One can view the (heterosexual) trans person as a dangerous 
contagion who will disrupt and challenge both the ontological and political 
security of Morton Hall. This raises several points. First, that heterosexual 
transgender people would actually disrupt or oppose the work of Morton Hall. 
Second, that all LGB people share a vision of what Morton Hall should be doing. 
Third, it presupposes that one has to be lesbian, gay or bisexual to advocate for 
LGB rights and equality. And fourth, that encompassing every discriminated 
minority in one organisation would ‘water down’ rather than strengthen equality 
campaigns. Also immanent within this view is the notion that heterosexual people 
(transgender or otherwise) do not suffer from homophobic abuse; given the 
prolific use of homophobic terms of abuse to signify anyone who is not sexually 
or gender normative this position seems untenable. This argument is expanded 
upon in Chapter 8 when Morton Hall’s involvement in the Education for All 
campaign is discussed. Ricky is specific about the possible polluting effects of 
allowing heterosexual transgender people into the organisation as he claims that 
this could reduce the effectiveness of Morton Hall, thereby situating transgender
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people as a group with aims contrary to those of Morton Hall. In the above 
extract, Ricky also positions Morton Hall as an organisation that follows a 
particular philosophy of equality of opportunity that tends to focus purely on 
gaining specific rights for specific groups of people, rather than producing a 
radical overhaul of the binary construction of gender and sexual identity. This is 
particularly important because the view of the danger that heterosexual 
transgender people present could only pose a problem for, and be accepted as a 
polluting influence by, those upholding the former view of equality.
Ricky is advocating a politics based on identity and difference. Such a 
politics has been shown to have a detrimental effect on equality by Lasch-Quinn 
(2001) specifically in the field of race relations. Her central contention is that the 
American civil rights movement bought great advances, however this was 
hijacked by a new paradigm of race relations in the 1960s which argued that one 
needed to treat whites and blacks differently because of the history of segregation 
and discrimination; ‘the identity tack made it nearly impossible to move beyond a 
simplistic polarisation between white oppressors and the black oppressees (recast 
as heroic resisters) ’ (Lasch-Quinn 2001: 120). Training groups and sensitivity 
training has changed the focus of the ideals of the civil rights movement from one 
of liberality to a focus on the differences between blacks and whites. Whilst 
Lasch-Quinn focuses on questions of race, one can see parallels with sexuality. 
Whilst there have not been large amounts of psychiatric training sessions on 
sexuality, contemporary diversity training in employment focuses on difference, 
with employees being taught to appreciate the differences of their co-workers, be 
it on the grounds of sexuality, race, gender, disability ad infinitum. This has 
served to perpetuate the notion that there are fundamental and irrevocable 
differences between gays and straights, whites and blacks, and so on. A more 
useful approach could be to adopt a model that advocates treating everybody, 
regardless of identity and status with respect and decency. I wish to be clear that I 
do not mean the mere toleration, or assimilation, that a liberal approach can often 
degenerate into. Parken (2003) has shown that many lesbians at work try to avoid 
talking about their home life because it would involve coming out. However, why
119
should a woman saying, for example, ‘last night I went out for a meal with my 
girlfriend’ be treated differently from a woman saying ‘last night I went out for a 
meal with my boyfriend’? My argument is that one does not reach equality by 
treating gay and straight people differently. To illustrate this with the club scene, 
there are gay clubs and straight clubs which tends to result in the ghettoisation of 
gay identity. Many of the clientele of gay clubs would not go to straight clubs, 
even though similar music would be played. Similarly, on arriving at a gay club 
with a woman, I have been informed that it was a gay venue by bouncers. I do not 
see that having separate venues for gay and straight people is equality. Rather, 
should not anyone, regardless of identity, be able to go to any club and not be 
treated differently by anyone because of who they are? Should not a same sex 
couple be able to hold hands and generally be a couple anywhere, rather than only 
in gay venues and spaces?
This is not assimilation or normalisation, which would involve queers 
striving to be part of the heterosexual majority, who do not always look kindly 
upon public displays of same-sex affection; it is a re-evaluation of what is 
considered ‘normal’. I wish to be perfectly clear that I am not advocating the 
obliteration of difference by wanting everyone to act, think, or look alike. 
Sedgwick’s axiom 1 is that “ people are different from each other’ (1990: 22) and 
this should not be forgotten. Without difference or division between people life 
would be a very boring thing. The problem arises not with the existence of 
difference or division per se, but rather arises when they are used as the basis of a 
hierarchy.
The Problem of Transgendered Heterosexuals
In the meetings few people attempted to problematise the exclusion of transgender 
on the basis of identity and difference. One of them was myself:
Alex: I want to come back to the idea of transvestites and that kind of thing; 
heterosexual people being involved in transgender. From my 
experience if you were to go down that route it’s a minefield, I mean
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I've gone out in town wearing skirts, that kind of thing, been out with 
my girlfriend, we've been walking down Queen Street and been called 
lesbians, dykes, queers all that kind of thing, now we’re quite blatantly 
not lesbians so ok you might have a heterosexual cross dresser but they 
can still have transphobic abuse, they can still have homophobic abuse, 
the fact they are not gay or bisexual doesn’t stop that happening so why 
can’t we cover them; so my suggestion is that on pretty much all 
grounds that we should include transgender.
In this extract I try to directly address some of the exclusionary concerns; rather 
than try and construct the debate in terms of identity, I explicitly concentrate on 
some of the actual discrimination that might befall a heterosexual cross dresser. 
This was done because it probably would have been futile to argue for the 
interconnectedness of sexual and gender identity on theoretical grounds. In 
making my case, I drew on my own experiences in a move to give my account 
more authority; I have experienced this conflation of homophobic and transphobic 
abuse and therefore am in a position to articulate these concerns, and have them 
listened to. The main point I was concerned to address was the implicit assertion 
that straight people cannot be victims of trans- or homo- phobic abuse and 
discrimination; whilst some appear to believe that the only criterion for such abuse 
is sexuality I wished to demonstrate that issues of gender and sexual identity are in 
fact far more complex than that. Therefore having made my case, with the use of 
my experience to give it more authority I make my recommendation to include 
transgender in the organisation, using the broad definition of the term. A central 
focus of this debate was that whilst one should articulate ones concerns on 
transgender inclusion/exclusion, one should also make a recommendation as to 
what the organisation should do.
The following extract is from an interview with Lauren, and refers to the 
first meeting in which the issue of heterosexual cross-dressers was raised:
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Lauren: They’re [some Executive Committee members] saying if you’re 
a heterosexual man who’s a transvestite then you can’t [be part 
of Morton Hall] ...
Alex: What do you think motivates those that were arguing against 
inclusion?
Lauren: The only thing I can think is that it’s the same thing that 
motivates homophobic people, that they’re insecure in their own 
sexuality simply. Why would you be so vociferous in policing 
borders of your own identity if you didn’t have a vested interest 
in doing that yourself? You don’t say ‘you can’t be in my gang’ 
unless you’re protecting something and if your protecting your 
own identity, why? You should be secure in your own identity to 
deal with all manner of people and it shouldn’t affect your own 
identity to be associated with other people. ... I think ... people 
who are insecure in their own identity or identities will be the 
most vocal in policing the boarders of those identities.
Much of the pollution behaviour and fear analysed in this chapter, and exemplified 
in the above extract, is a preface to transgression. This chapter demonstrates that 
for Morton Hall the dangerous contagion that has to be contained and expelled is 
the heterosexual transgender person. Chapter 7 considers the ways in which 
transgression, or perceived transgression, works to police the borders of Morton 
Hall, and therefore fosters a sense of collective identity -  the specific transgression 
considered is that of the transgender individual (as differentiated from the 
transsexual). As stated earlier, a transgender person occupies a liminal space 
because the rite of transition is not completed, and is therefore causing someone to 
exhibit pollution behaviour. The ensuing analysis will illustrate the ways in which 
the transgender person is construed as a dangerous and polluting influence on the 
organisation. In the above extract the dreaded spectre of the heterosexual cross 
dresser is raised. Morton Hall was clearly named by some as an organisation that 
was solely dedicated to improving the rights of lesbian, gay and bisexual people to 
the exclusion of all others. This constituted a very definite understanding of the
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purpose of the organisation, which could indicate that those who are against 
including heterosexual cross dressers believe that lesbian, gay and bisexual people 
form an easily identifiable and discrete minority group who share a collective 
understanding of their oppression. Furthermore, this sets up an opposition with 
heterosexual people in a move which homogenises heterosexual people as well as 
homosexual people, creating an ‘us and them’ ideology (see Young 1997). 
(Homo)sexuality is seen as something immanent that defines both personal 
identity and politics. Underlying this is the notion that all heterosexual people 
possess rights that all LGB people do not; moreover, instituting this division 
reinscribes the differences between gay and straight people; in invoking the binary 
it is strengthened. This is the detrimental effect noted by Lasch-Quinn (2000) 
with regard to race relations. For several Executive Committee members the main 
problem with the inclusion of transgender in Morton Hall was that the definition 
includes cross dressers, expressing a concern that the organisation would find 
itself representing heterosexual people. At no stage in the debate did these 
members indicate having a problem with LGB identified transgender (read 
transsexual) people being part of the organisation, therefore one can see that the 
heterosexual transgender person occupies the limen and represents a danger to the 
organisation. Part of the issue here is that, as discussed in greater detail in chapter 
5, for the majority of the Executive Committee members ‘transgender’ is actually 
conceptualised as ‘transsexual’, therefore transgender people are seen as crossing 
from one world to another safely, and therefore causing as little danger as possible 
to others. However, the heterosexual cross dresser problematises this as they do 
not perform the crossing, choosing rather to remain in a state of transition. 
Continuing Van Gennep’s metaphor of rooms and corridors, the transsexual 
simply moves from one room to another without incident, whilst the heterosexual 
cross-dresser loiters in the corridors between rooms causing trouble for everyone 
else. Therefore, it is clear that as well as having a discrete and stable definition of 
gay and straight, those advocating exclusion had a discrete and stable 
understanding of male and female; one is either one or the other, never something 
in between.
123
Douglas argues that ‘pollution behaviour is the reaction which condemns 
any object or idea likely to confuse of contradict cherished classifications’ (1991b: 
37). In response to my questioning, Lauren recognises this, claiming that it is 
those who are insecure about themselves who will attempt most strongly to 
strengthen the boundaries. The exclusionary reaction to the wide definition of 
transgender can be seen as pollution behaviour and is an attempt to exclude such 
polluting and dangerous people from the remit of the organisation, thus allowing 
Morton Hall to continue its work in safety. Lauren makes it very clear that she 
thinks that trans exclusion is advocated because of fear; the fear that one’s own 
identity will be troubled in uncomfortable ways -  being associated with people 
who are other to you should not affect you -  there should not be guilt by 
association. However, those supporting exclusion, particularly of heterosexual 
trans people, appear to view transgender as especially threatening. Moreover, 
vociferous exclusion illuminates what is allowable; ‘a rule of avoiding anomalous 
things affirms and strengthens the definitions to which they do not conform. So 
where Leviticus abhors crawling things, we should see the abomination as the 
negative side of the pattern of things approved’ (Douglas 1991b: 40). Therefore in 
the complete repudiation of heterosexual trans people one can see the approval of 
homosexual (trans) people.
The fears surrounding possible contamination of Morton Hall by 
transgender has parallels with some of the fears exhibited with regard to 
homosexuality in times past. As far back as the 1700s some believed that one had 
to provide strong measures to suppress homosexuality, because man would 
naturally revert to the state in which he prefers the company of other men, (see 
Chapter 4). Regarding the suppression of the molly houses, one can see that ‘no 
enemy is so monstrous as that which one fears lurking within oneself (Norton 
1992: 123). Similar views are also present in more recent times. During the 
period of gay liberation, much was made of the idea of polymorphous perversity, 
or inherent bisexuality (Marcuse 1969; Altman 1974), as being liberating from the 
constraints of normative sexuality. However, this was also considered with fear 
earlier in the century. For Freud ‘freedom to range equally over male and female
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objects as it is found in childhood, in primitive states of society and early periods 
of history, is the original basis from which, as a result of restrictions in one 
direction or the other, both the normal and inverted types develop’ (Freud 1949: 
25). Taking this further, West argues that ‘no progress can be made in the search 
for an understanding of causes without first recognising that homo-erotic 
propensities are a part of man’s natural biological inheritance ... the capacity for 
homo-erotic responsiveness is not, however, completely eradicated; it remains 
dormant, and can awaken given special circumstances’ (West 1955: 61). The 
special circumstances West refers to are all male social situations, such as 
boarding schools, prisons, the military and so forth. In this account one can 
clearly see that homosexuality is hiding below the surface of every ‘normal’ man 
and is waiting to break free given half an opportunity. Given that, as Chapter 4 
demonstrates, queer theory claims that gender is not natural, but a performative 
and cultural construction, one could make a case that it is only internal repression 
of the opposite gender which sustains a binary model of gender. Therefore one 
could argue that introducing transgender into Morton Hall would be a dangerous 
and polluting influence which would expose a repressed gender identity, just as 
West claims that certain all male social situations will expose a repressed 
homosexuality. Lauren’s claim that it is only those who are insecure in their own 
identity who would oppose the inclusion of transgender reinforces this. If one is 
not in fear of what is lurking under the surface one would have little need to 
segregate LGB activism from transgender activism. It is also possible to argue 
that those advocating exclusion are afraid that widening the remit of Morton Hall 
would expose queer claims that gender is not natural.
This is to illustrate that fear and pollution behaviour around sexuality is 
nothing new, rather than to attempt to provide psychological explanations of the 
Executive Committee members’ behaviour. As stated previously, one can never 
truly know the personal beliefs and emotions of another; however, there reactions 
to a disordering influence can nevertheless be illuminating. It is clear that, for 
some Executive Committee members, there is a level of fear associated with 
(heterosexual) trans people, but it seems over simplistic to argue that it is because
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they fear personal contamination, especially given that LGB trans people are still 
welcome in the organisation. There is a high level of insecurity over the potential 
effects of including straight trans people in Morton Hall, but I think this is more 
concerned with the effect on the organisation rather than the individual. The 
pollution behaviour appears to be more directed at the disadvantageous effect on 
Morton Hall that the inclusion of heterosexual trans people would have, whilst the 
fear is more a fear of the unknown. The Executive Committee members’ fear is 
concerned with the fact that they perceive that including transgender (on a broad 
definition) will materially alter Morton Hall and make it less effective at 
campaigning for lesbian, gay and bisexual equality, combined with the opinion 
that someone who is straight will have no knowledge of LGB issues. The 
‘unknown’ in this debate is what straight trans people would actually bring to 
Morton Hall, be it positive or negative.
As Chapter 5 argues, for most of the Executive Committee members, 
transgender means transsexual, with a resultant emphasis on the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 and other transition issues. This means that there has been 
little discussion of the needs of trans people (gay or straight) who have no desire 
to change their sex. Those in such a position, especially if they are heterosexual, 
are immediately placed in a position that defines their needs as contrary to those of 
the LGB membership of Morton Hall. I was the only Executive Committee 
member to suggest that their might be areas of commonality between heterosexual 
trans people and LGB people (see extract above). Mel makes similar claims vis-a- 
vis transgender as a whole and LGB, discussed in Chapter 8 Moreover, in the 
Executive Committee meeting, no-one directly responded to my opinion, and 
heterosexual trans people remained an object of pollution behaviour.
In the context of Douglas’ ideas of pollution and danger, both Lauren and I 
did not see the heterosexual transgender person as a polluting influence, or as 
presenting a danger to ourselves or Morton Hall itself. Therefore we attempted to 
mitigate some of the danger felt by others by attempting to bring such individuals 
into the fold. However, this attempt was unsuccessful. Douglas argues that ‘ideas 
about separating, purifying, demarcating and punishing transgressions have as
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their main function to impose system on an inherently untidy experience. It is 
only by exaggerating the differences between within and without, above and 
below, male and female, with and against, that a semblance of order is created’ 
(1991b: 4). I believe there is a fundamental difference between the trans excluders 
and both Lauren and me in that they desperately wanted that semblance of order 
created and maintained, whereas we had no such desire to impose order on ‘an 
inherently untidy experience’, for, as Douglas rightly maintains, such order is only 
a semblance, given that the definition of ‘semblance’ in the Oxford English 
Dictionary is ‘an appearance or outward seeming of (something which is not 
actually there or of which the reality is different from its appearance).’ It is clear 
that in Ricky’s extract he does exaggerate the differences between a heterosexual 
transgender person and an LGB one; it was this type of exaggeration that Lauren 
and I attempted to challenge by drawing on the similarities between the 
discrimination suffered by both heterosexual and homosexual transgender people. 
Also, as well as exaggerating the differences that Douglas describes, potential 
similarities are ignored as they would start to refute the differences that have been 
claimed.
In the following extract Terry questions the use of others’ opinions of 
homosexual and transgender people as a basis for including transgender within the 
remit of Morton Hall.
Terry: all I was going to say was, working with diversity in the police, one of 
the things I see is transgenders and homosexuals have the same place in 
a bigots mind as paedophiles etc. If someone is issuing bigotry we are 
in the same little box in their head as paedophiles and there is no way 
we would be presumed to represent paedophiles, or have any interest in 
it.
Here Terry has responded to my claim that homophobic and transphobic abuse are 
connected. Rather than deny this, which would be very difficult, Terry instead 
claims that trans and LGB people are the same as paedophiles as far as a bigot is 
concerned. This moves to exclude transgender from Morton Hall and both
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addresses my earlier statement and does not rely on a separation between gender 
and sexuality. Terry’s account is further strengthened by the fact that he has this 
information from working with the police; this is therefore not just a theoretical 
connection but one that he as actually witnessed. One could make the argument 
that because homosexuality, transgender and paedophilia are linked in the bigot’s 
mind there must be historical, social and cultural reasons for such a connection, 
therefore it would make sense to bring all the issues together. However, Terry is 
very quick to distance himself, and Morton Hall, from paedophilia: ‘there is no 
way we would be presumed to represent paedophiles or have any interest in it’. It 
is rhetorically powerful to forge the link with paedophilia as there are few other 
things that can be guaranteed to induce such high levels of fear; there is no other 
contagion as dangerous. Moreover, Terry’s definition of a paedophile is likely to 
be someone sexually attracted to young (probably prepubescent) children, rather 
than anyone having sex with someone under the age of consent; the reason for this 
is that in fighting for an equalisation of the age of consent laws Morton Hall was 
technically campaigning for those who would have been classed as, at the very 
least, sex offenders. This move also distances Morton Hall from other radical 
queer groups such as Outrage who campaigned for the age of consent to be 
fourteen for everyone.
Indeed, the effect of including paedophilia or man/boy love within an LGB 
umbrella has already proved definitionally problematic for the International 
Lesbian and Gay Association, and there are parallels with this case and Morton 
Hall. Gamson (1997) looks at the effects of inclusion and exclusion with regard to 
the North American Man/Boy Love Association (NAMBLA) and the International 
Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), and transsexuals and the Michigan 
Womyn’s Music Festival (MWMF). NAMBLA had been a member of the ILGA 
for ten years, but the major problems came when the ILGA was given a 
consultative role within the United Nations. Gamson notes that it is almost taken 
for granted that we define ourselves at least partly by what we are not, and that all 
social movements, to some extent, have exclusionary membership criteria; this is 
exacerbated when the social movement in question is one based upon identity.
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This is not just defining against antagonists, but also against prospective 
protagonists; this is what happened in Morton Hall -  transgendered people are not 
against the organisation, rather they are potential allies, but, apparently with 
enough differences from other Morton Hall members to make their membership an 
issue.
Gamson shows that it is not the participation of people in the movement 
that is the problem; NAMBLA members were involved in the ILGA, and after the 
exclusion of transsexuals from the MWMF, they were quietly allowed in again. 
He therefore suggests that ‘this gap between practice and public discourse 
suggests that internal movement debates over inclusion and exclusion are best 
understood as public communications’ (Gamson 1997: 180 original emphasis). 
Whilst the debate in Morton Hall has not arisen in the public domain the ‘public’ 
have been invoked by Executive Committee members as a rhetorical device; for 
example, it has been asked what the effect of explicit exclusion would be on the 
public image of Morton Hall. There is also a difference between practice and 
public discourse within Morton Hall. It has been decided that the organisation 
will not widen its remit to include trans people, nevertheless, Morton Hall is part 
of a national LGB 7  campaign and has promised to raise trans issues whenever 
possible and collaborate with a local transgender group. Furthermore, prior to the 
debate the organisation did not have a position on transgender and there was 
inclusion on an ad hoc basis which involved collaboration and partnership with the 
above local transgender group. Therefore there are already transgender people in 
the organisation; Mel claims that there are about 60 trans people in Morton Hall 
(just under ten per cent of the membership -  her figure is unverifiable). Moreover, 
technically if heterosexual trans people are not allowed to join the organisation, 
any who are already in the organisation should be asked to leave. This has not 
happened, again demonstrating the exclusion of trans from Morton Hall is more 
symbolic that practical.
There are similarities between Morton Hall and the ILGA. The presence 
of NAMBLA became an issue because of public concern, but it had had a position 
in the ILGA in a time when the boundaries of lesbian and gay sexuality and sexual
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minorities were less contested. The debate then centred itself on who can call 
themselves gay or lesbian. This is a large part of the discussion in Morton Hall, 
and is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. Gamson notes that NAMBLA’s 
adversaries had three main arguments: they are child molesters; paedophilia is not 
a gay issue and NAMBLA is hindering the ILGA’s political efficacy. This is a 
fairly standard effort to demonise one’s opponents -  claim the issues are different 
and then claim that policy reasons mitigate exclusion. These two tactics have 
been employed by Executive Committee members, although no-one has tried to 
demonise trans people. Regardless of whether one believes that transgender 
should be part of the remit of lesbian and gay organisations, it does form part of 
the current equality agenda, whereas man/boy love does not.
The ILGA claimed that NAMBLA was not a gay organisation; their central 
point being that ‘you are not us’ (Gamson 1997: 185 original emphasis). This 
‘you are not us’ discourse has been articulated by several Executive Committee 
members; only LGB trans people are welcome on the basis that heterosexual 
transgender people have no understanding of LGB issues. As analysed in Chapter 
5 there is a very strong effort on the part of some Executive Committee members 
to separate sexuality from gender. In answer to this charge, NAMBLA claimed 
''you are us and we are you’ (Gamson 1997: 186 original emphasis). They 
claimed that man/boy love was a part of homosexual history right from the 
Ancient Greeks and that similar practices exist contemporaneously in other 
cultures. They further claimed that NAMBLA has been long active in gay and 
lesbian campaigning. One can easily see a similar argument being put forward in 
favour of including transgender in Morton Hall, and indeed this was the case. 
Issues linking gender and sexuality have been ever present as Chapters 3 and 4 
show; gay men have often been seen as effeminate, whilst lesbians have often 
been seen as masculine -  the book often regarded as the classic of lesbian 
literature, The Well o f  Loneliness (Hall 1928) could perhaps more properly be seen 
as being about a trans man. Moreover as Mel has said, transgender people are 
already a part of Morton Hall, whether it is desired or not. Trans people have had 
a long standing part in LGB history and communities, be it in the centre or on the
130
margins, and will no doubt continue to be a part regardless of Morton Hall’s final 
act of exclusion. In a sense this makes the exclusion all the more interesting 
because it goes against the general process of inclusion shown by other 
organisations in the past few years, such as the National Union of Students 
(towards trans people) and UNISON (towards bisexual and trans people). 
Furthermore, one can see that the previous basis of ad hoc inclusion masked a very 
complex and problematic debate that called the nature of Morton Hall into 
question.
Gamson argues that an organisation’s loose boundaries are tightened 
‘when the communication environment changes, the fault lines bridged by loose 
boundaries are exposed triggering attempts to define the collective more purely’ 
(1997: 187). This is an accurate description of Morton Hall; one of the catalysts to 
the debate was local trans people wishing to be part of the organisation, it was this 
demand for inclusion that revealed the loose boundaries of the organisation.
Having provided a rebuttal to myself by claiming that one should not rely on 
the oppressors’ definition of sexuality or gender Terry proceeds to talk about 
heterosexuals being in Morton Hall:
That’s extreme but how should I say, people who want to be involved 
probably have the same interests at heart, the heterosexual transgender 
wouldn’t come within 50 miles of us, so in a lot of respect I’d go along 
with what Pat says if a case comes up which is obviously in our remit 
obviously we’d support it. It'd be very hard for us to go out and 
campaign for some people who have the transgender and for some 
reason are homophobic, that would seem to be a total betrayal of what 
we stand for. I don’t know what the answer is that’s the top and 
bottom of it but if we went purely on other peoples perception of us it’s 
a different kettle of fish.
Here one can see Terry drawing on a collective ideology of the purpose of 
Morton Hall and assuming that everyone has shared opinions; those who want to 
be involved with Morton Hall ‘probably have the same interests at heart’. Whilst
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this is an attempt to foster a sense of a commonality of purpose, it does not sit 
easily with the fact that some transgender people do wish to be part of Morton 
Hall, whilst some Executive Committee members do not want such involvement; 
clearly those who want to be involved do not have the same interests at heart. 
However, it is most likely that Terry supposes that the only people who would 
want to be involved with the organisation would be lesbian, gay or bisexual, as he 
claims that heterosexual transgender people would not want to join Morton Hall. 
(This is a very strange argument that is also employed by others and is be explored 
further in chapter 7 and the conclusion: Terry is using Morton Hall’s present 
remit, that it is LGB, as an argument for why heterosexual transgender people 
would not want to join the organisation if it were to be widened to become LGBT, 
which using the Gender Trust’s definitions would necessarily include heterosexual 
transgender people.) Terry then proceeds to support Pat’s argument for a case-by- 
case basis of inclusion when the issue is ‘obviously in our remit’. In saying this 
Terry assumes that the remit is obvious; that is, it is known to all the Executive 
Committee members, meaning he does not have to explain it -  the organisations 
remit is part of the assumed knowledge of Morton Hall. I am also unsure what in 
this context a ‘case’ actually is; Morton Hall is primarily a lobbying organisation 
and does not undertake service provision (for instance, the organisation does not 
support individual cases under the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) 
Regulations 2003, or provide advice to those who have been victims of 
homophobia), therefore Morton Hall would not, for instance, be helping individual 
transsexuals negotiate the Gender Recognition Act 2004, or help them if they 
suffered transphobic discrimination. This therefore means that the ‘case’ will 
necessarily relate to some area of policy or community development that is of 
relevance to transsexuals; however, unless Morton Hall becomes an LGBT 
organisation, such cases would be outside its remit. Viewed from this angle it 
appears that the ‘case-by-case’ idea is merely a cover for exclusion, however, I 
cannot believe that this was the intention of Pat, who introduced the idea, as she 
advocated full inclusion of transgender people in Morton Hall.
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Terry makes the connection between transgender, homosexuality and 
paedophilia, invoking paedophilia as the ultimate pollution, the danger of which 
must be avoided at all costs. This danger is made reference to, not because it is 
likely that Morton Hall will ever represent paedophiles but rather because it 
demonstrates that even though transphobic abuse is similar to homophobic abuse, 
transgender can still have a polluting influence on the organisation. This attempt 
to separate gender and sexuality, in response to my conflation of the two, is a 
move to strengthen the idea of the heterosexual transgender person as a dangerous 
influence, and thereby place such individuals beyond the pale of Morton Hall. 
Ricky gave one example of how the polluting influence of heterosexual 
transgender people would affect Morton Hall -  it would detract from the issues 
that the organisation campaigns on -  here Terry gives a second example; he raises 
the spectre of the homophobic transgender individual. Whilst I agree that the 
situation raised by Terry would be a difficult one, it is noteworthy that he does not 
also say that, if the remit was widened, it would be equally hard to campaign for 
transphobic LGB people. However, Terry says, ‘what we stand for’, defining the 
primary aim of the organisation as being about sexuality, therefore transgender 
would be a dirty outside influence betraying the (in his account, collectively 
agreed and supported) aims of Morton Hall. This relates to the confusion of the 
purpose of Morton Hall identified by Lauren and explored in greater detail in 
Chapter 8; should the organisation be made up of those who share a sexual 
identity, or those who share the same political ends?
This extract raises the issue of internal differences and prejudices between 
LGB and transgender people and in so doing assumes that there are no such 
internal differences or prejudices between lesbian, gay and bisexual people. It is 
feasible that some lesbian and gay people could be prejudiced against bisexuals, 
seeing them as still trying to claim heterosexual privilege; some (radical feminist) 
lesbians could be prejudiced against gay men, seeing them as hypermasculine; 
some bisexuals could be prejudiced against lesbians and gays, believing that they 
have not recognised everyone’s innate polymorphous perversity. These examples 
illustrate some of the potential internal differences between LGB people that are
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not seen as problematic for the work of Morton Hall, firstly, therefore this 
questions whether a homophobic transgender person would pose a problem for 
Morton Hall (using Terry’s logic, would such a person ‘come within 50 miles of 
us’ anyway) or not, secondly this illustrates that the symbolic ideas of pollution 
that Terry (and others) draw upon is based on a false unity of LGB people.
Conclusions
This chapter has illustrated some of the ways that the Executive members of 
Morton Hall constitute the heterosexual transgender person as betwixt and 
between, as neither fish nor fowl. This chapter has developed an understanding of 
some of the ways in which the figure of the heterosexual transgender person has 
been an object of danger and pollution behaviour for the Executive Committee 
members.
The multiple ways in which transgender has been excluded by this 
behaviour reveals the centre that is defined by the margins. Douglas claims that 
‘we can assume that the community, in so far as it shows a common culture, is 
collectively interested in pressing for conformity to its norms’ (1991a: 53). This 
chapter shows that transgender does not (save LGB transsexuals) conform to the 
norms of Morton Hall. The heterosexual trans person particularly is of 
foundational importance to the debate, and that there is something about this 
figure that is seen by some members as troubling. The Executive Committee 
members’ responses to the pollution of transgender represent what Bauman terms 
the phagic and emetic strategies:
The phagic strategy is ‘inclusivist’, the emetic strategy is ‘exclusivist’. The 
first ‘assimilates’ the strangers to the neighbours, the second merges them 
with the aliens. Together, they polarize the strangers and attempt to clear 
up the most vexing and disturbing middle-ground between the 
neighbourhood and alienness poles. To the strangers for whom they define 
the life condition and its choices, they posit a genuine ‘either/or’: conform 
or be damned, be like us or do not overstay your visit, play the game by our
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rules or be prepared to be kicked out from the game altogether (Bauman 
1993: 163)
Most of the reactions seen in this chapter represent the emetic strategy; that 
which is disturbing is ‘kicked out of the game’. Douglas provides an 
excellent understanding of the emetic strategy. While her analysis of 
pollution behaviour is excellent for considering adverse reactions to a 
contagion, it does not, however, provide the conceptual tools necessary to 
theorise why some people in a group do not exhibit such behaviour. That is 
she does not provides the tools to understand the phagic strategy, why some 
people opt for the inclusivist as opposed to the exclusivist path; this forms 
the subject of Chapter 8. Furthermore, Douglas has less to say on why an 
object of pollution behaviour occupies such a position, other than it being 
the subject of disapprobation by the group. It is to this that I turn in the 
following chapter which draws upon Morton Hall’s construction of 
transgender (particularly heterosexual) as a transgression which further 
seeks to define the collective identity of Morton Hall.
135
7C o l l e c t iv e  Id e n t it ie s : T r a n sg r e ssin g  B o u n d a r ie s
This chapter considers the use of transgression and transgressive practices in 
defining the boundaries of Morton Hall. As already stated, for the purpose of 
Morton Hall the definition of transgender employed was that of the Gender Trust, 
and I quote it again:
Transgender. A term used to include transsexuals, transvestites and cross 
dressers. A transgenderist can also be a person who, like a transsexual, 
transitions - sometimes with the help of hormone therapy and / or cosmetic 
surgery - to live in the gender role of choice, but has not undergone, and 
generally does not intend to undergo, [sex reassignment] surgery 
(http ://www. gendertrust.org.uk/indexl .htm)
This definition, although limited, is capable of including a significant number of 
people who transgress currently accepted sartorial convention. I argue that this 
transgression is central to demarcating the membership boundaries of Morton 
Hall. Furthermore, I analyse the, largely suppressive, reaction of the organisation 
to gender transgression. The following chapter (8) will demonstrate some of the 
problems with categorising gender variance into transgender and transsexual; for 
instance those who identify as something other to male and female and have no 
desire for surgery are largely excluded from these definitions. However, for the 
purpose of this chapter the defining transgression is that of the (heterosexual) 
cross dresser. Whilst there would have undoubtedly been a reaction against the 
above example, the situation did not present itself because, as will become clear, 
the limit is set much closer to the centre. I begin, however, by considering how 
transgression is a defining feature of collective identity, before discussing some of 
the ways in which Douglas (1991a, 1991b), Hegel (1991), Nietzsche (1969, 1974, 
2003a, 2003b) and Bataille (2001) have conceptualised transgression. I relate
136
these theorists to the trans inclusion/exclusion debate and use them to illustrate the 
identity work of Executive Committee members.
From Transgression to Identity
For many of the executive members of Morton Hall, as Chapter 5 has shown, 
‘transgender’ is largely conceptualised as ‘transsexual’ - that is, although in 
discussion most people used the word transgender, it is clear that they are referring 
to pre- or post-operative transsexuals (for example, there is much talk of the 
Gender Recognition Act 2004 which only pertains to transitioning transsexuals), 
rather than those who transgress gender norms, but have no intention of actually 
changing sex. I have suggested in the previous chapter that this is because, 
although transgressive, changing sex is an act that is normalised by having a finite 
end point. That is, the person undergoing the sex change does not remain in the 
liminal stage between genders, but rather crosses from one to another (van Gennep 
1960; Turner 1974). However, when one transgresses gender norms and has no 
desire to leave the limen then one is in a far more dangerous position, and the 
transgression is all the more powerful for that. It is this particular transgression 
that is a central defining force in the arguments for transgender inclusion or 
exclusion within the organisation.
It should be noted that I am analyzing the transgression of transgenderism, 
and more specifically heterosexual transgenderism, not because they are 
immanently more transgressive than transsexuality but because it is the inclusion 
of transgender, using a broad definition, that is the shining light that illuminates 
the limits of Morton Hall most clearly. As stated in chapter 3, there is nothing 
inherently transgressive or subversive about transgender, but it is seen as such by 
several members of Morton Hall.
Jenks writes that ‘the story which always precedes the commission or 
acknowledgement of a transgressive act is the constitution of a centre, a centre that 
provides for a social structure, and a structure of meaning that is delimited or 
marked out by boundaries’ (2003: 15). In the context of my work, the ‘centre’ is 
the remit of the organisation, whilst the ‘social structure’ is the structure of
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Morton Hall and the kinds of policies that it follows. Moreover, one can see the 
structure of meaning being created -  the meaning of being lesbian, gay, bisexual 
and transgender. Moreover, ‘logically, mclusion entails exclusion, if only by 
default. To define the criteria for membership of any set of objects is, at the same 
time, also to create a boundary, everything beyond which does not belong’ 
(Jenkins 2004: 79 original emphasis). This point is worth remembering, as much 
of the trans inclusion/exclusion debate is framed in terms of social justice and 
equality. However, this does not alter the fact that a certain group of people have 
been denied access to membership of Morton Hall. Further, the creation of a 
boundary creates the possibility of transgression which in turn provides the 
opportunity for a future re-evaluation of the boundary.
Durkheim’s (1947) notions of solidarity and repressive and restitutive 
sanctions provide a useful way of understanding the function of transgression in 
fostering a sense of collective identity. Whilst repressive and restitutive sanctions 
apply to different forms of solidarity, their function is essentially the same -  that 
is, to preserve order. In a society with mechanical solidarity ‘a crime (or 
transgression) offends against the shared collective consciousness, it is therefore a 
crime (or transgression) against society itself,’ whilst in a society with organic 
solidarity ‘the symbolic response to transgression has to be an attempt at the 
restoration of the status quo and a declaration of difference’ (Jenks 2003: 20). 
Interestingly, in the arguments used in the trans inclusion/exclusion debate, one 
can see both forms of sanctions being employed, perhaps indicating that some 
Executive Committee members are attempting to foster a sense of mechanical 
solidarity onto what is arguably an organic community, given the diversity of the 
LGB ‘community’. To elaborate: I am defining Morton Hall and the LGBT 
community as a whole as an organic community; that is, it is made up of people 
who whilst able to work together, do not have shared belief and value systems. 
Therefore, the ‘correct’ response to a transgression should be a restoration of the 
status quo and a marking off of the transgressor as other. This type of response 
has occurred in the debate, such as the claims that gender and sexuality are two 
distinct categories discussed in Chapter 5. However, there have been responses to
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the transgression that would be more appropriate to a mechanical community in 
which there was a shared sense of right and wrong, and of identity. Such 
responses include many of those detailed below and in the previous chapter (6). 
Such pollution behaviour and attempts at purification only make sense if one 
thinks that there is a shared collective conscience in the community. This 
argument is expanded upon in the conclusion. According to Durkheim ‘criminal 
acts are those which seem harmful to the society that represses them, that penal 
rules express, not the conditions which are essential to social life, but those which 
appear such to the group which observes them’ (Durkheim 1947: 73 original 
emphasis). However, as Durkheim is keen to stress, this does not tell us much on 
its own; what is of interest is why certain conditions appear as central to a 
particular group. In a non-juridical setting one can see that the acts, beliefs and 
values of a group, in this case an LGB organisation, are those which appear 
essential to the group’s continued existence; therefore contrary acts, beliefs and 
values are those seen as harmful to the organisation. Further, in attempting to 
discover why certain criteria appear as central to a particular group one begins to 
gain an understanding of the constitution of the group as a whole.
Jenkins argues that ‘community membership depends on the symbolic 
construction and signification of a mask of similarity which all can wear, an 
umbrella of solidarity under which all can shelter’ (2004: 110) and furthermore 
that ‘community is itself a symbolic construct upon which people draw, 
rhetorically and strategically ’ (2004: 112 original emphasis). It is also possible to 
view communities as imagined. For Anderson, the nation is an ‘imagined political 
community -  and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’ (1991: 6). 
Although specifically writing on the nation, this definition can be productively 
applied to the LGB ‘community,’ especially given the reliance on ethnic 
homosexualities by several Executive Committee members (see chapters 4 and 5). 
Here the nation is imagined because the members of all but the smallest 
communities will not know one another and it is limited because it has boundaries 
-  ‘no nation imagines itself as coterminous with mankind’ (Anderson 1991: 7). 
Lastly, ‘it is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality
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and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a 
deep, horizontal comradeship’ (Anderson 1991:7). Considered in this fashion, 
community is imagined, in that it does not refer to anything solid, but is 
nevertheless something that the members will fight (in the literal sense when one 
considered nations) to protect. One can see therefore, that the criteria for 
membership of an organisation are constructed and are maintained by policing the 
transgressions that occur at the boundaries of membership.
Dangerous Transgressions
I now move to consider some of the theoretical analyses of transgression in order 
to understand the ways in which transgression, or perceived transgression, works 
to police the borders of Morton Hall, and therefore foster a sense of collective 
identity. This extract is from an interview with Lauren, referring to the first 
meeting in which the issue of heterosexual cross-dressers was raised:
Lauren: they’re [some Executive Committee members] saying if you’re a 
heterosexual man who’s a transvestite then you can’t [be part of 
Morton Hall] ... I think ... people who are insecure in their own 
identity or identities will be the most vocal in policing the boarders of 
those identities.
The particular transgression, as Lauren states, I am interested in is that of the 
transgender individual (as differentiated from the transsexual). As the previous 
chapter argues, a transgender individual, such as a cross-dresser, occupies a 
liminal position because s/he refuses to perform the rites of transition. The 
ensuing analysis illustrates the ways in which the transgender person is 
constructed as a dangerous and polluting influence on the organisation by the 
executive members, raising themes of transgression. Here the Executive 
Committee members have placed heterosexual transvestites outside the boundaries 
of Morton Hall. However, using the typology of ‘gender defenders’ and ‘gender 
outlaws’, introduced in Chapter 3, one can regard some transvestites as gender 
defenders because it is important that they are wearing women’s clothes and
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accoutrements, rather that those which can be worn by both men and women. 
Moreover, there is often a clear transition between male and female, at least for 
the duration of the cross-dressing. In chapter 3 I claimed that Morton Hall is more 
likely to support those trans people who uphold the idea of binary genders, 
however, it is not that simple. Whilst transsexuals and transvestites can both be 
seen to be gender defenders (see also chapter 8) the issue of sexuality is 
paramount. This is not to negate the fact that the heterosexual cross-dresser is 
transgressively defining for Morton Hall, but to acknowledge that this particular 
limit is contingent upon the Executive Committee members’ construction of 
transgender issues and people, rather than an inherent division between 
transgender and transsexual. Therefore, it is clear that as well as having a discrete 
and stable definition of gay and straight, those advocating exclusion had a discrete 
and stable understanding of male and female; one is either one or the other, never 
something in between. In the second section of the extract, Lauren recognises that 
the exclusionary reaction could be because personal identities have been brought 
into question, claiming that it is those who are insecure about themselves who will 
attempt most strongly to strengthen the boundaries. The exclusionary reaction to 
the wide definition of transgender can be seen as pollution behaviour and is an 
attempt to exclude such polluting and dangerous people from the remit of the 
organisation, thus allowing Morton Hall to continue its work in safety. It is clear, 
therefore, that transgression can be a polluting influence that can induce pollution 
behaviour in individuals that serves to strengthen the definition of the collective.
Dialectics of Transgression
I now consider transgression, with its polluting influence, and the construction of 
collective identity as a dialectical movement, as the ‘boundary can be seen as the 
dialectical synthesis of internal thesis and external antithesis,’ (Jenkins 2004: 118). 
In these terms the transgressive act is the antithesis which destabilises the status 
quo of the organisation causing the re-evaluation of the thesis into a new 
synthesis. In saying that there is a dialectic of transgression, I am not employing 
dialectics as a process embedded in historicism, as Hegel does. For example The
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Philosophy o f History (Hegel 1991) illustrates one giant dialectical movement 
from the time of the Greeks to the present; furthermore, he saw that ‘the history of 
the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom’ (19). It 
is possible to see Hegelian dialectics as a totalising and deterministic form of 
thought that is in opposition to poststructural critiques of identity and difference. 
However, when one removes the historical impulse from dialectics, it is still the 
case that,
In the categories of our thought, in the development of consciousness, and 
in the progress of history, there are opposing elements which lead to the 
disintegration of what seemed stable, and the emergence of something 
new which reconciles the previously opposing elements but in turn 
develops its own internal tensions (Singer 2001: 103).
A dialectical analysis can illustrate some of the ways in which identity is formed 
through discussion and negotiation, as well as demonstrating the importance of 
transgression in the formation of identity. It is also important to note that although 
each dialectical movement will terminate in a synthesis, ‘not every synthesis 
brings the dialectic process to a stop in the way that Hegel thought the organic 
community of his own time brought the dialectical movement of history to an end’ 
(Singer 2001: 102). A synthesis may resolve the one sidedness of its thesis and 
antithesis. However it may still find itself one sided in another respect, and 
additionally it is possible that the original antithesis (particularly if it is a 
transgressive impulse) may still not be fully resolved.
In the context of the transgender inclusion/exclusion debate within Morton 
Hall, the thesis was the position of the organisation before April 2004, that is, that 
the organisation was for lesbian, gay and bisexual people only and therefore that 
transgender people would only be represented if they were also lesbian, gay or 
bisexual. The antithesis was the argument from certain people, both within and 
without the organisation, that the remit be widened to include transgender people. 
The synthesis was the final decision of the organisation; that it will continue to be 
LGB, as before, but will additionally attempt to support transgender activists
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gaining funding to set up their own organisation. This is the overall picture of the 
dialectical movement; however, on closer inspection it is apparent that the 
situation is more complex. Moreover, as will become clear, the synthesis is 
precarious and will probably form the thesis for another dialectical movement -  
see chapter 8 for more on the probable re-evaluation of the decision. The reasons 
for this complexity are the multiple arguments for trans inclusion/exclusion that 
have been employed in the debate; there have been two main foci of debate; firstly 
practical considerations of such things as costs and staffing and secondly, 
considerations of identity. The effect of this was that there were almost two 
concurrent, but nevertheless interconnected, debates on trans inclusion/exclusion, 
one on the practical considerations and one on identity matters. The following 
two extracts demonstrate some of this complexity, and are situated at the very end 
of the transgender inclusion/exclusion debate, and thus represent its conclusion. 
Robin was chairing that particular meeting and was bringing the debate to a close.
Robin: generally speaking the discussions have gone round the fact that 
with the Gender Reassignment Act which firmly comes under the 
Equal Opportunities Commission, we have a capacity issue in terms 
of the number of staff that are there to be able to pick up and run with 
and train and answer all the questions round that, it would be quite 
difficult for Morton Hall to pick up [...] I think Evelyn you were 
saying that we have identified that there is the possibility of funding 
for either [local trans organisation] or for a transgender group to pick 
that up and we would certainly want to work with that group to 
support it, but at this stage it does seem to be over and above our 
remit to include the T as though Morton Hall is representing 
transgender people across [area] I mean I think that is the general 
feeling.
Robin: Can we then come to that conclusion, that it remains the status quo 
but with all those provisos that we continue to support alongside 
where we can and any campaigns that we are involved in may well 
include the transgender issue. So is that ok? Are you happy with
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that? It would be worth I think, two years’ time, three years’ time, 
saying that we may want to revisit it if things change. We don’t 
know what is going to happen with the commission and so on but to 
get this again and again would be counterproductive.
As with elsewhere in the discussion, transgender has been largely conceptualised 
as transsexual. Whilst it was claimed that those who have issues under the 
Gender Reassignment Act should be directed to the Equal Opportunities 
Commission (although as stated in Chapter 5, I think this argument is spurious), 
the situation for those who have issues unrelated to transition are in a far more 
precarious position. An example of this is the case of Smith v Safeway Pic (1995) 
at an Employment Appeal Tribunal which found that it was contra the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 to have a requirement for men to have to have their hair 
not below the collar, whilst women were permitted to have long hair. However, 
on appeal (Smith v Safeway Pic 1996) it was held that ‘rules concerning 
appearance will not be discriminatory because their content is different for men 
and women if  they enforce a common principle of smartness or conventionality, 
and taken as a whole and not garment by garment or item by item, neither gender 
is treated less favourably in enforcing that principle’ (Smith v Safeway Pic 1996: 
457). This demonstrates the potential difficulty that a transgender person could 
find themselves in, and it is far from clear to whom such a person should go for 
help.
In Robin’s summing up one can see the practical considerations in 
operation; it is questionable whether the organisation would have the resources to 
take on board trans issues as well as those of sexuality. Robin then went on to 
note that there was the possibility of funding for another organisation to take on 
these issues, and that Morton Hall would want to work with the new transgender 
organisation. However, this seems a rather tautological argument; the debate 
concerns whether the organisation should widen its remit to include transgender 
people as well as LGB people, therefore it seems illogical to use the fact that at 
present the organisation does not include transgender -  and consequently does not
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have the capacity to do so at present — as a reason for not widening the remit in 
the future and so being able to apply for funding on that basis. The only reason 
that it is ‘over and above our remit to include the T’ is that the remit has not been 
widened to include it.
This would appear to make this a very precarious synthesis that is liable to 
change in the future; this is acknowledged in Robin’s second extract. Here Robin 
indicated that this is not a once and for all decision; if the political situation 
changes (‘the commission’ refers to the Commission for Equality and Human 
Rights, coming into being in 2007) then Morton Hall may change its policy. This 
demonstrates that it is likely that the present synthesis will form the thesis for 
another dialectical movement; the unknown factor is the antithesis -  it could, for 
instance be a change in the political climate, or further demands from trans people 
to be included in the organisation. This demonstrates a break with Hegel’s 
historical dialectics; there is no absolute to which the dialectical movement is 
directed; rather it is a constructed and fluid process.
Having said that the status quo remains, Robin says that some of the 
campaigns that the organisation is involved with may well include transgender 
issues, in which case they would work on them. An example of such a campaign 
is Education for All, which is a joint campaign run by LGBT Youth Scotland, 
FFLAG (Friends and Families of Lesbians and Gays), and Stonewall, with nearly 
seventy coalition members across the UK. This is directly discussed by Jerry in 
the penultimate meeting that considered trans inclusion/exclusion:
Jerry: you know what is happening in many of the campaigns, for instance 
Education for All is an LGBT campaign so there is the involvement 
there. We are now talking to policy makers on lesbian and gay issues, 
if there’s an obvious link then we’ll talk about transgender issues to 
them. Morton Hall does obviously represent transgender people who 
are lesbian gay or bisexual; that is Morton Hall’s position, we are a 
lesbian gay and bisexual organisation and we include anyone who is 
LGB whatever ethnicity or transgender or diversity generally, so I think 
we are covering it.
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The aim of the Education for All campaign is to tackle homophobia in schools. 
However, the campaign is LGBT, and there is a recognition that ‘homophobia 
affects all pupils and students -  lesbian, gay, bisexual and straight’ (Stonewall 
2005). Furthermore, when this campaign was launched for the organisation there 
was much talk of how homophobic abuse and bullying was a problem for both 
gay and straight students, as well as an awareness that ‘gay’ as a term of abuse 
was as much about signifying someone’s break with accepted masculinity or 
femininity as sexuality itself. Jerry also says that when talking to policy makers 
that if there is an ‘obvious link’ with transgender issues then they will also be 
raised. This raises two points, the first being the nature of an ‘obvious link’. The 
second point is that this presupposes that there is a potential pool of obvious links 
between issues affecting LGB people and issues affecting transgender people 
which appears contrary to claims made by some other Executive Committee 
members that the two issues are separate. Furthermore, it is rather a misnomer to 
say that because Morton Hall represents LGB people who are transgender that ‘we 
are covering it.’ A trans LGB person is being represented on the basis that they 
are lesbian, gay or bisexual, not that they are transgender. Jerry would not have 
said that because the organisation represented black and ethnic minority LGB 
people that ‘we cover’ the issues affecting black and ethnic minority people. 
Moreover, the organisation cannot truly claim to be ‘covering it’ when the 
business plan has no mention of transgender issues; however, this does not 
explain Robin and Jerry both paying, at the very least, lip service to representing 
trans issues. There are at least two possible explanations for this. The first is 
somewhat cynical and is that it is an attempt to pacify those, both within and 
without the organisation, in favour of trans inclusion. However, I favour the more 
sympathetic view that Morton Hall will attempt to raise trans issues when and 
where ever it can. This is because the organisation is involved in the Education 
for All campaign which does include transgender. Consequently I think the 
motivations are sincere, although I would dispute that ‘we are covering it’. If 
Morton Hall is truly covering trans issues on the basis of its representation of trans
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LGB people then there is little reason to exclude straight trans people. However, 
that this was not the case shows that the issue of sexuality remains of central 
import. Elsewhere (see chapter 8) Jerry states that Morton Hall does not have the 
expertise to, for example, guide people through the gender recognition process, 
therefore it seems clear that the only trans issues that Morton Hall will work on 
are those that have a clear and unarguable like with LGB issues. How such a link 
will be decided up remains to be seen (especially given that the mere existence of 
such a link is anathema to many Executive Committee members), but the 
Education for All campaign appears to be one such example. These quotes show 
a more fluid understanding of sexuality than those used by Executive Committee 
members who claimed that sexuality is about sexual orientation and transgender is 
about gender. This means that the organisation will be operating with two 
competing understandings of sexuality simultaneously; referring back to Jenkins’ 
(2004) statement on internal thesis and external antithesis (above), it also appears 
that there is an internal antithesis as well. These problems make a dialectical 
understanding of the trans inclusion/exclusion debate difficult; the synthesis is 
supposed to embody some kind of truth, the thesis and antithesis ‘must be brought 
together, unified in a manner that preserves them, and avoids their different forms 
of one-sidedness’ (Singer 2001: 102). It appears awkward to write of this debate 
as a complete dialectical movement -  as I have tried to do, as the organisation has, 
for the time being at least, made its decision on trans inclusion/exclusion -  as it is 
far from clear that the movement is complete. What this does demonstrate 
however, is that transgressive elements of transgender have found their way into 
the organisation even though the official stance of Morton Hall is to remain LGB.
Part of the reason that the above dialectical analysis seems somewhat 
forced is ‘because dialectics substituted for the questioning of being and limits the 
play of contradiction and totality’ (Foucault 1977: 38). Nevertheless the analysis 
is productive as it illustrates the fact that the debate cannot sensibly be reduced to 
thesis, antithesis and synthesis and shows that the problem is far more complicated 
and interwoven. Therefore I now move to question being and limits within the 
context of the trans inclusion/exclusion debate.
147
Of Madmen and Free-Spirits
Having looked at the debate as a whole I intend now to analyse specifically the 
transgression that has fostered the debate; that is, the non transsexual transgender 
person, who may, or may not, be gay. To this end I employ Nietzsche’s theory of 
the will to power, and his deep suspicion of given values to understand the 
purposive effects of the transgression. Probably Nietzsche’s most famous, and 
most misinterpreted, statement is that ‘God is dead’, and this is relevant here 
(Nietzsche 1969, 1974, 2003a, 2003b). That ‘God is dead’ is far more about 
morality than theology; it was the moral and philosophical aspects of the death of 
God that interested Nietzsche for it leads to a decentralisation and re-evaluation of 
values and morals. Religion no longer is the maker of morals, rather we are left 
with the will to power and the doctrine of the eternal return; ‘the survival of the 
human spirit no longer rests in the hands of the collective but in the affirmation of 
the new triumphalist, the individual in the incarnation of the Ubermensch (the 
overman). Humankind must escape from the protective and pacifying politics of 
order into a celebration of life as ‘the will to power’ (Jenks 2003: 70). It could be 
argued that this leads to a nihilistic freefall in which all is relative and there are no 
values, however, this would be to misread Nietzsche. He is not saying that values 
are inherent in the world (a rejection of Kantian a priori reasoning), nor is he 
saying that people create their own values, rather Nietzsche is claiming that values 
and morality are socially constructed and often have the appearance of being 
‘true’; the central concern is ‘Under what conditions did Man invent for himself 
those judgements of values, “Good” and “Evil”? And what intrinsic value to they 
posses in themselves’ (Nietzsche 2003b: 4 original emphasis). Further, he writes 
that ‘it has been the good themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the 
high-stationed, the higher minded, who have felt that they themselves were good, 
and that their actions were good, that is to say of the first order, in 
contradistinction to all the low, the low minded, the vulgar, and the plebeian’ 
(Nietzsche 2003b: 11). From this it is clear that Nietzsche was developing a
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sociology of morals and values that sought to critique the existing (religious) 
moral systems, and also to transvaluate them.
Nietzsche, then, presents us with a call to the will to power, and to re­
evaluate norms and morals, as their validity no longer resides with the judgement 
of God. The transgression of transgender exemplifies this call. Transgender is a 
rejection of the normative, binary construction of gender in society and as such 
represents a transvaluation of gendered values and morality. The will to power is 
about seizing one’s life and destiny and being self-determining; ‘to manage one’s 
destiny is to refute, overcome and cast aside the values of others, they become 
barriers to true purpose’ (Jenks 2003: 71). A transgender individual is clearly 
constructing their own identity and being, and is casting aside the judgements of 
others. This is the transgressive impulse that appears to be too much for Morton 
Hall to accept; the values (on gender at least) of the organisation are not, therefore, 
very different from those of wider society -  male is male and female is female and 
never the twain shall meet. In The Gay Science it is a madman who after 
proclaiming the death of God, sees the looks of astonishment on his listeners’ 
faces and continues;
“I have come too early,”’ he said then, “my time is not yet. This 
tremendous event is still on its way, still wandering; it has not yet reached 
the ears of men ... deeds, though done, still require time to be seen and 
heard. This deed is still more distant from them than the most distant 
stars -  and yet they have done it themselves” (Nietzsche 1974: 182 
original emphasis).
This is an indication that the transvaluation of values and morality is a slow 
process; perhaps transgender individuals have accomplished a re-evaluation of 
gendered values that the rest of society (including some LGB people) are not yet 
ready to accept; the transgressive transgender madman has come too early! 
Interestingly Nietzsche says ‘and yet they have done it themselves’; as was shown 
above, Morton Hall has already begun to accept that homophobic abuse can 
happen to straight people and that ‘gay’ as an insult is about gender as well as
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sexuality. This, however has not yet manifested itself as a widening of the 
organisation’s remit to include transgender. There are clear parallels between this 
and the idea of becoming-trans based upon Deleuze and Guattari put forward in 
the following chapter.
One must remember that, for Nietzsche, the death of God was undoubtedly 
a positive thing as it would open up new ways of seeing and thinking. It is worth 
quoting Nietzsche at length;
Indeed, we philosophers and "free spirits" feel, when we hear the news 
that the "old god is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart 
overflows with gratitude, amazement, premonitions, expectation. At 
long last the horizon appears free to us again, even if it should not be 
bright; at long last our ships may venture out again, venture out to face 
any danger; all the daring of the lover of knowledge is permitted again; 
the sea, our sea, lies open again; perhaps there has never yet been such an 
"open sea" (1974: 280 original emphasis).
The death of God is, then, fundamentally about breaking with old values and 
replacing them with something new. Proclaiming the death of God is a 
transgressive act itself that breaks down old boundaries and values. This drastic 
change (and it must be drastic) is a contributory factor that leads to the pollution 
behaviour identified earlier. It is clear, then, that the will to power of transgender 
is a transgressive force that has the (potential) power to transvaluate the remit of 
the organisation, and thereby define its membership; ‘transgression is part of the 
purpose of being and is the unstable principle by which any stasis either sustains 
or transforms. This does not make all transgressions either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, it 
renders them purposive’ (Jenks 2003: 81). Central to the defining effects of the 
will to power and the proclamation of the death of God are the reactions to this of 
the herd (the rest of society) -  do they fall silent and look on in astonishment? Or 
do they welcome the transvaluated morality. In the case of Morton Hall it is 
evident that the former reaction proliferated as was elucidated when discussing 
dialectics, above.
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The Taboo Holds
From Nietzsche we begin to leam that transgression is not inherently good or bad, 
rather it has a purpose. For Nietzsche the purpose is part of the eternal re- 
evaluation of values and the will to power; for Bataille (2001) and Foucault (1977) 
transgression is more about the taboo, or limit, that the transgression is part of. In 
Bataille, there is, however, still a sense of a ‘will to transgression’; ‘there is in 
nature and there subsists in man a movement which always exceeds the bounds, 
that can never be anything but partially reduced to order’ (2001: 40). Life is 
inherently disordered, and it is the operation of transgression and taboo that bring 
order; furthermore it is two contrasting feelings that influence the transgression -  
‘men are swayed by two simultaneous emotions: they are driven away by terror 
and drawn by an awed fascination. Taboo and transgression reflect these two 
contradictory urges. The taboo would forbid the transgression but the fascination 
compels it’ (2001: 68). There is then, a drive to transgress the taboo, however, it 
is important to note that Bataille is not arguing that the taboo should be abolished. 
Abolishing the taboo would remove the possibility of its transgression; similarly to 
Freud, Bataille believes that sexuality and eroticism are constructed by the 
operation of taboos, therefore to eradicate the taboos would also be to eradicate 
desire. To illustrate this, MacCabe, in his introduction to Eroticism writes that ‘it 
might be possible to construct an argument that would see the ever-increasing 
production of pornography as relating to an ever-decreasing fading of desire’ 
(MacCabe in Bataille 2001: xv).
The question of the eradication of the taboo, of the old values, is a point of 
contention between Nietzsche and Bataille as I now elaborate. In the context of 
my work, the taboo is gender, as exemplified by transgender, that is, the crossing 
of the boundary between male and female (or refusing to recognise the boundary 
in the first place). The Nietzschian transvaluation of values and morality would 
suggest that the whole edifice of traditional gender identity be bought down as the 
old god of gender dies; this necessarily leads to the future impossibility of gender 
as we know it and would abolish transgender, as well as male and female, as there 
would simply be no limit to cross. Contrastingly, as illustrated above, Bataille
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would appear to refuse such an abolition of the limit. Central to this debate is the 
question, what would be lost if the taboos of gender were abolished? One’s 
perspective on this will largely be defined by one’s views on the desirability of 
gender categories. MacCabe’s view that it could be possible to argue that 
increasing pornography leads to a fading of desire is predicated on the fact that 
such a fading of desire is a bad thing. However, it is questionable whether 
reducing or erasing the centrality of gender to identity is also a bad thing; as 
Chapter 3 illustrates, this is the aim of some trans theorists and activists. Part of 
the problem here lies in the difficulty of imagining what a world without gender 
would look like. It is possible, that if one were to follow Nietzsche rather than 
Bataille, that such a world would open up new possibilities for desire, rather than 
foreclosing it. Notwithstanding this, it is still the case that the relationship 
between the transgression and the taboo or limit is revelatory, even though the 
relationship is not a simple binary,
Rather, their relationship takes the form of a spiral which no simple 
infraction can exhaust. Perhaps it is like a flash of lightening in the night 
which, from the beginning of time, gives a dense and black intensity to 
the night it denies, which lights up the night from the stark clarity of its 
manifestation, its harrowing a poised singularity; the flash loses itself in 
the space it marks with its sovereignty and becomes silent now that it has 
given a name to obscurity (Foucault 1977: 35).
Transgression is, then, a transient flash of light that illuminates its limit; moreover, 
in revealing the limit, the centre is also revealed. Continuing the lightening 
analogy, it seems that many of the Executive Committee members of Morton Hall 
to not want to be out in the thunderstorm; they do not wish to be confronted with 
the transgression.
Bataille notes that ‘often the transgression of a taboo is no less subject to 
rules than the taboo itself. No liberty here. “At such and such a time and up to a 
certain point this is permissible” -  that is what the transgression concedes’ (2001: 
65). One can clearly see this with regard to cross-gender behaviour. As Garber
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(1992) (see Chapter 3) recognises, cross-dressing can be a sign of privilege and 
power in some contexts and a sign of opprobrium and perversion in other context. 
Only some people, in some circumstances can break the taboo in safety. In the 
context of the transgender inclusion/exclusion debate within Morton Hall one can 
see the regulation of the transgression. In the first instance, LGB transgender 
people are permitted to be in the organisation, although this is on the basis of their 
being lesbian, gay or bisexual, not because of their gender identity. This raises the 
difficult and highly problematic question of what being lesbian, gay or bisexual 
and transgendered means in terms of life experiences; there has been little 
discussion of the complexities of the intersection of non-normative sexual and 
gender identities. It also appears that transsexuality is a permissible transgression 
of gender, whilst transgender (particularly heterosexual cross-dressing) is not. As 
already noted in Chapter 5, for many Executive Committee members although the 
word ‘transgender’ is being used it seems apparent that they are referring to 
transsexuals, that is, people who have, or wish to have, sex reassignment surgery. 
For instance some have mentioned referring transgender people onto Press for 
Change if they come to Morton Hall for help; as Chapter 3 argues, Press for 
Change is a UK organisation that works primarily on issues affecting transsexuals 
and does not appear to do much for those who are transgender but have no wish to 
change sex. It is this latter group of people who are transgressing gender in a non- 
permissible manner. Bataille also notes that ‘concern over a rule is sometimes at 
its most acute when that rule is being broken, for it is harder to limit a disturbance 
already begun’ (2001: 65). Similarly, there is a far greater disturbance in the 
transgression of transgender as opposed to transsexual. In the case of 
transsexuality, although a rule is being broken, the rule is reconstituted on the 
completion of sex reassignment surgery. The idea that there are two discrete 
genders is not troubled, particularly if the ‘right gender, wrong body’ discourse is 
used; one undergoes surgery to construct one’s ‘correct’ body. However for a 
non-operative transgender person the rule is broken and remains broken, 
consequently there is a far greater disturbance as there is not an end to the 
transgression, rather it is continuous.
153
Foucault also discusses the relationship between the transgression and the 
limit, arguing that ‘the limit and transgression depend on each other for whatever 
density they possess: a limit could not exist if it were absolutely uncrossable and, 
reciprocally, transgression would be pointless if it merely crossed a limit 
composed of illusions and shadows’ (1977: 34). This indicates that the more rigid 
and inflexible the limit, the more powerful the transgression that crosses it, 
therefore the stronger the counter reaction to the transgression. Foucault also 
comments on what happens the moment the transgression crosses the limit, 
claiming that
The limit opens violently onto the limitless, finds itself suddenly carried 
away by the content it had rejected and fulfilled by this alien plenitude 
which invades it to the core of its being. Transgression carries the limit 
right to the limit of its being; transgression forces the limit to face the 
fact of its imminent disappearance, to find itself in what it excludes 
(perhaps, to be more exact, to recognise itself for the first time), to 
experience its positive truth in its downfall (1977: 34).
This sounds both immensely liberating (for the transgressors) and immensely 
frightening (for those within the limit) in equal measure. It is clear from this that 
transgression illuminates in a flash the limit and carries with it a violent and 
disruptive potential. It is interesting that Foucault argues that the transgression 
makes the limit recognise itself for the first time as this indicates that the 
transgression reveals a previously unthought-of limit; the trans inclusion/exclusion 
debate in Morton Hall is the first time that many Executive Committee members 
had thought about the similarities or differences between gender and sexuality. In 
the context of the debate, the transgression did push the limit (of the organisation) 
to the limit of its being, particularly given the wider definition of transgender 
being used, with the inclusion of heterosexual cross dressers. However, this did 
not lead to the downfall of the limit, rather the limit was defined again; ‘the 
transgression does not deny the taboo but transcends it and completes it’ (Bataille 
2001: 48). The relationship between the taboo and the transgression is a symbiotic
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one; each requires the other for its existence. Furthermore, the completion of the 
taboo by the transgression could lead to the strengthening of the taboo, rather than 
weakening it, but whatever happens, the taboo remains; ‘it [transgression] opens 
the door into what lies beyond the limits usually observed, but it maintains these 
limits just the same. Transgression is complementary to the profane world, 
exceeding its limits but not destroying it’ (Bataille 2001: 67). This conception of 
transgression is also reminiscent of Rubin’s (1984) notion of both the sacred 
circle/outer limits and the line. The sacred circle/outer limits refers to a sex 
hierarchy in which the charmed circle consists of those acts and behaviours which 
are deemed ‘good, normal, natural’ (281) such as those that are monogamous, 
heterosexual, procreative and in a relationship which is contrasted against the 
outer limits which consists of acts and behaviours which are deemed ‘bad, 
abnormal, unnatural’ (281) such as those that are promiscuous, homosexual, non- 
procreative and casual. In this schema one can clearly see the demarcation 
between the outer limits and the charmed circle as operating along the lines of a 
taboo. Similarly, Rubin talks of the struggle over the line which one draws 
between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ sexual behaviour. Rubin places heterosexual 
reproductive monogamy on the ‘good’ side of the line, whilst the ‘bad’ includes 
transvestites, transsexuals and sado-masochists. Between the two Rubin places an 
area of contest which includes homosexuality, which has a degree of acceptability. 
With regard to the Executive Committee members, one can see that where to draw 
the line is not only a question for those on its ‘good’ side; those in the contestable 
middle ground are also seeking to draw a line between themselves and bad, 
unnatural sexualities.
Conclusions
This chapter has, then, explored the relationship between transgression and the 
construction of collective identity generally, and within Morton Hall particularly. 
The central conclusion to arise is that transgression always serves a purpose, 
although that purpose may not be exactly what the transgressor intended. 
Transgression is always in a relationship to the limit and helps define that limit.
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Importantly, the transgression and the limit are not static; the definition of the 
limit, and thereby of what can transgress it, is ordered by social interaction. On 
reaching, and passing, the limit one feels both fascination and horror, much like 
the reader of The Story o f the Eye (1987) or Blue o f Noon, (2001) two of Bataille’s 
deeply transgressive novels, feels the compulsion to continue reading as well as 
revulsion at the disturbing subject matter. When one crosses a boundary it is not 
destroyed, rather the power of the boundary is felt by the transgressor. According 
to Suleiman ‘the characteristic feeling accompanying transgression is intense 
pleasure (at the exceeding of boundaries) and of intense anguish (at the full 
realisation of the force of those boundaries)’ (1990: 75). It is this ‘full force’ of 
the limit that has been most in evidence in the trans inclusion/exclusion debate; 
those transgressing gender within a non bio-medical discourse are made to feel the 
full power of the organisations regulatory apparatus. Notwithstanding this, a study 
of transgression and limits also reveals the constitution of the centre; the, generally 
hostile, reaction of the Executive Committee to the transgression reveals the basis 
on which gender and sexuality are defined for Morton Hall.
This, and previous chapters have focused more on the arguments for trans 
exclusion, as these dominated the debate. However, in the following chapter I 
employ the work of Deleuze and Guattari to analyse the argument for trans 
inclusion, and draw comparisons with those for exclusion.
156
8T h e  R h iz o m e : A r g u m e n t s  F o r  In c l u sio n
This chapter will use some of the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari to think through 
Morton Hall’s transgender inclusion/exclusion debate. Their focus on 
multiplicities make their work particularly appropriate for analysing the arguments 
put forward by Executive Committee members for inclusion, as these tend to rely 
on an understanding of gender and sexuality as fluid and/or multiple. I use the 
theory of rhizomatic and arborescent thought to argue that the rhizome advocates 
inclusion, whilst arborescence stabilises and defines identity as truth which 
advocates for exclusion. I then employ the concept of becoming minoritiarian to 
consider some of the ways in which one can argue that transgender is already 
being included in the organisation to some extent. This section also argues that, as 
time moves on, it will become increasingly untenable to support trans exclusion. 
The concluding section discusses the ways in which the arguments for exclusion 
or inclusion can be viewed in terms of maps and tracings. This chapter tends to 
focus on explicating the ways in which the arguments in favour of inclusion rely 
on fluid and changing understandings of gender and sexuality, whilst the 
arguments in favour of exclusion employ understandings of gender and sexuality 
that fix and solidify these concepts.
Rhizomes versus Arborescence
This section will consider the trans inclusion/exclusion debate using Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory of rhizomatics. Furthermore I elaborate on their views on 
arborescent, radicle or fascicular, and rhizomatic multiplicities within this debate. 
I argue that the limited recognition of the plurality of gender by certain Executive 
Committee members is a pseudo-multiplicity of the fascicular type, whereas a 
rhizomatic understanding would argue for full inclusion of transgender within 
Morton Hall.
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The first kind of thought described by Deleuze and Guattari is arborescent, 
that is, tree-like; linear, proceeding from the roots to the branches; one becoming 
two.
One becomes two; whenever we encounter this formula, even stated 
strategically by Mao or understood in the most “dialectical” way possible, 
what we have before us is the most classical and well-reflected, oldest, 
and weariest kind of thought. Nature doesn’t work that way, in nature 
roots are taproots with a more multiple, lateral, and circular system of 
ramification, rather than a dichotomous one. Thought lags behind nature 
(2004: 5).
Moreover, the logic of arborescence is binary ‘which is as much as to say that this 
system of thought has never reached an understanding of multiplicity’ (2004: 5). 
More amenable to multiplicity, but nevertheless not multiple itself is the radicle, 
or fascicular, root. This is a root which has been aborted or had its end cut, onto 
which other, lesser, roots have grafted themselves. This is a kind of non­
interconnected thought system that, although it can recognise multiplicities and 
potentialities more than arborescence, it is not rhizomatic. Central to my 
argument is the fact that ‘multiplicities are rhizomatic, and expose arborescent 
pseudo-multiplicities for what they are’ (8). In other words, the complex reality of 
transgender and sexual identity exposes the fallacy of attempting to view gender 
and sexuality in binary terms. I argue that by supporting the perspective that the 
organisation should exclude trans people, but nevertheless continue to support 
them is a kind of coalition politics through which Executive Committee members 
are favouring an arborescent pseudo-multiplicity. This approach is multiple 
because it recognises that there is some level at which lesbian, gay and bisexual 
people and trans people can work together for the same ends. However, it remains 
arborescent as it remains trapped in a binary, categorising logic that institutes 
organisational separation between gender and sexuality.
Before continuing my analysis I shall elaborate some of the key features of 
a rhizome; ‘unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other
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point, and its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature ... the 
rhizome is an acentered, non-hierarchical, non-signifying system without a 
General and without an organising memory or central automaton, defined solely 
by a circulation of states’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 23). The rhizome abhors 
structure; it has no central defining feature, nor does it seek to define others. 
Rhizomes are not authoritarian; they are multiple and heterogeneous. A rhizome 
can be broken, but will start up again on either old lines or new lines, never being 
totally destroyed. One can see, then, that a rhizome is truly interconnected and 
multiple.
Here I present two extracts from the same meeting I which the Executive 
Committee members advocate including transgender in Morton Hall:
Pat: one of my ex partners and very dear friend is a transsexual person and as 
far as I can see it’s a quadrant model maybe your going to take your 
sexual orientation with you when you cross that divide, maybe your not, 
but either way the proportion of heterosexuals is going to be very small, 
the majority of trans people must by definition be, well I’d use the word 
queer but that’s another debate.
Alex: yeah I pretty much agree with what Pat just and I want to come back 
what Jean just said about the idea of transvestites and that kind of thing, 
heterosexual people being involved in transgender, from my experience 
if you were to go down that route, it’s a minefield, I mean I've gone out 
in town wearing skirts that kind of thing, been out with my girlfriend, 
we've been walking down the street and been called lesbians, dykes, 
queers all that kind of thing now we’re quite blatantly not lesbians, so 
ok you might have a heterosexual cross dresser but they can still have 
transphobic abuse, they can still have homophobic abuse, the fact they 
are not gay or bisexual doesn’t stop that happening so why can’t we 
cover them, so my suggestion is that on pretty much all grounds that we 
should include transgender.
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From the above, one can see that those who argue for exclusion tend to refuse the 
multiplicity of sexuality and gender, whilst those who argue for inclusion tend to 
advocate a much more multiple and interconnected view of sexual and gender 
identity. In contradistinction to earlier speakers who saw sexual and gender 
identity as discrete and distinct, both Pat and myself attempted to problematise 
that belief by demonstrating ways in which gender and sexual identity inter-relate. 
In order to increase the authority of our statements, both Pat and myself draw on 
our own personal experiences as evidence for our beliefs. In saying that a 
transsexual may or may not carry their sexual orientation across transition Pat 
shows an awareness that the majority of transsexual people will at some stage of 
their life experience same-sex sexual attraction, whether it is before or after 
transition; this is a realisation that does not appear to be shared by many of the 
other Executive Committee members. In saying that the proportion of those who 
would be heterosexual is very small Pat is attempting to down play the perceived 
threat of heterosexuals to the organisation: the potential threat from heterosexuals 
to the organisation is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6. Although, in the 
context of this debate, a sensible point to make, this could still reinforce the point 
that heterosexuals are not welcome in the Morton Hall. However, Pat is the only 
person in the debate who brings in the notion of queer, claiming that most 
transsexual people would be queer. This could, in theory, lead to the inclusion of 
all transsexuals in the organisation on the basis of sexuality alone; this is a move 
that could argue for inclusion, whilst still preserving a distinction between gender 
and sexuality. Morton Hall would still only represent sexuality and queer people, 
but would also include transsexuals as they have been (re)defined as queer. In 
some contexts this argument could succeed, however, I think that those on the 
Executive Committee arguing against trans inclusion would also argue against 
queer understandings of gender and sexuality. In saying ‘but that’s another 
debate,’ Pat herself recognises this, and nothing more on the subject is said in the 
meeting. Here Pat is employing a very wide definition of sexuality that recognises 
the blurring effects of transgender on discussions of sexual identity; this definition 
shows that she believes that sexuality is a more complicated issue than simply one
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of being unproblematically lesbian, gay or bisexual. In essence, she is illustrating 
the multiple nature of sexual and gender identity and is going some way to 
recognising the rhizomatic nature of those identities. Although, as with most of 
the participants in the debate, Pat is still only talking about transsexual people, she 
provides a response to those who claim that only transsexuals who are lesbian, gay 
or bisexual can be in the organisation. However, in this extract, Pat is explicitly 
referring to ‘transsexuals’ and not using transgender when transsexual would be 
more appropriate (see Chapter 5). This could be because Pat has realised that the 
focus of the debate has been on the exclusion of transitioning transsexuals above 
all else. The argument that only lesbian, gay and bisexual transsexuals are 
welcome in the organisation relies on a static definition of sexuality and does not 
recognise that one’s gender identity problematises one’s sexual identity, however, 
Pat’s quadrant model, and belief that most transsexuals are queer, does 
demonstrate this problematisation. Furthermore, raising the issue of ‘queer’ is an 
indication that Pat would support inclusion under a broad definition of transgender 
as well. This renders the argument put forward by certain Executive Committee 
members that it is only non-LGB trans people who cannot join the organisation 
simplistic as it questions the very idea that such people exist in any large number.
In my extract, I agree with Pat, and like her am also arguing against earlier 
concerns that the wide definition of transgender being used by the organisation 
would allow heterosexual cross dressers to join the organisation and thereby in 
some way harm it. Whilst Pat refers only to transsexuals, my primary concern in 
the above extract was to put forward a case for widening the remit of the 
organisation to include (heterosexual) cross-dressers. I demonstrate that a cross­
dresser in an opposite sex relationship can be the victim of homophobic abuse; 
indeed, in the situation I describe, the majority of the abuse is homophobic rather 
than transphobic, as I am more often read as a woman than as a man wearing 
women’s clothes. My statement that ‘now we’re quite blatantly not lesbians’ was 
a rhetorical device to reinforce the point that homophobic abuse can be directed on 
the basis of how one’s gender is read, rather than on the basis of actual 
homosexuality. In the extract I am demonstrating the belief that the organisation
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should not only represent people who are actually lesbian, gay or bisexual, but 
also those people who suffer from homophobic abuse but do not identify as LGB. 
This would obviously also include those who were not transgender, however, the 
point with cross-dressing is that it can form the basis of, or exacerbate, 
homophobia. It should also be noted that in an earlier meeting I put forward an 
even wider definition of transgender that that being used by the organisation:
Alex: transgender can encompass anyone who transgresses gender norms, 
which doesn’t necessarily have to be wearing clothes of the opposite 
sex, or changing sex, it can be something in between; any kind of 
intermediate gender, third gender, any of those multiple positions.
Another thing relates to the arguments against transgender that 
transgender is about gender and LGB is about sexuality -  in this 
society sexual orientation is fundamentally about gender -  it’s about 
the gender of object choice, the gender of the person who you are 
attracted to, so to my mind it seems a complete nonsense to say that 
sexuality isn’t about gender
This definition is wider than that used by the organisation as someone could 
deviate from gendered sartorial norms but not be a cross-dresser, for example a 
man having long hair, or a woman having short hair, furthermore, my definition is 
able to encompass a more androgynous gender identity than that used by the 
organisation. The main categories of people that have been discussed in this 
debate are transsexuals and transvestites, both of which involve a more or less 
simplistic switch from one gender to the other, although for differing lengths of 
time, whilst excluding those who look androgynous whether it be out of choice or 
otherwise. It is worth here revisiting, for the last time, the definitions used by 
Morton Hall; those of The Gender Trust:
Transsexual. A person who feels a consistent and overwhelming desire to 
transition and fulfil their life as a member of the opposite gender. Most
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transsexual people actively desire and complete Sex Reassignment 
Surgery.
Transvestite. The clinical name for a crossdresser. A person who dresses 
in the clothing of the opposite sex. Generally, these persons do not wish 
to alter their body.
Transgender. A term used to include transsexuals, transvestites and 
crossdressers. A transgenderist can also be a person who, like a 
transsexual, transitions - sometimes with the help of hormone therapy 
and / or cosmetic surgery - to live in the gender role of choice, but has 
not undergone, and generally does not intend to undergo, surgery.
So, transsexuals actively want to change sex, whilst transvestites wear the clothing 
of the opposite sex, without any body modification. Transgender is merely an 
umbrella category covering transsexuals and transvestites. This is a very different 
definition to that advocated by myself (above) and others (see chapter 3). The 
three categories defined by The Gender Trust all rely on someone living (full or 
part time) in their ‘gender role of choice’, which implies that one must choose 
what that gender role is, whereas my definition includes all those who have a non 
normative gender presentation and those who may not consider themselves as 
either male or female.
This definitional problem has also been recognised by androgynes, as the 
following quote from ‘Androgyne Online’ demonstrates:
The term transgender has led all too many androgynes to confusion in that 
generally, transgender is polarized into transvestite crossdressers on one side 
and transsexuals on the other. Setting the two categories up as opposites 
implies that transgender individuals either want to wear the other sex's 
clothes or else want to change their anatomy to match the other sex. 
Androgynes, however, may well want to wear the other sex's clothing, but 
they do not want to change their anatomy to match the other sex -- at least, 
they dont think about having the other sex's anatomy often enough to resolve 
to do much about it. What differentiates androgynes from transvestites and 
transsexuals is that they do not identify fully with either masculinity or
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femininity: they are either somewhere in the middle of the two or consider 
themselves to be something else entirely (http://androgyne.Ocatch.com/)
The proliferation of gendered desires and identities that follow on from this 
would, I think, be too much for Morton Hall. Having said, up until now, that 
gender of object choice is the defining feature of sexual orientation for the 
organisation, it might be more proper to say sex of object choice. This is to 
distinguish ‘gender’ as a social construct and ‘sex’ as what is between someone’s 
legs. In this theory, you are homosexual if you are attracted to someone with the 
same genitalia as you, regardless of whether you were bom with that genitalia or 
not; this therefore renders one’s gendered identity irrelevant to sexual orientation. 
This represents a rejection of gendered multiplicities in favour of the binary of 
sex. I am aware that intersexuality problematises the notion of binary sexes, 
however, this is something that was never discussed in the meetings. In fact, in 
the minutes of one of the meetings, a typing error lead to ‘LGB’ being typed as 
‘LGBI’, to which I asked whether we had decided to represent intersex people. 
The chair’s reply was no, and that they had not been able to think what the ‘I’ 
stood for. In my extract, I demonstrate that gender, like ‘a rhizome is not 
amenable to any structural or generative model. It is a stranger to the idea of 
genetic axis or deep structure’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 13). As the quote 
from Androgyny Online shows ‘transgender’ tends to get structured as transvestite 
or transsexual (as has happened in this debate); both categories are ones that often, 
although not always, reify the notion of two discrete genders; one must always 
‘pass’ as the gender one is presenting as. I posit that it is the unstructured, 
rhizomatic nature of gender that causes so much trouble for some Executive 
Committee members, therefore they have attempted to argue for an arborescent 
understanding of gender, relying on binary logic. Deleuze and Guattari write, 
‘unlike trees or their roots, the rhizome connects any point to any other point, and 
its traits are not necessarily linked to traits of the same nature; it brings into play 
very different regimes of signs and non-sign states. The rhizome is reducible 
neither to the One nor the multiple’ (2004: 23). This indicates that there can be
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significant differences within a rhizome; in this context there does not have to be a 
linear (arborescent) route from gender to sexuality, rather there could be cyclic, 
transversal, tangential lines of flight from one plateau to another.
The understandings of sexuality and gender of the organisation are 
arborescent and thereby linear. Arborescent thought, unlike rhizomatic, forces 
structure onto something that is not amenable to structure, thus ignoring 
multiplicities; ‘The tree imposes the verb “to be,” but the fabric of the rhizome is 
the conjunction “and ... and ... and ...” This conjunction carries enough force to 
shake and uproot the verb “to be”’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 27). The 
injunction ‘to be’ is of central importance to many members of the Morton Hall 
Executive Committee. One has to have an identity that is unchanging; one’s 
sexual or gender identity is first discovered as an essence (via a ‘coming out’ 
narrative) and is then fixed for ever more. The oft employed argument that only 
LGB trans people should be allowed in the organisation serves this process of 
identity fixation. This argument relies on individuals (trans or otherwise) being 
unproblematically homosexual, bisexual or heterosexual; there is no place for 
multiplicity. Furthermore, many gays and lesbians, including some in Morton 
Hall have had heterosexual relationships or been married; one assumes that some 
of these relationships were happy and that they cannot all be attributed to attempts 
to sublimate homosexual desires. Therefore some of the Executive Committee 
members themselves have had either personal proof, or proof via friends, that 
sexual desires can change. However, this is stabilised by the traditional coming 
out narrative which present everything that came before coming out as an error. 
One can also see a similar process of coming out with regard to transgender -  one 
lives one’s life in one’s birth gender until one realises that one is actually in the 
wrong body, leading to a trouble free transition (at least as far as gender identity 
goes -  I do not want to say that actual transition is ‘trouble free’). This is also 
coupled with an unproblematic inversion of sexual orientation at the point of 
transition. This is enforced by the Gender Recognition Act 2004; as Chapter 5 
illustrates, to apply for a gender recognition certificate one must intend to live in 
one’s new gender for life, whilst changing one’s birth certificate obliterates a
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transsexuals pre transition past. This process is arguably fine for transsexuals 
desirous of sex reassignment surgery; however this makes little sense for anyone 
with a transgender or androgynous gender. What would the situation be for a 
male transvestite who, when in masculine attire identifies as heterosexual, and 
when in feminine attire identifies as a lesbian. Under the ‘you’re only welcome in 
Morton Hall if in your gender of choice you identify as lesbian, gay or bisexual’ 
argument this male transvestite would be welcome only whilst dressed up, 
therefore if he suffered abuse or discrimination whilst dressed as man, and 
therefore identifying as straight he could not go to Morton Hall for support. 
However, this level of complexity was unthought-of by those advocating 
exclusion, which illustrates that they were attempting to ignore anything that 
could end in a potential destabilising of sexual and gender identity. To continue 
the Deleuzian metaphor, Morton Hall has successfully ensured that the tree of 
sexual and gender identity is not uprooted and continues to stand. As previous 
chapters have shown, the tree has been well shaken, but is yet to be uprooted, 
although it may be starting to topple over.
On the contrary, the discourses of inclusion employed by Pat, Lauren and 
myself represent the never-ending process of the conjunction ‘and’. Whilst ‘to be’ 
stabilises and fixes identity, ‘and’ recognises myriad sexual and gender identities 
and does not force them into narrow boxes. Furthermore, the ‘and’ is limitless; a 
continual means of addition with no finite end point. ‘And’ does not presuppose 
the simple coming out narrative outlined above; following the logic of the 
rhizome, one’s sexual and gender identity could begin at any point and end at any 
point without there being neat categories of homosexual and heterosexual, man 
and woman. Those who supported trans inclusion rejected the solidification of 
sexual and gender identity -  Pat claimed that it worked on a four sided model 
whereby you may or may not take your sexual orientation with you when you 
cross genders. Moreover, she claimed that the majority of trans people must be, 
by definition, queer. This demonstrates a refusal to constrain identity into 
dichotomous boxes; rhizomatic reasoning has exposed the binary nature of 
Morton Hall. The extract from Androgyne Online (above) is also highly
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pertinent here. The author’s complaint is that the term ‘transgender’ as is 
generally understood refers to transvestites and transsexuals, which, as stated 
earlier, both involve a clean transition from male to female or vice versa. On this 
reading, transgender is a term that enforces the verb ‘to be’ because it does not 
allow for an open proliferation of genders and gendered desires. ‘Transgender’ 
enforces and stabilises gender identity because it attempts to place everyone on 
the spectrum from male to female, whilst the writer on Androgyne Online argues 
that people may not identify with either masculinity or femininity. Furthermore, 
several other writers, such as Wilchins and Bomstein (1995) (see Chapter 3) use 
transgender in such a way as to be inclusive of all behaviour that deviates from 
accepted gender roles, however, this is not the most usual understanding of 
transgender. A cursory search of the internet can reveal tens, if  not hundreds, of 
terms for gender variant people (http://www.queerbychoice.com/genderbend.html 
lists over a hundred) that are not fully covered by ‘transgender’. This points to the 
extreme difficulty of defining ‘transgender’ as well as the highly problematic way 
in which it was viewed by Morton Hall; ‘transgender’ was much more likely to be 
acceptable to the Executive Committee members when it was solidifying and 
centring, that when it was multiplying and transcending.
This relates to the multiple possible understandings of transgender described 
in Chapter 3. Trans can be conceptualised as static and highly normative, or it can 
be seen as highly subversive. Generally, closer to the subversive end of the 
spectrum, one’s perspective is more amenable to gender variance, by which I 
mean non-static gender performance. Conversely, if one’s perspective lies at the 
normative end then one is often less accepting of gender variance: that is, male is 
male and female is female. (To clarify, I am classing a MTF individual as female 
and an FTM individual as male.) It is possible for a trans person, who follows the 
‘wrong body’ discourse to have more invested in the hegemonic gender order than 
a non-trans person as Bomstein (1995) recognises. In other words, one is more 
likely to find transsexuals and some transvestites at the normative end of the 
spectrum and other cross dressers and gender queers at the other end. Static and 
simplistic understandings of transgender do not fundamentally challenge gender
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and sexual identity and are therefore acceptable to Morton Hall. This 
demonstrates the danger of regarding all trans identities as subversive.
Moreover, it is those transsexuals who do not challenge the gendered status 
quo that are most acceptable to Morton Hall, however, this is also the group of 
trans people which it is easiest to distance from Morton Hall. Not challenging 
gender or sexual identity makes some transsexuals acceptable to Morton Hall 
because, as has been shown in earlier chapters, the majority of Executive 
Committee members do not wish to challenge gender or sexual identity 
themselves and exhibit pollution behaviour when others challenge them. This has, 
however, not resulted in such transsexuals being welcomed into Morton Hall on 
the basis that both groups appear to share similar views on gender and sexual 
identity; rather, the issues between transsexualism and sexuality are seen as too far 
removed for political alliance. In this instance emphasis is placed on the needs of 
transsexual people, for example around sex reassignment and the Gender 
Recognition Act 2004 which do not pertain to LGB people. This perspective is 
predicated on thinking that the only issues of importance to transsexuals are those 
that relate to transition. In her interview Mel mentioned several common areas in 
the needs of transgender and LGB people, such as hate crime, housing needs and 
marriage, which are unrelated to transition. If these needs and support 
requirements were the focus of the debate it would have made it harder to distance 
trans people from the organisation. This serves to further illustrate the stabilising 
and fixative nature of the verb ‘to be’; when one solidifies identity difference is 
given prominence over similarity.
The foregoing has demonstrated, then, that in the trans inclusion/exclusion 
debate the majority of the Executive Committee members of Morton Hall have 
been relying on the binaries that are embedded in thought of the arborescent type; 
‘this is as much as to say that this system of thought has never reached an 
understanding of multiplicity’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 5). In Deleuze and 
Guattari’s schema there is another category in between arborescent and rhizomatic 
logic, and it is to this that I now turn:
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The radicle-system, or fascicular root, [which] is the second figure of the 
book to which our modernity pays willing allegiance. This time, the 
principle root has aborted, or its tip has been destroyed; an immediate, 
indefinite multiplicity of secondary roots grafts onto it and undergoes a 
flourishing development (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 6).
The fascicular root represents a pseudo-multiplicity that makes attempts to 
recognise multiplicity, but nevertheless fails in its project -  in one respect 
multiplicity is recognised, however nothing is fundamentally changed; dualistic 
thought is still being relied upon. If transgender (understood as transsexuals and 
transvestites) had been included within the remit of Morton Hall I would have 
argued that this would be of this system. The other, in the form of transgender 
would have been added, but it would not have been done so in a way that would 
be in the least bit challenging to gender and sexual norms. ‘In truth, it is not 
enough to say, “Long live the multiple,” difficult as it is to raise that cry’ (Deleuze 
and Guattari 2004: 7). Whilst admitting the existence of multiplicity is important, 
it is by no means the end point. As it is, Morton Hall has not even cried Tong live 
the multiple’; the existence of multiplicity has only been admitted to the extent 
that it facilitates exclusion. The debate in Morton Hall has, however, at the very 
least made all concerned aware of the wide disparity of both people and opinions, 
which may well be foundation for greater future plurality. One could also, just 
about, argue that the final decision of the debate (only LGB identified trans people 
are welcome, but Morton Hall will support and work with other trans group) is 
also a multiplicity on the fascicular model. The principle root (Morton Hall’s ad 
hoc inclusion) has been thoroughly aborted during the process of this debate, onto 
which the promise of support for another transgender organisation has been 
grafted. Moreover, the discussion has raised many questions that point to a 
possible future inclusion of transgender, such as the fact that certain campaigns, 
such as ‘Education for A ll’ are LGBT. However this, final, decision does tend to 
refuse any understanding of multiplicity in any real sense. What I argue is that 
some of the Executive Committee members act as though they believe that 
Morton Hall has adopted a liberal perspective that is aware of the interconnected
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nature of gender and sexuality; for example, the framing of the debate in terms of 
social justice and pledging support for a trans organisation as well as saying that 
one will raise trans issues whenever it is feasible. I believe that the Executive 
Committee members have arrived at an understanding of gender and sexuality that 
is a pseudo multiplicity, in that although the rhetoric of plurality is deployed, the 
realities of de(con)structive, rhizomatic identities expose the latent arborescence 
of the multiplicity. Central to this are concerns over the relationship between 
identity and difference; ‘the identity of something implies its difference from 
others. Conversely, since difference is always difference from something, it 
implies reference to an identity of some kind. Identities presuppose difference 
and are inhabited by them, just as differences, inevitably presuppose and are 
inhabited by identities’ (Patton 2000: 46). Because of this it is possible to use 
arguments based on an awareness of difference to racist, sexist, homophobic or 
otherwise discriminatory ends. Patton cites the examples of the French far right 
demanding the repatriation of ethnic minorities out of a respect for cultural 
difference and the legal defence of Sears, Roebuck & Co. that the gender 
imbalance at the company was a result not of discrimination but immanent 
differences between men and women. In the context of Morton Hall, particularly 
the separating of gender and sexuality, one can clearly see that a belief in inherent 
differences between gay and lesbian people and transgender people was employed 
as a reason for excluding trans people from the organisation. This further 
illustrates the highly limited degree to which the organisation has been prepared to 
recognise multiple gender and sexual identities; difference has only been admitted 
to the extent that it may be used as a method of exclusion. This exemplifies the 
danger of assuming that an awareness of multiplicity will automatically lead to 
greater inclusivity.
The Becoming-Trans of Morton Hall
Deleuze and Guattari note that the difference between the majority and the 
minority is not a quantitative one, given that the number of people included in 
‘minorities’ can outweigh those in the ‘majority’. Given this Deleuze and
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Guattari introduce a third category, that of the minoritiarian, or becoming-minor; 
this is the ‘creative process of becoming-different or divergence from the 
majority’ (Patton 2000: 48). The situation is however, more complex than this 
because,
We must distinguish between: the majoritarian as a constant and 
homogeneous system; minorities as subsystems; and the minoritiarian as 
a potential, creative and created becoming. The problem is never to 
acquire the majority, even in order to install a new constant. There is no 
becoming-majoritarian; majority is never becoming. All becoming is 
minoritiarian (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 117).
They use the example of Arthur Miller’s novel Focus in which the central 
character, Lawrence Newman, an average (anti-Semitical) American, has to get 
glasses which have the effect o f making him look Jewish. This leads to his losing 
jobs and being subjected to bigotry and violence, which Deleuze and Guattari 
term the becoming Jewish of a non-Jewish person. The following extract is from 
the interview with Lauren that took place after the debate had come to its 
conclusion:
I think people are becoming more aware of the difficulties [of exclusion] 
and as you said and [speaker at conference] said homophobic insults are 
not actually about sexuality, it’s to do with perception. It may be that the 
person who is being abused or bullied is not gay or trans or whatever. I 
think that the concept of transgender has become more ingrained as 
campaigns have moved along and as people have defined what needs to 
be done. I think the realisation that trans is integral to anything to do 
with homophobia, so transphobia and homophobia actually go hand in 
hand because of non normative gender presentation, rather than because 
they’ve been seen kissing a bloke or a girl, so I think its becoming more 
difficult to query the inclusion of trans. Like you said Education For All 
includes T the work we've been doing in schools includes T. And the 
fact that with the advent of civil partnership and the fact that transsexual
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people can change their birth certificates, all of that impacts on the areas 
of goods and services that kind of stuff, it impacts on what constitutes a 
marriage and what services you should be afforded in relation to that. So 
the trans issue has become integral to anything that Morton Hall does 
now anyhow. Now the issues are to do with intolerance and the physical 
manifestation of that its not so clear that it’s sexuality only; it’s become 
an issue of how people are [and the] attitudes that need to be changed and 
the attitude toward trans people is right up there with it, so hopefully by 
the next iteration of the terms of reference it will become obvious that T 
needs to be included.
Here Lauren discuses some of the ways in which the remit of Morton Hall may be 
widened in the future. In the context of Deleuze and Guattari’s conception of 
minority/majority, regardless of numerical issues, LGB is the majority whilst trans 
is the minority: ‘majority implies a state of domination’ (2004: 321). This leaves 
the field open for the (gradual) process of becoming-trans of Morton Hall; that is, 
the realisation that transgender is becoming a part of the organisation regardless of 
intention. Just as putting on a new pair of glasses made Newman look Jewish, the 
changing political climate begins to make Morton Hall look like a trans inclusive 
organisation. It is central that it is a becoming-trans of LGB, not a becoming- 
LGB of trans; all becomings are minoritiarian, there cannot be a becoming 
majoritarian -  ‘there is no becoming-man because man is the molar entity par 
excellence, whereas becomings are molecular’ (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 322). 
For Deleuze and Guattari, molar and molecular are used to contrast multiplicities 
that are ‘divisible, unifiable, totalisable and organisable’ with those that are ‘not 
unifiable or totalisable and that do not divide without changing in nature’ (Patton 
2000: 42) respectively. Therefore, the majoritarian category or identity, in this 
case sexuality, is fixed and unchanging; it is not something that one becomes. 
The trans people excluded from Morton Hall as a result of this debate will not be 
claiming that they are lesbian, gay or bisexual in an attempt to rejoin the 
organisation because one cannot become the majority. However, one can become 
the minority; Morton Hall could experience a becoming trans that relies upon the
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molecular, rhizomatic nature of transgender to subsume non normative sexual and 
gender performances under the rubric of gender. In the above extract Lauren 
identifies several moves that could be associated with this process of becoming- 
trans. She references one of the speakers at one of the annual conferences, where 
the Education for All campaign was launched, who was talking about how 
homophobic bullying in schools not only affects homosexual pupils. Some level 
of awareness that homophobia and transphobia are interconnected is seeping into 
the organisation, regardless of whether it is desired. Moreover, the very fact that 
trans inclusion/exclusion was debated at all will have brought the issue out into 
the open and made the Executive Committee members more aware of the 
complexities of the situation than if the debate had not occurred. It was the 
fundamental point of most of my personal interventions in the debate that whether 
one suffers from homophobic abuse or discrimination is often much more related 
to gender performance than to sexual identity. It could be argued that the political 
project of some trans activists, such as Bomstein and Wilchins is the becoming 
trans of LGB. As discussed in Chapter 3 they argue that of transgender and LGB, 
it is transgender that is the more inclusive category, based upon the fact that 
homosexuality is an inversion of accepted gender norms.
Maps and Tracings
Deleuze and Guattari’s injunction is to ‘make a map, not a tracing’ (2004: 13) for 
the map is synonymous with the rhizome, whilst tracings abort the rhizome, 
returning it to roots and radicles. ‘What distinguishes the map from the tracing is 
that it is entirely orientated toward an experimentation in contact with the real’ 
(Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 13); the map in changeable, interconnected and is 
subject to the possibility of continual reworking, whilst the tracing forces 
structure. A tracing does not reproduce a map, or rhizome, rather it is like a 
photograph; a snap-shot in time that restricts, taking only one image. There is no 
space in the photo/tracing for multiplicity. The tracing ‘has generated, 
structuralized the rhizome, and when it thinks it is reproducing something else it is 
in fact only reproducing itself. That is why the tracing is so dangerous’ (Deleuze
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and Guattari 2004: 15). Two examples that Deleuze and Guattari give of the 
danger of tracing are that of psychoanalysis and linguistics, arguing that they only 
produce photos or tracings of the unconscious and language respectively. 
Psychoanalysis does not try to map the unconscious of it patients, rather the 
psychoanalyst traces the clients unconscious with regard to Freudian complexes; 
the tracings have ‘organised, stabilised, neutralised the multiplicities according to 
the axes of significance and subjectification belonging to it’ (2004: 15). This 
section will demonstrates how the comparison between maps and tracings can be 
used to further comprehend the identity practices of the Morton Hall Executive 
Committee members.
Of importance here is how the Executive Committee members attempt to 
make sense of the multiple nature of sexual and gender identity. Do people follow 
the call to make maps, that is, do Executive Committee members accept the 
multiple and fluid nature of identity, or do they attempt to create order by taking 
photo-tracings of identity? Moreover, what are the political affects of making 
either maps or tracings; does one lead to a more inclusive political strategy than 
the other. This extract from the interview with Lauren begins to answer some of 
these questions:
It certainly didn’t seem that people had got what I was saying; the idea 
that separating gender from sexuality is just oxymoronic, I think that’s 
probably the wrong word. But the fact that sexuality as it’s currently 
understood in society is based on gender of object choice means that 
sexuality is always already inherently gendered, therefore to try to 
separate gender from sexuality is either utopic to the extreme or just 
misunderstands sexuality as currently is used in common parlance.
In this extract, Lauren is talking about her input into the debate and the reactions 
to it. The point that she was trying to make was that one cannot separate gender 
from sexuality because, as Sedgwick (1990) argues, sexual orientation is based 
upon gender of object choice. This interpretation of sexual and gender identity is 
a map because it is amenable to the rhizome; it attempts to construct an
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understanding, rather than reproducing an earlier image. However, as the extract 
shows, this argument was not generally accepted, for Lauren this error is either the 
result of high levels of idealism or a fundamental misunderstanding of what 
sexuality is. One can argue that either of the two options are the result of making 
tracings as opposed to maps. Both options abort and refuse the multiple nature of 
sexual and gender identity by taking only a snap-shot of identity that organises, 
normalises and stabilises it along pre conceived lines. The central point is that the 
majority of Executive Committee members are, for whatever reason, not viewing 
sexuality as ‘always already inherently gendered’, which is the result of the 
separation of gender and sexuality discussed in Chapter 5. There is an 
unwillingness to view sexuality as based upon gender, which may well be an 
attempt to fully distance oneself from earlier understandings of homosexuality 
which relied on ideas of inversion -  that a male homosexual was really a woman’s 
soul trapped in a man’s body. However, this is not the point that Lauren was 
trying to make. Being attracted to the same sex does not mean that one is ‘really’ 
of the opposite sex, however it does mean that one is crossing the normal gender 
roles for ones sex by choosing a partner of the same sex. If, in the meetings, the 
point had been pushed to its logical conclusion -  that all LGB people are 
transgender -  there would probably have been uproar. Those refusing to make 
these connections are attempting to abort and stultify a broad understanding of 
sexuality and gender that would advocate for trans inclusion.
This, however, does not explain why this misunderstanding occurs; for 
Lauren the reasons are political:
The knock on effect of my understanding of transgender is that sexuality 
as is currently used is redundant, but you use it to a political end. So 
identity claims, from my perspective, are for attaining certain political 
ends, in certain situations or contexts. So to claim the identity of lesbian 
or bisexual or gay or transgender is to do something, to elicit a response, 
or to claim something that creates a response in someone else, rather than 
any necessary truth about yourself. This is again where I think there was 
a disjuncture between what my understanding of identity was and what
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some of the others was, as far as a lot of the other people were concerned 
identity was truth; it was fact.
Here Lauren posits her understanding of the meanings of identity claims. The end 
point of the Lauren’s deconstructive notion of transgender is that ‘sexuality’ is a 
redundant term that possesses no inherent meaning; however, one is still able to 
use sexuality to a given political end. The central point here is that to make an 
identity claim does not express any kind of truth about a person. Deleuze and 
Guattari claim that ‘the map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is 
detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be tom, 
reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or 
social formation’ (2004: 13-4). For Lauren, identity claims are Deleuzian maps: 
depending on the context that one is in, one will make different identity claims 
because they will fit different political purposes. In the interview, Lauren said 
that although she identifies as trans, she did not make that identity claim in the 
Executive Committee meetings because she did not want to be told to leave the 
room. Whilst this may sound extreme, Lauren relates how a bisexual friend was 
told to leave the debate at the National Union of Students lesbian and gay 
conference which concerned whether to expand the group to include bisexuals. 
Here one can see Lauren making different identity claims at different times 
because each claim serves a different purpose. Identity claims can mean different 
things to different people and can be manipulated and folded to any given 
purpose; if Lauren had identified herself as trans in the Executive Committee 
meetings it would have been to elicit a response from the other Executive 
Committee members and would not have defined any kind of fact about herself. 
However, if one understands Lauren’s perspective on identity as a map of 
sexuality and gender, then one can also understand the majority of the other 
Executive Committee members’ perspectives as tracings. For most Executive 
Committee members, as Lauren identifies, identity is truth; it represents 
something than an individual can be said to be. Claiming an identity as your own 
means that that identity defines you and is permanent and immutable.
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For Lauren, what should be important for any liberation campaign is that 
anyone who supports the stated aims of a group should be able to campaign on 
that particular issue; such campaigns should not only be open to those in particular 
identity groups: She defines two distinct spheres of work that she thinks have 
gotten confused within Morton Hall; first, lobbying and campaigning; and second, 
providing a support network. For Lauren, these two spheres could require 
different styles of working. Lobbying and campaigning can be carried out by 
anyone, regardless of identity, who subscribes to the aims of the organisation. 
The situation may be different for support work as a lesbian may not feel 
comfortable talking about homophobic discrimination with a heterosexual person. 
These two spheres of work have become blurred because Morton Hall is trying to 
do both -  the organisation’s main body of work is around campaigning and 
lobbying, but there has also been a significant amount of community development 
work aimed at building the LGB community, particularly in more rural areas:
There is a separate issue between campaigning, and achieving a stated 
political aim, and who should be allowed or not allowed to be involved.
My argument would be as long as the aims are clear it doesn’t matter 
who’s involved in that, but then within Morton Hall there is this 
community support aspect which it seems has become problematic. ...
The fact that they’re trying to gather a community certainly in rural areas 
is laudable, but at the same time it does seem to be at the expense of all 
else. And if you’re not part of that community then there is something 
wrong with you, which again is this exclusionary approach to identity 
that I think is bad.
Having two, largely separate, work plans has, for Lauren, helped to create the 
identity crisis for Morton Hall. Allowing anyone who shares the aims of the 
organisation to work on achieving those aims can be seen as map because it 
follows the rhizomatic nature of sexual and gender identity. Those that campaign 
on issues around sexuality and gender do not have to reproduce specific identities; 
rather connections can be made across boundaries. Conversely, insisting that
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those who campaign on any given issue need to be affected by that issue relies on 
tracing, on arborescent logic that enforces ‘to be’. The idea that one must have a 
particular identity and all the experiences that that entails has been critiqued in 
Chapter 6. This type of thought is dangerous in that constructs homosexuality as 
other to heterosexuality and that homosexuality is only of importance to those 
who identify as homosexual. This is exemplary of identity politics as defined by 
Young (1997) and expanded upon in Chapter 5. The community building and 
support aspect of Morton Hall’s work complicates this matter, for, as Lauren 
admits, it is easier to construct an argument that such support should be given by 
those who are lesbian, gay or bisexual as they may well, although not necessarily, 
have a greater knowledge of the issues than a heterosexual person. The 
community building aspect also raises the question of whose community it is, and 
who is welcome in such a community. Given that, at least away from large 
centres of population such as London and Manchester, the LGB community is 
relatively homogonous and only caters to a certain type of LGB person, notions of 
community building are returning gender and sexual identity to the root; the 
rhizome is aborted by a unifying and structuralising tracing. If you do not feel 
part of what Morton Hall considers to be the LGB community then the work that 
the organisation is doing with regard to community building and support will be 
of little personal relevance, even though the political work will be of value.
It is clear that Lauren is refuting the model of identity politics as 
considered in Chapter 5. The conflict between ‘us and them’ and ‘active 
oppressors and active resistors’ (Young 1997) is circumvented. For those 
operating within an identity politics model, as I have argued, identity is tmth; it 
defines a person, usually in opposition to some other category. However, if 
identity is not seen as expressing any kind of truth about a person it becomes 
increasingly difficult to maintain the above distinctions. This is not to deny that in 
Lauren’s schema there will not be a distinction between us and them, and active 
oppressors and active resistors, but to state that the differentiation will not be on 
the basis of an identity as truth. The ‘us’ would be those who support the aims of 
Morton Hall, whilst ‘them’ would be those who were opposed to the
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organisation’s aims. Therefore the dichotomy between active oppressors and 
active resistors becomes meaningless because those who are in the privileged 
group may well support the oppressed. The outcome of this understanding of 
politics, were it adopted by Morton Hall, would be that it would become an 
organisation which would allow anyone, regardless of identity, who support the 
business plan, to become a member. This would also, as Lauren recognises, also 
problematise the idea of community building; if identity is not truth, and identity 
claims are only made in certain contexts and for a purpose, who exactly is ‘the 
community’? This demonstrates that identity does not have to be foundational for 
the organisation; contra Sartre (see Chapter 5) a pledged group does not have to 
refer back to a series based upon a particular relationship to practico-inert 
structures.
Conclusions
This chapter has used some of the work of Deleuze and Guattari as a heuristic 
device to think through some of the complexity of the trans inclusion/exclusion 
debate in Morton Hall. This chapter has demonstrated the importance of one’s 
view of transgender identity has on the inclusion/exclusion debate; those that tend 
employ more fluid understandings of gender identity were more likely to advocate 
trans inclusion than those who had a more fixed understandings of gender identity. 
Furthermore, the arborescent logic of exclusion attempts to order and stabilize 
gender and sexual identity, even in the face of a possible future becoming trans of 
Morton Hall.
179
9B o r d e r  C r o s s in g s  a n d  Q u e s t io n in g  C o m m u n it y
Whilst each of the preceding chapters could feasibly stand on their own, there are 
a multitude of themes and ideas that bisect and connect them. This concluding 
chapter will attempt to pull out and expand upon some of these points. At this 
point I reiterate the conclusion of the trans inclusion/exclusion debate because this 
chapter should be read with this in mind. Transgender people are welcome to join 
Morton Hall so long as they, in their gender of choice, identify as either, gay, 
lesbian or bisexual. Additionally the organisation will raise trans issues whenever 
it feels that there is an ‘obvious link’ with an LGB issue that is being raised in a 
particular instance, as well as attempt to facilitate a local transgender group gain 
more funding. In essence, after a year of debate, nothing has really changed. The 
only difference is that the latter two commitments are now on paper, rather than 
being the de facto  practice of the Morton Hall. I say that nothing has 
fundamentally changed because if there were any heterosexual trans people in the 
organisation prior to the debate, they have not, to my knowledge, been expelled 
from the organisation. However, what has changed is that transgender has been, 
symbolically at least, excluded from the organisation and the earlier ad hoc 
inclusion has been abandoned.
Chapters 3 and 4, on transgender and LGB identity and politics, have 
contextualised the research within a particular spatial and temporal setting. It was 
shown that defining transgender itself is highly problematic and that the resultant 
multiple definitions are important vis-a-vis inclusion or exclusion. Furthermore, 
transgender has not had a stable relationship with LGB: at varying times 
transgender people and practices have been intimately connected to same-sex 
orientation and politics (molly houses or early gay liberation, for example) whilst 
at others it has been rejected and repudiated (the Michigan Womyn’s Music 
Festival or the present case, for example). Chapter 5 charts the several ways in
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which Morton Hall constructs an ethnic and essentialist understanding of both 
gender and sexual identity. Heterosexual transgender people are marked as people 
without the knowledge of LGB identity and experience that is placed as central 
within Morton Hall’s organisation identity. This chapter also illustrates the 
manner in which transgender is generally understood as transsexual and delineates 
the consequences of this assumption with regard to the debate; for most, the non­
transsexual transgender person remains unconsidered, other than as an object with 
a potential polluting influence. The theme of the polluting heterosexual 
transgender is taken up in Chapter 6 where transgender is discussed in terms of 
liminality. Whilst the transsexual successfully transitions from one stable 
category to other, the non-transsexual transgender refuses to do so and remains in 
the limen and is thus a troubling influence on others.
The positioning of transgender as liminal is also taken up in Chapter 7 
where it is argued that the heterosexual transgender person is a transgressive force 
that illuminates the central constitution of Morton Hall. This chapter also 
illustrated some of the complex relationships between Morton Hall and 
transgender which are described in more detail, below. Whilst the chapters up to 
this point mostly considered arguments for exclusion (given their prominence in 
the debate), Chapter 8 focused on arguments in favour of inclusion. Those 
advocating for trans inclusion are seen as relying on rhizomatic understandings of 
gender and sexual identity, rather than the arborescent logic employed by those 
advocating exclusion which rely on stabilising and solidifying identity.
Organisational Exclusion
The exclusion of transgender from Morton Hall relies both on contradictory and 
tautological arguments. As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, the rhetoric 
of exclusion often relies on constructing a symbolic unity between all LGB 
people; all lesbian, gay and bisexual people have a shared understanding of being 
LGB, which is a shared understanding that is not open to trans people. However, 
if all LGB people did truly possess this then there would be an a priori 
understanding that (heterosexual) trans people were not welcome in the
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organisation, removing any need for a debate on the matter. However, the very 
existence of the trans inclusion/exclusion debate, with Executive Committee 
members on both sides, demonstrates that this shared understanding does not exist. 
Even within the small number of LGB people that made up the Morton Hall 
Executive Committee there was no shared knowledge of the nature of being 
lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgendered; this was, however, ignored by most 
Executive Committee members. As Chapter 8 argued, the arguments put forward 
for trans inclusion exposed the arborescent and categorising logic of the 
organisation and showed that those advocating exclusion were trying to impose a 
sense of order onto an inherently disordered group. This inherent disorder is also 
demonstrated by the mere existence of the debate in the first place. As I have 
claimed, Morton Hall relies upon an essentialist, minoritising and ethnic 
understanding of sexuality; sexual orientation refers to an identity rather than a 
practice.
Furthermore, some Executive Committee members’ opinions run along the 
lines that because the current remit of the organisation is LGB it is outside of the 
organisation’s remit to include trans people. For example, Jerry cites the fact that 
Morton Hall would not have enough money to take on transgender issues as well 
as LGB issues. This ignores the fact that if Morton Hall did decide to become 
trans inclusive they would be able to apply for extra funding on that basis. Here I 
repeat an extract from Robin:
I think Evelyn you were saying that we have identified that there is the 
possibility of funding for either [local trans organisation] or for a 
transgender group to pick that [issues around Gender Recognition] up and 
we would certainly want to work with that group to support it, but at this 
stage it does seem to be over and above our remit to include the T as 
though Morton Hall is representing transgender people across [area] I 
mean I think that is the general feeling
Robin claims here that there is a possibility of funding for a trans group; were 
Morton Hall to include transgender then they could have tried to get that funding.
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Robin then claims that it is ‘over and above’ the remit of Morton Hall in include 
transgender. The whole point of the debate was to decide whether the remit of 
Morton Hall should be widened to include transgender. Using the fact that at 
present the organisation is LGB to say that it should not be widened to include 
trans people is highly tautological. A similar argument was made by Terry 
regarding heterosexual trans people not wanting to join Morton Hall anyway This 
again uses the present remit of the organisation (that it is LGB) as a reason why 
heterosexual trans people would not want to be part of it were it to become LGBT. 
If the organisation had decided to include transgender, using a definition, such as 
that of the Gender Trust, then heterosexual transgender people may well have 
joined because Morton Hall was being inclusive of them.
For many Executive Committee members, trans exclusion is predicated 
upon gender and sexuality being disconnected; Morton Hall should only define 
itself as concerned with sexuality and LGB people. However, the transgression of 
gender is central to this definitional process -  it is a person’s gender identity that 
defines the sexual orientation of their relationships. The collapse of transgender 
into transsexual takes sexuality from the moment of gender transition, eclipsing 
and erasing any pre-transition identities. This is an interesting perspective 
because, unlike the trans inclusion/exclusion debate concerning the Michigan 
Womyns Music Festival, no one has claimed that transsexuals are not ‘real’ men 
or women (post-transition) or that their being in Morton Hall would be divisive, so 
long as there were lesbian, gay or bisexual. For Morton Hall a post-op MTF is 
female, so if in a relationship with another female, a lesbian. Similarly if this 
person was in a relationship with a male, they are seen as heterosexual. The 
problem is not about allowing trans people into the organisation, but about 
allowing heterosexual people in. However, as previous chapters have shown, this 
relies on a somewhat simplistic understanding of transsexual transition. It is not 
unusual for transsexuals to think they were, or experiment with being, gay or 
lesbian at some point in their lives. Furthermore as Rees (1996) shows, even if 
one may not exactly identify as lesbian or gay prior to transition, one may be seen 
as such by others and experience harassment and discrimination because of it.
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These are the future heterosexual trans people who will (apparently) have no 
knowledge of LGB experience.
The existence of Morton Hall is seemingly founded upon a belief that there 
are shared experiences, and, indeed, identities, with a concomitant political 
perspective, that unite all LGB people. This however, raises the question of what 
is actually shared. Do you have to have been discriminated against because of 
your sexuality? Nothing in Morton Hall says this is the case. Do you have to be 
solely attracted to people of the same sex? Bisexuals are part of Morton Hall, so 
that cannot be the case; there is nothing inherent in opposite-sex attraction that 
forbids one joining the organisation. Do you have to have some degree of same- 
sex attraction? A previous member of the Executive Committee, and Chair for a 
time was also a member of FFLAG (Friends and Families of Lesbians and Gays) 
and was heterosexual (this was however an individual who had already proved 
their dedication to the cause o f LGB equality). This means that the only things 
shared by the Executive Committee members are that they broadly support the 
aims of the organisation and they have some idea of what being LGB is like, either 
from oneself or others. Furthermore, whilst all members have an idea of what 
being LGB is like, this is not to say that all members the have same ideas. Given 
this, the exclusion of trans people from Morton Hall appears to be about 
distancing those heterosexuals who transgress gender, - that is, non-transsexual 
heterosexual trans people - from the organisation by claiming that they are, and 
always will be, simplistically heterosexual, and thus have no idea about LGB 
experience.
The relationship of the individual to the group is of paramount importance. 
Much work on (political) group identity formation carries with it the assumption 
that there is some a priori connection between the individual and group. What 
connects and brings together all women for feminist action? What connects and 
brings together all lesbian, gay and bisexual people for LGB action? These 
questions all assume that there are such connections that be discovered. In 
Sartre’s theory of class formation (see chapter 5) the group refers back to a series 
which is constituted by people sharing the same relationship to the practico-inert
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reality. It is this type of thinking that predominates in Morton Hall: the practico- 
inert reality which orders the series is one’s position vis-a-vis the hetero/homo 
binary. Thus the collective that the group draws upon is solely constituted by 
LGB individuals. However, continuing Sartre’s metaphor of the bus stop (chapter 
5) there may be those who do not use public transport, but nevertheless want there 
to be a decent service. How many nineteenth century socialists came not from 
poor, working class backgrounds, but from positions of varying degrees of 
privilege?
When I started this research, one of my main interests concerned how an 
identity politics organisation defined sexual and gender identity, especially in the 
face of the level of critique that such a political model has been subjected to in the 
past twenty years. It seems, however, that whilst critiques of essentialist 
understandings of identity are widespread in the academic world, they are not so 
prevalent in some parts of the LGB community. This is not necessarily a problem, 
but it does suggest that further research could consider why some people (not just 
those who are activists) find it important to identify as lesbian or gay in a largely 
essentialist manner.
As chapters 6 and 7 argue, issues of liminality and transgression were 
central to the construction of Morton Hall’s organisational identity. It has been 
shown that Morton Hall (as an organisation -  not all its members) supports static 
understandings of gender and sexuality; one is either male or female, either gay or 
straight (Roen 2002), whilst discourses of both/neither are repudiated and refuted. 
Those activities, practices and identities that occupy a liminal or transgressive 
position in relation to gender and sexuality are marked as off limits for Morton 
Hall. It is in what is proscribed that one can most clearly see what is permitted; 
the revelation of the limit, of the taboo, reveals the constitution of the centre.
Identity as Fiction
Some of the problems in this debate arise from the dual purpose of Morton Hall; 
that is, political lobbying and community building. If the organisation was purely 
a campaigning one it would be easier to open membership up to all those who
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supported its aims. It is more problematic when community building is also part 
of Morton Hall’s work as some people may think that heterosexuals should not be 
part of an LGB community because of, for example, safety reasons. Would, for 
instance, a gay man who has been attacked because of his sexuality be 
comfortable talking about it with a straight man? It should be noted, however, that 
this is not an insurmountable problem, as other LGB groups are also inclusive of 
heterosexual allies; witness the growth of Gay and Straight Alliances in American 
colleges and universities. Changes of this sort would have to entail another debate 
(possibly even more divisive that the trans inclusion/exclusion debate) concerning 
the ethics of creating a gay ‘community’.
From this thesis it is clear that those involved with Morton Hall are a very 
diverse group of people who are able to work together even with differences of 
opinion. However, the arguments for trans exclusion are an attempt to create a 
sense of unity across the organisation, although I would argue that any resultant 
unity is false. The debate can be seen as an attempt to enforce similarity at the 
expense of the multiple differences between Executive Committee members. This 
is the enforcement of ‘to be’ at the expense of ‘and...’. This fixing and stabilizing 
of identity also has implications for the community building aspect of Morton Hall 
-  whose community is being constructed? These questions address some central 
concerns over the aims of a gay organisation and the endpoint of LGB equality. 
Morton Hall covers a reasonably large area of the UK, both urban and rural. As 
one would expect, the urban areas have more of an LGB ‘scene’, whereas the rural 
areas are lacking. It is in these rural areas particularly that the organisation is 
working towards community building. What requires discussion here is the nature 
of that community -  it is one thing to create a forum where people of all sexual 
orientations can come together to work towards a common goal, it is another to 
attempt to create some sort of gay community as it exists in urban areas. The 
latter is almost always exclusionary in some regards, and only benefits some LGB 
people as opposed to all (albeit that this is usually unintentional).. This leads to 
the question of the endpoint of equality -  by what criteria do you adjudge that 
equality on the grounds of sexual orientation has been achieved? This is important
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because one must have consideration of the ends before one can devise the means. 
Similarly, well intentioned means can have a disadvantageous effect if the 
potential ends are not thought through. One needs to question whether the 
creation of LGB(T) communities is beneficial to the cause of equality. It should 
be noted that I am not saying that LGB people should not come together for 
political ends; rather I am separating the social and the political. Clearly, without 
the several LGB groups bring pressure to bear on successive governments equality 
legislation would not be such as it is. Also, I recognise that for many people, 
especially those in more rural areas, joining or forming an LGB community can 
have a strong lure. I, however, remain unconvinced by the merits of this. To 
quote Rubin again (see chapter 4), we live in a world where
A modem gay man ... may migrate from rural Colorado to San Francisco 
in order to live in a gay neighbourhood, work in a gay business, and 
participate in an elaborate experience that includes a self-conscious 
identity, group solidarity, a literature, a press and a high level of political 
activity (Rubin 1984:286).
To Anglicise this, one could transpose Colorado to Cornwall and San Francisco to 
London or Manchester. Whilst that level of segregation can only occur in major 
metropolitan centres, aspects of this can be seen in many other places. Is creating 
gay friendly places and venues, and remaining within them, equality? Most gay 
pubs and clubs are exclusive; certain clothes, fashions and music tastes proliferate 
at the expense of others. This is not necessarily an inherent problem -  it is 
obvious that all clubs play a particular kind of music and attract certain types of 
people. The problem lies with the fact that gay venues tend to only cater for one 
section of LGB people, not all. There are, for example, very few gay pubs or 
clubs that cater to gay people who like music generally denoted by the label 
‘alternative’. Furthermore, equality is not having some gay spaces and venues for 
homosexuals, whilst leaving heterosexuals with the majority; is not equality 
having spaces, workplaces, venues &c. that do not differentiate between hetero 
and homo?
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This minoritising exclusion does not just apply to the type of situations 
described above; it can also be applied to LGB organisations. Morton Hall has 
constructed, and temporarily fixed, its organisational identity in a particular way, 
based upon specific understandings of gender and sexual identity. This has, 
therefore officially excluded the non-LGB trans person, however, I suggest that it 
has ‘unofficially’ excluded those LGB people who do not subscribe to the 
definitions of sexual identity provided by the organisation. Given that Morton 
Hall has fixed its identity, for the moment at least, it is feasible that other 
members, or potential members could feel alienated from an organisation that is 
not inclusive of transgender. It is also true that if the final decision was to include 
transgender then there would be another sector of LGB people who would feel 
alienated from the organisation.. Indeed, if the executive members of Morton Hall 
Are taken as representative of the general membership, then the latter group would 
probably be more numerous than the former.
One of the main arguments for trans exclusion was that (heterosexual) 
trans people would have no knowledge or experience of being lesbian, gay or 
bisexual. As Terry said ‘the heterosexual transgender wouldn’t come within 50 
miles of us’, which I think can be widened to also include non-trans heterosexuals 
as well. This is Sedgwick’s minoritising logic -  LGB sexuality and the issues 
arising are only of importance to those who are lesbian, gay or bisexual. As 
previous chapters have demonstrated, this logic says that it is only homosexuals 
who are affected by LGB issues and discrimination; a perspective I have argued to 
be false. However, this theory places heterosexuals as the enemy, rather than as 
potential allies. This is not to say that heterosexuals who are actively anti-gay do 
not exist, clearly they do, but rather to say that placing all heterosexuals in that 
category is, at best, foolish.
It may seem that I am simply advocating assimilation or normalisation: /  
am not. Assimilation means becoming like, and being incorporated into, the 
heterosexual majority, which would necessarily involve the silencing of same-sex 
desire. However, the end that I think we should be striving for is a society where 
the gender of the person someone is attracted to is inconsequential, and where
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being lesbian, gay or bisexual or heterosexual says nothing more about a person 
than their gender of object choice. Nor would this merely involve the 
heterosexual majority merely tolerating homosexuals; it would be acceptance. 
When meeting new people, most people have a default assumption that they are 
straight. Until this type of assumption is overturned we will not have true 
equality. Similarly should one not be freely able to talk about one’s same-sex 
partner in the same way that heterosexuals do about their opposite-sex partner?
This is not normalisation, rather it is a re-evaluation of what is considered 
normal. In The Trouble with Normal Warner (1999) lambastes those who seek 
assimilation; gay marriage and gays joining the military are examples he uses. His 
general point is that it is not equality when LGB people are seeking acceptance for 
their sexuality by trying to imitate heterosexual relationships, or live by 
heterosexual norms. The type of equality I envisage is one in which what is 
considered normal is refigured; heterosexuality is no longer the default option. 
Queer, as stated in Chapter 4 sets itself in opposition to what ‘normal’ and seeks 
validation for this outsider status. This is a very productive theoretical position 
(and its insight used in this thesis) and can provide comfort to those who occupy 
an outsider status. However, fundamental change can only occur when the 
majority change, as the example of gay marriage illustrates (below).
This way of thinking also has wider implications, for example, with 
equality law. To illustrate; a marriage can only be contracted between a man and 
a woman, whilst a civil partnership is only valid between two people of the same 
sex. This was demonstrated in the case of Wilkinson v Kitzinger (2007) in which 
the petitioner and first respondent entered into a same-sex marriage in British 
Columbia, and wished it to be recognised as such in the UK. In his justification 
for refusing the application, Sir Mark Potter stated that
Parliament has not called partnerships between persons of the same-sex 
marriage, not because they are considered inferior to the institution of 
marriage but because, as a matter of objective fact and common 
understanding, as well as the present definition of marriage in English 
law, and by recognition in European jurisprudence, they are indeed
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different. ... To the extent that by reason of that distinction it 
discriminated against same-sex partners, such discrimination has a 
legitimate aim, is reasonable and proportionate, and falls within the 
margin of appreciation accorded to Convention states (Wilkinson v 
Kitzinger 2007: 217).
This is the equal but different philosophy; gays and lesbians can, in all but name, 
marry, but heaven forbid if  it is actually called marriage. In essence, this is the 
same as remaining within the safe gay spaces. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
rights attendant upon entering a civil partnership are near identical to marriage, 
this sends a signal that same-sex relationships are somehow fundamentally 
different to opposite sex relationships. Indeed, this was recognised by the 
petitioner, and was one of the main reasons for bringing the case. Referring to the 
fact that the marriage would be ‘downgraded’ to a civil partnership, her first 
witness statement states,
I do not wish my relationship with Celia to be recognised in this way 
because we are legally married and it is simply not acceptable to be asked 
to pretend that this marriage is a civil partnership. While marriage 
remains open to heterosexual couples only, offering the “consolation 
prize” of a civil partnership to lesbians and gay men is offensive and 
demeaning.... They are not equal symbolically, when it is marriage that is 
the key social institution, celebrated and recognised around the world; and 
they are not equal practically, when it is apparent that civil partnership is 
a lesser alternative, which will not be recognised around the world, or 
even across Europe (Wilkinson v Kitzinger 2007: 187).
It is clear therefore, that, regardless of whether one favours or otherwise the dual 
system of marriage and civil partnership that in having a system for gays and 
lesbians, and one for straights a problematic distinction is drawn. For many this is 
not equal but different, merely unequal.
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Here the norm is marriage, which can only be contacted between a man 
and a woman; when measured against this, gay relationship fall short by ‘matter of 
objective fact and common understanding’. It is this privileging of one specific 
type of relationship over another that is problematic. In this case a re-evaluation 
of what is considered normal would involve the re-evaluation of the privilege of 
marriage as the ideal relationship between someone who has ‘male’ on their birth 
certificate and someone who has ‘female’ on their birth certificate. It would argue 
not for merely allowing LGB people to marry in the conventional sense, but would 
go much further. It would question why we, as a society, give precedence, and a 
raft of legal rights, to a particular type of relationship between two people over all 
other types of possible relationships between two or more people.
The Gender Recognition Act is something that fixes and stabilises gender 
identity, as previous chapters have stated. Again, I am not saying that the GRA is 
a bad thing. As the high take-up of gender recognition certificates shows, there 
are many transsexuals who want this legal change of gender. My point is that the 
gender recognition procedure is only available to a particular class of transgender 
person. Changing one’s birth certificate is, I think, normalisation. It is done 
because of the many times that one may need to provide documentation which 
includes one’s sex. In privileging one aspect of trans experience, other options 
that could be more supportive of those trans people who do not wish to transition 
are foreclosed. Moreover, as discussed in chapter 5, a married (that is, a legally 
opposite sex) couple in which one partner applies for a Gender Recognition 
Certificate, will have to divorce before the full certificate can be granted. This 
again comes down to the same problems in the Wilkinson case; that marriage is 
for opposite sex couples only. Here re-evaluation of the normal would question 
the need for anyone to have to ‘prove’ their sex.
Future Progressions
At the commencement of this research my interest lay specifically with the 
construction of lesbian, gay and bisexual collective identity. As chapter 2 outlines 
I wished to consider how an identity politics organisation operated given the
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academic critiques of such ways of working. However, particularly due to the 
fortuitous timing of the trans inclusion/exclusion debate, the research became 
something much broader. Morton Hall has become a case study for the more 
general topics of (organisational) identity, belonging and transgression.
As stated, one of the key aims of this thesis was to interrogate queer ideas 
of identity using the analysis of an identity politics organisation. Referring back 
to the definitions of queer theory presented in Chapter 4 it is clear that they cannot 
be applied to Morton Hall as an organisation, although they may be applicable to 
some members. Notwithstanding the queer injunction to deconstruct identity then, 
the lure of identity, and of belonging, remains strong. Much of this thesis has 
shown that, in Sedgwick’s (1990) terms, the minoritising logic of identity is 
prevalent in Morton Hall; sexuality is only of importance to those who are lesbian, 
gay or bisexual. I have used queer theory as an analytic lens with which to 
deconstruct identity, as it was employed in Morton Hall, in order to consider the 
ways in which a collective, organisational, identity manifests itself. Thus, I have 
shown that Morton Hall’s identity is constructed by the marking of certain groups 
(particularly heterosexual trans people) as the other. This othering is predicated 
upon a rejection of a universalising view of gender and sexual identity. It must be 
remembered here that I am talking about the organisational identity of Morton 
Hall; various individual Executive Committee members hold views that are more 
or less amenable to queer theory. This demonstrates some of the paradoxes that 
inhere in the organisation. Below the surface, the constitution of Morton Hall is 
more contingent and subject to difference that its initial labeling as an identity 
politics organisation might suggest. As elucidated at the beginning of this chapter, 
Morton Hall has, for the time being, fixed its identity, but, to my knowledge, there 
has not been a purge of those members who do not ‘fit’. Therefore, the exclusion 
of transgender appears more as a symbolic exclusion than an actual one. Only 
time will tell if this assumption is correct; indeed, this would be an interesting area 
of further study.
This thesis has become an analysis of the construction of organisational 
identity more generally. The theoretical understandings of identity construction
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are applicable outside of the narrow research site. I have outlined myriad ways in 
which the identity of Morton Hall has been constituted through, for example, 
pollution behaviour, transgression and arborescent logic. These are themes that 
can be productively applied to any organisational setting. Any defined group of 
people is always exclusionary in some, not necessarily obvious, way; this thesis 
provides the theoretical tools required to explicate these complex processes of 
exclusion and inclusion -  of defining the centre.
One of the main strengths of this work is the utilisation of a diverse range 
of theories. The use of theorists such as Durkheim, Douglas, Nietzsche, Bataille, 
Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari, in combination with both my own research 
and previous work on similar topics (Young, Roen, and Gamson) has enabled a 
sustained critique of how ‘the other’ is constructed. This theoretical synthesis, in 
conjunction with the historical sketching of the relationship between lesbians, gays 
and bisexuals and transgender, has given me a unique facility to analyse and 
explicate the often complex and contradictory nature of practices of inclusion and 
exclusion. Further, the theoretical understandings of, for example, how 
transgressive acts work to define the constitution of the centre, or how a 
rhizomatic identity differs from an arborescent one, can be applied in a multitude 
of situations not related to gender or sexuality.
Whilst the work contained in this thesis is important and valuable on its 
own, there are several ways in which this research could be developed. One thing 
lacking in this thesis is the input from (with a couple of exceptions) transgender 
people themselves. This was obviously due to Morton Hall being a LGB 
organisation in the first instance, meaning that there were few trans people on the 
Executive Committee. However, it would be interesting to see if transgender 
people, be they pre/post/non-opp transsexuals, heterosexual cross-dressers or other 
transgressors of gender, actually want LGB organisations to open their doors to 
them. Based on this thesis I have several ideas as to who would and would not 
want to be part of an LGB organisation. For example, I suggest that a post- 
operatively heterosexual transsexual who is heavily invested in the either/or 
dichotomy would not want to join an LGB group, whilst I suggest that a
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genderqueer individual would be more inclined to do so; this however requires 
further investigation. Furthermore, the type of politics employed by the 
organisation would also affect who would want to join it. So far the analysis has 
primarily focused on those within the borders, changing the focus to those without 
would be beneficial and would increase my understanding of the nature of 
(organisational) identity, community and belonging.
Furthermore, on a more broad level it would be worthwhile to consider the 
questions raised in this thesis in an area other than gender and sexuality. The 
theoretical understandings of identity and transgression could profitably be applied 
to other settings. Any situation where a group of people are attempting to define 
their identities could be analysed in this fashion. There are also other theorists and 
philosophers’ ideas that could be brought to bear on the contents of this thesis, and 
further research, which would increase my understanding of the subject. I am 
thinking here particularly of some of the existentialist philosophers such as 
Heidegger and Sartre whose ideas could be employed to critique notions of 
(in)authentic communities and identities. This could explore some of the tensions 
inhering in the verb ‘to be’ -  for Deleuze and Guattari this refers to fixing and 
stabilising, whilst for Heidegger this refers to the existent’s desire to be an 
authentic self.
In summation then, this thesis has provided a theoretical analysis of the 
myriad ways in which organisational identity is constructed and transiently fixed. 
Moreover, this works affords me an excellent starting point for future work on the 
topics of community, belonging and identity.
194
References
Altman, D. (1974). Homosexual Oppression and Liberation. London, Allen Lane.
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London, Verso.
APA (2000). Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Washington, 
American Psychiatric Association.
Atkinson, M. (1988). Our Master's Voices: The Language and Body Language of 
Politics. London, Routledge.
Atkinson, P. and A. Coffey (2001). Revisiting the Relationship Between 
Participant Observation and Interviewing. Handbook of Interview 
Research. J. F. Gubrium and J. A. Holstein. Thousand Oaks, Sage: 801- 
814.
Bataille, G. (1987). The Story of the Eve. San Francisco, City Lights.
Bataille, G. (2001). Blue of Noon. London, Penguin.
Bataille, G. (2001). Eroticism. London, Penguin.
Bauman, Z. (1993) Postmodern Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell.
Becker, H. S. and B. Geer (1970a). Participant Observation and Interviewing: A 
Comparison. Qualitative Methodology. W. J. Filstead. Chicago, Markam: 
133-142.
Becker, H. S. and B. Geer (1970b). Participant Observation and Interviews: A 
Rejoinder. Qualitative Methodology. W. J. Filstead. Chicago, Markam: 
150-152.
Benson, D. and J. A. Hughes (1983). London, Longman.
Billings, D. B. and T. Urban (1996). The Socio-Medical Construction of 
transsexualism: An Interpretation and Critique. Blending Genders: Social 
Aspects of Cross Dressing and Sex Changing. R. Ekins and D. King. 
London, Routledge: 99-117.
Bomstein, K. (1995). Gender Outlaw : On Men. Women, and the Rest of Us. New 
York, Vintage.
195
Bray, A. (1988). Homosexuality in Renaissance England. London, Gay Men's 
Press.
Broad, K. L. (2002). "GLB + T?: Gender/Sexuality Movements and Transgender 
Collective Identity (De)Constructions." International Journal of Sexuality 
and Gender Studies 7(4): 241-264.
Butler, J. (1993). Bodies That Matter: on the Discursive Limits of "Sex”. New 
York and London, Routledge.
Butler, J. (1999). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New 
York, Routledge.
Butler, J. (2004). Undoing Gender. London, Routledge.
Coffey, A. (1999). The Ethnographic Self: Fieldwork and the Representation of 
Identity. London, Sage.
Coffey, A. and P. Atkinson (1996). Making Sense of Qualitative Data. Thousand 
Oaks, Sage.
Cohen A. P. (ed) 1982. Introduction. In: Belonging: identity and social 
organisation in British Rural Cultures. Manchester: Manchester
University Press.
Cohen A. P. (ed.) 1985. Introduction In: The Symbolic Construction of 
Community. Chichester: Ellis Norwood.
Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (2004). A Thousand Plateaus. London, Continuum.
Deleuze, G. and F. Guattari (2004). A Thousand Plateaus. London, Continuum.
D'Emilio, J. (1983). Sexual Politics. Sexual Communities: The Making of a 
Homosexual Minority in the United States. 1940-1970. Chicago, Chicago 
University Press.
Denzin, N. K. (2001). "The Reflexive Interview and a Performative Social 
Science." Qualitative Research 1(1): 23-46.
Denzin, N. K. and Y. S. Lincoln (2000). Introduction: The Discipline and Practice 
of Qualitative Research. Handbook of Qualitative Research. N. K. Denzin 
and Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, Sage: 1-28. 2nd Edn
Descartes, R. (1997). Key Philosophical Writings. Ware, Wordsworth.
196
Dilley, P. (1999). "Queer Theory: Under Construction." International Journal of 
Qualitative Studies in Education 12(5): 457-472.
Douglas, M. (1991b). Purity and Danger: An analysis of the concepts of pollution 
and taboo. London, Routledge.
Durkheim, E. (1947). The Division of Labour in Society. Glencoe, Illinois, The 
Free Press.
Durkheim, E. (1966). The Rules of Sociological Method. New York, The Free 
Press.
Ekins, R. (2005). "Science, Politics and Clinical Intervention: Harry Benjamin, 
Transsexualism and the Problem of Heteronormativity." Sexualities 8(3): 
306-328.
Ekins, R. and D. King, Eds. (1996). Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross 
Dressing and Sex Changing. London, Routledge.
Ellis, H. (1942). Studies in the Psychology of Sex. Volume 1. New York, Random 
House.
Feder, E. K. (1997). "Disciplining the Family: The Case of Gender Identity 
Disorder." Philosophical Studies 85(2-3): 195-211.
Foucault, M. (1977). Language. Counter-Memory. Practice. Oxford, Basil 
Blackwell.
Foucault, M. (1998). The Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: 1. 
London, Penguin.
Freud, S. (1949). Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. London, Imago.
Fuss, D. (1989). Essentially Sneaking: Feminism. Nature and Difference. London, 
Routledge.
Gamson, J. (1996). 'Must Identity Movements Self-Destruct?: A Queer Dilemma. 
Queer Theorv/Sociology. S. Seidman. Oxford, Blackwell: 395-420.
Gamson, J. (1997). "Messages of Exclusion: Gender, Movements, and Symbolic 
Boundaries." Gender and Society 11(2): 178-199.
Gans, H. J. (1999). "Participant Observation in the Era of "Ethnography"." Journal 
of Contemporary Ethnography 28(5): 540-548.
197
Garber, M. (1992). Vested interests : cross-dressing & cultural anxiety. Routledge, 
London.
Gender Recognition Panel (2005). Guidance for married people of those in civil 
partnerships. London, Gender Recognition Panel.
Gender Recognition Panel (2006a). Guidance on completing the Application form 
for a Gender Recognition Certificate: Fast Track Applications. London, 
Gender Recognition Panel.
Gender Recognition Panel (2006b). Guidance on completing the Application form 
for a Gender Recognition Certificate: Standard Track Applications. 
London, Gender Recognition Panel.
Gold, R. L. (1969). Roles in Sociological Field Observations. Issues in Participant 
Observation: A Text and Reader. G. J. McCall and J. L. Simmons. 
Reading, MA, Addison-Wesley: 30-38.
Halberstam, J. (1998). Female Masculinity. Durham, NC, Duke University Press.
Hall, D. E. (2003). Queer Theories. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Hall, R. (1928). The Well of Loneliness. London, Jonathan Cape.
Halperin, D. (1995). Saint Foucault: Towards a Gav Hagiography. New York, 
Oxford University Press.
Hegel, G. W. F. (1991). The Philosophy of History. New York, Prometheus.
Hemmings, C. (2002). Bisexual Spaces: A Geography of Sexuality and Gender. 
London, Routledge.
Howath, J. (2000). Epistemic Issues in Phenomenology. Concise Routledge 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. London, Routledge: 670-671.
Jagose, A. (1995). Queer Theory. Carlton South, Melbourne University Press.
Jeffreys, S. (1994). "The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality in the 
Academy." Women’s Studies International Forum 17(5): 459-472.
Jeffreys, S. (2003). Unpacking Queer Politics. Cambridge, Polity.
Jenkins, R. (2004). Social Identity. London, Routledge.
Jenks, C. (2003). Transgression. London, Routledge.
198
King, D. (1996). Gender Blending: Medical Perspectives and Technology. 
Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross Dressing and Sex Changing. 
R. Ekins and D. King. London, Routledge: 79-98.
King, J. (1999). "Am not! Are Too! Using Queer Standpoint in Postmodern 
Critical Ethnography." International Journal of Qualitative Studies in 
Education 12(5): 473-490.
Kirsch, M. H. (2000). Queer theory and Social Change. London, Routledge.
Kvale, S. (1996). Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research 
Interviewing. Thousand Oaks, Sage.
Lasch-Quinn, E. (2001). Race Experts: How Racial Etiquette. Sensitivity Training, 
and New Age Therapy Hijacked the Civil Rights Revolution. New York, 
W.W. Norton & Company.
Latimer, J. (2004). "Commanding Materials; (Re)Legitimating Authority in the 
Context of Multi-Disciplinary Work." Sociology 38(4): 757-775.
Lyotard, J.-F. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.
Manchester, Manchester University Press.
Marcuse, H. (1969). Eros and Civilization : a Philosophical Inquiry into Freud.
London, Allen Lane.
May, T. (2001). Social Research: Issues. Methods and Process. Buckingham, 
Open University Press.
McGee, M. C. (1989). "Rhetoric, Organizational Communication, and Sartre's 
Theory of Practical Groups."
http://mcgees.net/ffagments/essavs/archives/sartres.htm as at 12.30pm 
Thursday 28 November 2002.
Mishler, E. G. (1986). Research Interviewing: Context and Narrative. Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press.
Money, J. (1986). Venuses Penuses: Sexology. Sexosophv. and Exigency Theory.
Buffalo, Prometheus Books.
Namaste, K. (1996). The Politics of Inside/Out: Queer Theory, Poststructuralism, 
and a Sociological Approach to Sexuality. Queer Theory/Sociology. S. 
Seidman. Oxford, Blackwell: 194-212.
199
Nietzsche, F. (1969). Thus Spoke Zarathustra. London, Penguin.
Nietzsche, F. (1974). The Gay Science. New York, Vintage Books.
Nietzsche, F. (2003a). Beyond Good and Evil. London, Penguin.
Nietzsche, F. (2003b). The Genealogy of Morals. New York, Dover Publications.
Nietzsche, F. (2003b). The Genealogy of Morals. New York, Dover Publications.
Norton, R. (1992). Mother Clap’s Molly House : The Gay Subculture in England. 
1700-1830. London, Gay Men’s Press.
Parken, A. (2003). Gender Mainstreaming : ’Outing’ Heterosexism in the 
Workplace. SOCSI. Cardiff, Cardiff University.
Patton, P. (2000). Deleuze and the Political. London, Routledge.
Rapley, T. J. (2001). "The Art(fulness) of Open-Ended Interviewing: Some 
Considerations on Analysing Interviews." Qualitative Research 1(3): 303- 
323.
Raymond, J. (1980). The Transsexual Empire. London, Women's Press.
Raymond, J. (1996). The Politics of Transgenderism. Blending Genders: Social 
Aspects of Cross Dressing and Sex Changing. R. Ekins and D. King. 
London, Routledge: 215-223.
Rees, M. (1996). Becoming a Man: The Personal Account of a Female-to-Male 
transsexual. Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross Dressing and Sex 
Changing. R. Ekins and D. King. London, Routledge: 27-38.
Renold, E. (2000). '"Coming out': gender, (hetero)sexuality and the primary 
school." Gender and Education 12(3): 309-326.
Renold, E. (2005). Girls. Bovs, and Junior Sexualities : Exploring Children’s 
Gender and Sexual Relations in the Primary School. London, Routledge.
Riddell, C. (1996). Divided Sisterhood: A critical review of Janice Raymond's The 
Transsexual Empire. Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross 
Dressing and Sex Changing. R. Ekins and D. King. London, Routledge: 
167-171.
Rivera, S. (2002). Queens in Exile, The Forgotten Ones. GenderOueer: Voices 
from beyond the Sexual Binary. J. Nestle, C. Howell and R. Wilchins. 
Los Angeles, Alyson Publications.
200
Roen, K. (2002). ,MfEither/0r" and "Both/Neither": Discursive Tensions in 
Transgender Politics." Signs 27(2): 501-522.
Rubin, G. (1984). Thinking Sex. Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female 
Sexuality. C. S. Vance. London, Pandora Press.
Sartre, J.-P. (1976). Critique of Dialectical Reason Vol. 1. London, New Left 
Books.
Scheurich, J. J. (1997). Research Method in the Postmodern. London, Falmer 
Press.
Schwable, M. (1996). "The Mirrors in Men's Faces." Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography 25(11: 58-82.
Seale, C. (1999). The Quality of Qualitative Research. London, Sage.
Sedgwick, E. K. (1985). Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial 
Desire. New York, Columbia University Press.
Sedgwick, E. K. (1990). Epistemology of the Closet. Berkley, CA, University of 
California Press.
Sedgwick, E. K. (1993). How to Bring your Kids Up Gay. Fear of A Queer Planet: 
Queer Politics and Social Theory. M. Warner. Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press: 69-81.
Seidman, S. (1993). Identity and Politics in a "Postmodern" Gay Culture: Some 
Historical and conceptual Notes. Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics 
and Social Theory. M. Warner. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota 
Press: 105-142.
Seidman, S. (1995). Deconstructing Queer Theory or the Under Theorisation of 
the Social and Ethical. Social Postmodernism: Beyond Identity Politics. 
L. Nicholson and S. Seidman. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 
116-141.
Seidman, S. (1997). Difference Troubles: Queering Social Theory and Sexual 
Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Seidman, S., Ed. (1996). Queer Theory/Sociology. Oxford, Blackwell.
Sharrock, W. and B. Anderson (1986). The Ethnomethodologists. Chichester, Elis 
Horwood.
201
Silverman, D. (1993). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analysing Talk. 
Text and Interaction. Thousand Oaks, Sage
Silverman, D. (2000). Analyzing Talk and Text. Handbook of Qualitative 
Research. N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, Sage: 891- 
834.
Singer, P. (2001). Hegel. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Smith v Safeway Pic. (1995) Industrial Relations Law Report: 132.
Smith v Safeway Pic. (1996) Industrial Relations Law Report: 456.
Spargo, T. (2000). Foucault and Queer Theory. Cambridge, Icon.
Spelman, E. (1990). Inessential Woman : Problems of Exclusion in Feminist 
Thought. London, Women’s Press.
Spradley, J. P. (1979). The Ethnographic Interview. London, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston.
Stone, S. (1991). The Empire Strikes Back. Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of 
Gender Ambiguity. K. Straub and J. Epstein. New York, Routledge.
Stonewall (2005). Education for All.
Suleiman, S. (1990). Subversive Intent: Gender. Politics and the Avante Garde. 
Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
Swidey, N. (2005). What Makes People Gay. Boston Globe. 
www.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/articles/2005/08/14/what_makes 
_people_gay
Talburt, S. (1999). "Open Secrets and Problems of Queer Ethnography: Readings 
from a Religious Studies Classroom." International Journal of Qualitative 
Studies in Education 12(5): 525-539.
Tanesini, A. (1999). An Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies. Oxford, 
Blackwell.
Tiemey, W. G. (1999). "Introduction: Praxis at the Millennium - epistemological 
authority, voice, and qualitative research." International Journal of 
Qualitative Studies in Education 12(5): 451-456.
van Gennep, A. (1960). The Rites of Passage. Chicago, Chicago University Press.
202
Warner, M., Ed. (1993). Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory.
Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
Warner, M. (1999). The Trouble with Normal: Sex. Politics and the Ethics of 
Queer Life. New York, The Free Press 
Webb, S. (2000). Feminist Methodologies for Social Researching. Research 
Training for Social Scientists. D. Burton. London, Sage: 33-48.
Webb, T. (1996). Autobiographical Fragments from a Transsexual Activist. 
Blending Genders: Social Aspects of Cross Dressing and Sex Changing. 
R. Ekins and D. King. London, Routledge: 190-195.
Weeks, J. (1977). Coming Out : Homosexual Politics in Britain from the 
Nineteenth Century to the Present. London, Quartet Books.
West, D. J. (1955). Homosexuality. London, Duckworth.
Whisman, V. (1996). Queer by Choice : Lesbians. Gay Men and the Politics of 
Identity. London, Routledge.
Whittle, S. (1996). Gender Fucking or Fucking Gender? Current Cultural 
Contributions to Theories of Gender Blending. Blending Genders: Social 
Aspects of Cross Dressing and Sex Changing. R. Ekins and D. King. 
London, Routledge: 196-214.
Wilchins, R. (1997). Read mv Lips: Sexual Subversion and the end of Gender.
Milford, Firebrand Press.
Wilchins, R. (2004). Queer Theory. Gender Theory: Am Instant Primer. Los 
Angeles, Alyson Publications.
Wilkinson v Kitzinger (2007) Family Court Reports 183.
Wilson, M. (2002). "'I am the Prince of pain, for I am a Princess in the brain': 
Liminal transgender identities, narratives and the elimination of 
ambiguities." Sexualities 5(4): 425-448.
Young, I. M. (1994). "Gender as Seriality: Thinking about Women as a Social 
Collective." Signs 19(3): 713-738.
Young, S. (1997). Dichotomies and Displacement: Bisexuality in Queer Theory 
and Politics. Playing with Fire: Queer Politics. Queer Theories. S. Phelan. 
London and New York, Routledge: 51-74.
203
